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Executive summary 
Why was this evaluation done? To arrive 
at a judgment of performance and learn 
lessons for future EU cooperation. 
This report accordingly presents the 
findings of the 2010 Country Level 
Evaluation of the European Union’s 
support for Zambia. The purpose of the 
evaluation is to provide meaningful 
feedback to the Commission, the Member 
States and the public on the achievements 
of EU cooperation with Zambia between 
2001 and 2010. The lessons from the 
evaluation are intended to inform the 
current and future EU support for Zambia.  
Methodology: How was the evaluation 
done? 
The evaluation covered the EU’s coopera-
tion with Zambia during a period of eco-
nomic transition from a longstanding 
socialist regime, supported by an unprece-
dented rise in copper export earnings and 
macroeconomic support from the donor 
community.  
The reference period covers the last 
projects implemented under the eighth 
European Development Fund (EDF8), the 
core of EDF9 (2002-2007) implementation 
and the first stages of implementation of 
EDF10 (2008-2013). The evaluation is the 
very first step in the process of defining 
the EDF11 strategic response. 
The projects and their combined 
contribution to the development of Zambia 
were analysed on the basis of project 
evaluations, internal progress reports, 
monitoring data, and documentation from 
other development partners including 
international NGOs and research 
organisations. During a subsequent two-
week visit to Zambia the evaluators used 
interviews (110), focus group discussions 
(4) and visits to project sites (10) to 
validate the hypotheses they had formu-
lated on the basis of their review of the 
documentation. 
What was the social and economic context 
in Zambia for EU cooperation? 
Zambia has a population of 13 million 
people (half under 15 years of age) 
dispersed over an area of the size of 
France. Vast areas of the country are 
thinly populated since one third of the 
population resides in the two major 
financial centres of Lusaka and the 
Copperbelt.1 The weak infrastructures 
(bad road conditions, excessive tele-
communication costs and unreliable power 
supply) make it costly and difficult to 
access export markets or move imported 
goods.  
After three decades of economic 
mismanagement and decline in human 
development, the country has seen 
significant progress since 2000. Twelve 
successive years of growth have trebled 
per capita income to $995 and almost 
brought Zambia to lower-middle-income 
status. Progress in human and social 
development has been mixed.  
Government exhibited broad commitment 
to governance reforms although im-
plementation has been uneven and has 
slowed recently. The risk of misuse of 
government funds remains high, 
corruption being a persistent threat. 
Accountability to State institutions is still 
developing and, while Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) are active, they are 
still unable to hold government to account. 
How did the EU cooperate with Zambia? 
EDF9 and EDF10 have globally aimed to 
support the objectives of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper, the Fifth 
National Development Plan (FNDP) 2006–
2010 and the Sixth National Development 
Plan (SNDP) 2011-2015. The process of 
achieving the aims of the National Indi-
cative Programmes (NIP) 2001-2007 and 
2008-2013 shows that the EU develop-
ment aid programme is using a wide range 
of aid modalities and instruments to 
implement its strategic response. 
The EU intervention logic during the 
evaluation period focused on economic 
transition through infrastructure (road sec-
tor) development, regional integration, 
Public Finance Management (PFM) and 
support for private sector development. Of 
the approximately €1.1 billion of country 
strategy financing over the 2001–2010 
                                               
1
 World Bank (Country Assistance Strategy, 2008)  
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period, roughly equal proportions were 
allocated to general budget support (GBS) 
(39.2%) and project approach (39.9%). 
Sector Budget Support (SBS) accounted 
for the balance of about one-fifth of total 
resources (20.9%). 
 
What were the findings of the evaluation? 
Relevance of EU strategy and coordination  
The EU response strategy is well aligned 
with the policy and strategic priorities of 
the Government of the Republic of Zambia 
(GRZ) as reflected in its national 
development plans and similar strategic 
documents. It has at the same time 
focused reasonably well on the needs of 
the population but, even so, important 
challenges in that regard still remain to be 
met, particularly in terms of governance, 
poverty alleviation and addressing the 
basic needs of the more deprived districts. 
Moreover, the macro-economic and 
macro-financial situation of the country 
gradually evolving towards lower-medium 
income status since around the middle of 
the past decade has not been fully 
reflected in the various orientations of the 
response strategy.  
Effects of General and Sector Budget 
Support programmes  
EU Budget Support has increased the size 
and share of aid in the budgetary 
processes, and has served as a catalyst in 
various improvements to the government’s 
planning, accounting and reporting 
procedures. In providing resources 
through the budget to enhance 
government’s ability to implement its 
strategy effectively, the EU pioneered a 
major shift away from donor-led projects. 
During the second part of the evaluation 
period, despite the fact that the EU 
remained the major budget support 
contributor, the financial leverage of GBS 
diminished, with Zambia becoming less 
aid dependent.  
Zambia has relatively inclusive dialogue 
structures that have offered government 
and the EU a potential platform for 
handling sensitive and controversial 
political and economic issues. However, 
government lacks the capacity and 
political will to manage these dialogue 
structures in an effective and efficient 
manner, except in the case of health.  
Impacts on Economic Transition  
The major EU contribution to Private 
Sector Development dates from the first 
years of the reference period, with support 
for the SYSMIN, Mining Diversification and 
Export Development Projects.  
Following this targeted support, mainly to 
the mining industries during EDF8, the EU 
embarked on a more comprehensive 
approach to economic transition through 
Private Sector Development (PSD), linking 
up GBS, Road SBS, Capacity building for 
PSD (CBPSD), and the Public Expenditure 
Management and Financial Accountability 
project (PEMFA).  
Although these initiatives at first imparted 
a momentum to PSD reforms, this was not 
sustained during implementation of the 
projects. The private sector developed 
independently of the EU interventions that 
were aimed at improving its enabling 
environment. 
Transport 
Infrastructure 
€90M 
Institutional 
Development 
and Capacity 
Building ; 
€40M 
Macroecono
mic Support 
and Capacity 
Building for 
Economic 
Governance; 
€90M 
Education ; 
 €10M 
Health ;  
€10M 
Non focal 
Sectors; 
€20M 
EDF9 2001-2007 (€240M) 
Regional 
Integration, 
Transport 
Infrastructure  
€118M 
Health;  
€59M 
Macroecono
mic Support, 
General 
Budget 
Support; 
€232M 
Food Security 
+ Agriculture 
Diversification 
€30M 
Governance; 
€25M 
Non-State 
Actors; €5.5M 
Technical 
Cooperation 
Facility; €3M 
EPA/ Trade 
related 
support; €2M 
Others ; 
€1.5M 
 
Non Focal 
Sectors; 
€67M 
EDF10 2008-2012 (€475M) 
LEGEND Non Focal Sectors: 
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Impacts on Road Sector Management, 
and Accessibility-Mobility 
The EU contributed to major institutional 
reforms and to operationalising the Road 
Development Agency (RDA), the National 
Road Fund Agency (NRFA) and, to a 
lesser extent, the Road Safety Agency 
(RSA), by providing financial inputs 
through one of the very first EU Sector 
Policy Support Programmes (SPSP) in 
Africa, accompanied by significant 
technical assistance support.  
The 2009 Office of the Auditor General’s 
audit revealed major over-commitment, 
weak design and supervision, poor 
contract management, and systematic 
over-engineering of the Core Road 
Network (CRN) rehabilitation by the EU-
supported Road Development Agency. 
The EU duly suspended the final SPSP1 
disbursements and the launch of SPSP2, 
pending corrective measures by GRZ.  
The EU interventions made a major 
contribution to enhancement of Zambia’s 
economic accessibility from and to 
external markets through the SPSP1 
financial input for CRN maintenance and 
rehabilitation, particularly in regional 
corridors. However, the picture is different 
with the feeder roads, notably rural roads 
in bad condition.  
Impacts on Health 
The EU’s combined GBS and health SBS 
contributed to substantial budgetary 
increases and improved services, with 
increased utilization of health facilities. 
The EU’s specific focus on human 
resources management reform gave a 
strong forward thrust to its successful 
implementation and allowed addressing of 
the issue of persistent staff attrition in the 
context of an imposed staff employment 
freeze.  
However, the combined EU/ Development 
Partners’ support was not a sufficient 
response to ensure an equitable 
distribution of the growth revenues and to 
address the increasing vulnerability of the 
population associated with a deteriorating 
health environment, notably as regards 
nutritional issues (especially for pregnant 
women and infants) and patients’ 
response to AIDS treatments. Despite 
significant progress, results (e.g. in the in 
maternal mortality ratio) are still far from 
the targets set in the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG). In addition, 
the findings of recent studies will need to 
be addressed in the next support 
programmes, especially those confirming 
households’ increased preference for 
private suppliers of services and drugs.  
Finally, the 2009 crisis – with the 
misappropriation in health funds that led to 
a uniform response in delaying PRBS 
disbursement – played a pivotal role in the 
ongoing reform of the sector’s 
governance. 
Impacts on Food Security and Agriculture 
The EU’s Agriculture Diversification and 
Food Security (SADFS) project fell short of 
the initial expectation of elaborating a 
revised policy framework for food security 
as well as improving smallholder access to 
extension services and agricultural inputs 
(fertilizers, seeds, etc.). EU interventions 
had no significant impact on food security 
countrywide or even at local community 
level beyond the direct beneficiaries of 
small-scale Food Facility projects. They 
faced considerable difficulties with the 
inertia and limited capacities of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives’ 
(MACO) which were not anticipated during 
the design of SADFS and conservation 
farming projects. Only a few small-scale 
projects supporting non-state actor (NSA) 
initiatives were successfully and 
sustainably implemented. The scope for 
developing an integrated sector strategy 
and local ownership is limited. 
Strengthening Democratic Governance 
and Civil Society 
EU support for Civil Society Organisations 
(CSOs) was provided in the absence of a 
conducive legal and regulatory framework 
aimed at maximising the potential of CSOs 
as development actors. The presence of 
CSOs and their interface with government 
and the population is ensured only to a 
limited extent. Generally, CSOs in Zambia 
still face substantive obstacles to 
becoming sustainable entities operating in 
all the relevant policy areas.  
The EU has throughout fostered open 
dialogue, most particularly through regular 
consultations with CSOs in the thematic 
programmes. EU support has also 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report  
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 4 - 
contributed to transparent electoral 
processes and well-organised elections. 
Aid Efficiency 
The mix of EU aid instruments, 
approaches and financing modalities has 
generally been well adjusted to sector 
specific factors, adapting over the period 
in line with the changing context.  
An analysis of the synergy between aid 
modalities within each focal sector and 
across different areas was undertaken 
during EU strategy formulation at both 
country strategy formulation and regional 
levels. Complementarity of the EU aid 
modalities with those of other donors has 
been achieved, particularly in relation to 
the EDF10 CSP/NIP.  
During the reference period shortcomings 
affecting the JASZ harmonisation, the 
containment of crises in the health and 
transport sectors, and the necessary 
budget support (BS) enabling environment 
limited the overall performance of BS 
programmes. These shortcomings notably 
relate to the level of ownership; the quality 
of high-level political dialogue; 
weaknesses in the demand focus, 
especially of GBS; and the design and 
operational quality of the BS tools and 
systems.  
A lack of consensus with the Cooperating 
Partners (CP) as regards the ultimate 
rationale of budget support as an aid 
modality has reportedly affected the politi-
cal dialogue – and, in the end, corre-
sponding operations – negatively, some 
partners emphasizing development 
impact, others its functionality as a 
governance and accountability tool.  
Main Conclusions 
The EU response strategy has been in line 
with the policy priorities of the Government 
of Zambia. It was relatively well-focused 
on the needs of the population in the first 
half of the 10-year period under review 
(mostly covered by EDF9). The EDF10 
response strategy, though comprehensive 
and well-articulated, underestimated the 
speed of evolution of the emerging macro-
economic situation and its incidence on 
the steady decrease in the weight of 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 
overall GRZ revenues.  
In parallel with economic growth, an 
increased focus on accountability first 
emerged in the Civil Society and Media, 
and was then progressively taken on 
board by government, notably with EU 
support (PBRS Reviews, PEMFA2 compo-
nents, performance assessment frame-
works).  
During the first part of the evaluation 
period budget support increased the size 
and share of aid within GRZ‘s budgetary 
processes, facilitating implementation of 
the FNDP through improved government 
planning, accounting, and reporting proce-
dures in respect of aid inflows. However, 
the amount of off-budget aid requiring 
parallel planning, administration, and 
reporting processes is still substantial. 
In contrast with this increase in the volume 
of EU GBS funding, its percentage share 
in government expenditure decreased 
from an initial 6.4% in 2002 to 3.7% in 
2004 and then to 2.5% in 2010. Aside from 
this relative decrease, alternative external 
sources of funding are multiplying, with 
incomparably lower transaction costs. 
Zambia has generally lost its appetite for 
EU financial support, mainly on account of 
its comparative disadvantages, notably 
lengthy procedures, one-sided decision-
making, heavy reporting, and packaging of 
politically sensitive issues, along with high 
transaction costs.  
The EU actively participated in the PRBS 
reviews, the high-level policy dialogue on 
the strategic and long-term developmental 
agenda, and the sector advisory groups. 
However, dialogue opportunities were 
limited and weak; GRZ often shies away 
from open dialogue and refers everything 
back to 'Cabinet discussion'. This attitude 
was of a political nature during the later 
years of the reference period but has also 
reflected a lack of capacity (human 
resources, reliable and detailed budgetary 
data) within the Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning (MoFNP) – the main if 
not the only partner in policy dialogue.  
There is a lack of consensus, both among 
the cooperating partners and between 
them and the GRZ, on the appropriate size 
and content of the Performance Assess-
                                               
2
  Public Expenditure Management and Financial 
Accountability project 
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ment Framework (PAF). The PAF is the 
pivotal instrument of the PRBS policy 
dialogue but development partners have 
not managed to harmonise their different 
expectations of this central monitoring tool.  
Governance and Public Finance Manage-
ment (PFM) progressively became the 
major EU strategic concerns, un-
expectedly so considering the relatively 
good performance in both respects during 
the first half of the reference period. The 
EU contribution in dialogue on public 
financial management issues was 
however a driver of PFM reforms. The 
whole new administrative set-up, both 
PFM and indeed sector-wise, remained 
extremely susceptible to external political 
pressure and demonstrated only limited 
regulatory autonomy, if indeed any at all, 
as promoted by the EU.  
While some progress has been made in 
the strengthening and expansion of the 
Auditor General Office, there remains only 
weak domestic accountability by govern-
ment for the budgetary process, all the 
more so given the absence of concrete 
involvement of Parliament and CSOs 
during the first three years of MDG-
Contract implementation3.  
Main Recommendations 
The five meta-recommendations flowing 
from this evaluation are listed below: 
1. Engage in accelerated adjust-
ment of EU strategy in response to the 
steady decrease in the leverage 
capacity of EU financial input. 
Increased leverage – Increase further the 
focus of EU cooperation and free up more 
leverage capacity by gradually moving 
away from the infrastructure sector; the 
EU exit strategy from the road sector will 
be balanced by the multiplicity of 
alternative funding opportunities with far 
lower transaction costs and policy reform 
requirements. 
Good Governance and Development 
Contract – Engage in preparing a "Good 
Governance and Development Contract”4 
                                               
3
  Additionally, the team identified 32 specific con-
clusions directly related to EU sectors and 
programmes. 
4
  In line with the COM(2011) 638/2, “The Future 
Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries”. 
by the end of the MDG contract by 
progressively reorienting EU interventions 
towards mainstreaming Governance. 
Agriculture reform Contract – Initiate a 
"Sector Reform Contract" for agriculture, 
including rural investment, land tenure and 
access to agriculture inputs.  
Drivers of growth – Reinforce EU support 
for drivers of sustainable economic growth 
(Vision 2030) typical of lower-middle and 
middle income countries, such as trade 
liberalisation (through Regional Economic 
Communities followed by harmonization at 
national level) and SME development, with 
progressive widening to include social 
security system development, higher 
education and research. A project 
approach would suit the need for flexibility 
facilitated by progressive involvement.  
2. Focus on a “Good Governance 
and Development Contract” on vertical 
and horizontal accountability, demo-
cratic and economic governance, and 
performance monitoring. 
Domestic accountability and national 
control mechanisms – Effective accounta-
bility mechanisms compel both govern-
mental and non-governmental organisa-
tions to remain relevant and responsive to 
the needs and demands of the groups 
they serve. Therefore, the EU should 
focus on its fundamental values of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law 
when designing the next budget support 
contract. 
PFM reforms – engage government in 
developing a successor PFM reform 
programme (from 2013). 
Civil Society Organisations – Pursue a 
comprehensive and integrated capacity 
strengthening programme with demand-
driven, customised services for the 
different main types of CSO, appropriately 
clustered.  
Economic and Corporate Governance – 
engage in supporting economic regulation, 
that is to say separating the government's 
policymaking and regulatory roles by 
establishing independent regulatory 
mechanisms. Besides supporting cor-
porate governance, the EU should 
contribute to enhancing tripartite relations 
between private sector intermediary 
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organisations, government and unions 
through calls for proposal initiatives.  
3. Carry on with the project 
approach in agriculture, focusing on 
rural investment, land tenure and 
access to agriculture inputs. 
4. Engage in an exit strategy from 
the road sector by first maximizing the 
Road SPSP II focus on rural transport. 
Reorient SPSP2, minimising rehabilitation 
and even maintenance of the paved CRN, 
and conversely increasing focus on the 
unpaved CRN and feeder roads. 
Divert a part of SPSP2 from infrastructure 
to transport services so as to increase EU 
leverage in transport facilitation and rural 
transport.  
Force account units at provincial level 
should be progressively disbanded after 
organising massive training programmes 
for supervisors and technicians in the 
basics of spot improvements to rural 
roads. All local authorities and communi-
ties should be eligible for EU co-financing 
to improve responsiveness to needs and 
ownership, and thereby sustainability.  
5. Address the issue of persisting 
rural vulnerability in the districts most 
at risk. 
In a SWAp for the health sector, sustain a 
joint long-term EU commitment to 
improved staff management in Zambia.  
Support harnessing of high household 
expenditures into formalised systems such 
as social health insurance or community 
pre-payment schemes. The EU could also 
suggest development of mechanisms for 
encouraging contributions by private for-
profit companies.  
 
Figure 1: Map of Zambia 
 
 
Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html 
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1 Introduction 
The evaluation of the Commission of the European Union’s support for Zambia5 (Country-
Level Evaluation) is part of the 2010 evaluation programme approved by the former 
Directorates-General for External Affairs and Development (now DG DEVCO). The present 
evaluation has been carried out under consortium contract EVA 2007/geo-acp. The 
consortium is composed of the following companies: ECO Consult Sepp & Busacker 
Partnerschaft (Germany – Lead Company), AGEG Consultants eG, (Germany), Euronet 
Consulting EEIG (Belgium), Institut de Recherche et d’Applications des Méthodes de 
Développement (IRAM, France) and Nordic Consulting Group (Denmark). The Evaluation’s 
Terms of Reference (ToR) are included as an annex (Annex I). 
1.1 FRAMEWORK OF THE EVALUATION 
Scope of the evaluation 
The evaluation covers the EU’s co-operation strategy with Zambia and its implementation 
during the period 2001-2010. It is forward-looking and aims to draw out the lessons learned 
with a view to fine-tuning the future EU strategy and its implementation.  
The consultants’ assessments cover the following:  
 The relevance and coherence of the EU’s co-operation strategies for the periods 
2001-2010 and the on-going programming cycle. The consistency of the EU strategy 
in Zambia with the EU’s general policy framework in respect of developing countries 
has also been considered. 
 The implementation of the EU’s co-operation, focusing on efficiency, effectiveness 
and impact over the period 2001-2010 in focal sectors (macro-economic support, 
transport and health), and on the intended effects during the period of the ongoing 
programming cycle, including consistency with the previous strategy, effective use of 
lessons learned, and changes in the national context and bilateral relations.  
 The coherence and complementarity of the EU strategies with the national strategies 
and the interventions of other donors, notably the Member States. EU added value 
was analysed, notably in the framework of General Budget Support.  
The investments of the European Investment Bank (EIB) are outside the scope of this 
evaluation, but the coherence of EIB interventions with EU interventions was analysed. 
Thematically the evaluators focused, as requested in the TOR, on the sectors that form the 
core of the EU’s strategic response under EDFs 9 and 10. Both Country Strategy Papers 
(CSPs) identified the following focal and non-focal sectors:  
 Macroeconomic support (including General Budget Support and related Public 
Finance Management interventions) 
 Infrastructure: mainly the road network, but also airports and urban markets  
 Private sector development: direct support (loans) and Capacity Building 
 Social services: Health and Education 
 Food Security and Agricultural diversification 
 Support for Non-State Actors (NSAs)  
 Good Governance: support for elections and Access to Justice; and 
 Regional integration, Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and trade-related 
support.  
                                               
5
  In this report the consultants will refer to DEVCO and the European External Action Service (EEAS) which 
was created with the Treaty of Lisbon (entry into force on 01/12/2009) as opposed to the former DG AIDCO 
and DG RELEX. The term 'EU support' will not include development support by EU Member States, but rather 
development support managed by the Commission of the EU (e.g. in form of EDF or EU budget line funding) 
in coordination with the EEAS. 
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The analysis included crosscutting issues (gender, human rights, and environment), with an 
emphasis on the synergies found in connection with improved governance.  
Capacity Development is a crosscutting issue in the various sectors. The analysis of these 
sectors and issues covers the whole range of instruments, approaches and financing 
modalities used by the EU, based on an inventory of its funding from various instruments 
during the period under review. 
Another issue targeted by this evaluation is the way in which synergies were created and 
gaps filled between bilateral and regional EU strategies and programmes of the EU, in 
particular in the framework of co-operation with the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
Similar targeting was applied to thematic budget lines that contribute particularly to food 
security (Food Facility).  
The scope of this evaluation covers the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the 
previous country level evaluation (2006), particularly checking whether the EU implemented 
its main recommendations.  
Objectives of the evaluation 
The main objectives of this evaluation, as laid out in the ToR, are: 
 to provide the relevant external co-operation services of the EU and the wider public 
with an overall independent assessment of the Commission’s past and current 
cooperation relations with Zambia; 
 to identify key lessons in order to improve the current and future strategies and 
programmes of the Commission.6 
These objectives are understood in the context of the overall priorities of the Commission of 
the EU. The systematic and timely evaluation of its expenditure programmes is one of these 
priorities. As stated in the ToR this evaluation contributes to: 
 accounting for the management, that is use, of the allocated funds; and  
 promoting a lesson-learning culture throughout the organisation. 
It is therefore important that the evaluation strikes an appropriate balance between being 
(i) comprehensive enough to fulfil the above accountability requirement; and (ii) specific 
enough to yield useful and relevant lessons that can be used by the EU and its partners to 
increase the results-orientation of its support. 
1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE EVALUATION PROCESS 
Following the Terms of Reference and based on the methodology developed by the EU’s 
Joint Evaluation Unit, the phasing of the Country Level Evaluation for Zambia five-fold, viz.: 
(i) an inception phase;  
(ii) a desk phase;  
(iii) a field phase;  
(iv)  a synthesis phase bringing together the results of the field and desk phases;  
and finally  
(iv) a restitution in Zambia with stakeholders and the Delegation. 
In the elaboration of this synthesis report, the evaluators: 
 collected data and documentation from European Union (EU) headquarters (Common 
Relex Information Services – CRIS, On-line Accounting System (OLAS) databases) 
and the EU Delegation in Lusaka; selected donors; various libraries; and the 
Internet7;  
 conducted interviews with EU officials in Brussels and Lusaka, central services in 
                                               
6
  Emphases added by the consultant. 
7
  Bibliography used in this report is listed in annex VIII. All available documentation has been uploaded to a 
website by which the whole evaluation team can exchange large amounts of data. 
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Lusaka, decentralised services in Kaoma District, cooperation partners, and civil 
society organisations (CSOs)8. 
 organised three focus groups with EU interventions beneficiaries; 
This Synthesis Report: 
 discusses the evolving context of EU assistance to Zambia; 
 presents the overall intervention logic of the EU in Zambia; 
 presents findings in accordance with the judgment criteria (JC) and indicators that 
measure progress towards the objectives the EU set for its involvement in Zambia 
(see information matrix in annex); 
 provides an analysis of the contribution that the EU has made to improving the 
situation in Zambia by presenting answers to the EQs and related conclusions; 
 presents the implied recommendations. 
1.3 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
A detailed description of the evaluation design and methodology is included as Annex II. 
The Evaluation Questions (EQs) are based on: 
 the stated objectives, priorities and principles, keeping in mind the need for a clear 
and useful overall assessment;  
 expectations expressed in the ToR and by Reference Group members and other 
informants; 
 the need for useful answers in line with the purpose of this evaluation; 
 the need to pay due attention to difficult criteria such as efficiency or sustainability. 
The EQs were approved by the Reference Group and form part of the contractual 
obligations. 
The evaluation is based on the five evaluation criteria defined by the OECD-DAC (relevance, 
efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability) as well as the criteria of coherence, 
coordination and complementarity in three respects:  
 coherence within the development programme of the Commission of the EU;  
 coherence/complementarity with the policies of the partner country and 
complementarity with the interventions of the other funding agencies; 
 coherence/complementarity with other Community policies and the added value of the 
EU's interventions.  
The information matrix in the annexes (Annex XI, Volume III) presents the findings (and the 
sources used) at indicator level. The analysis of the judgement criteria and the implied 
answers to the EQs are included in this main report.  
2 The Co-operation Context  
After three decades of economic mismanagement and decline in human development, the 
country has seen significant progress since 2000. Twelve successive years of growth have 
trebled per capita income to US$995 and brought Zambia to the cusp of lower-middle-
income status. This growth has been built on sound macro-economic management and a 
friendly business climate drawing in major foreign investment, mostly in mining9. The 
industrial sector represents 33.7% of GDP and its main source of income is mining, mostly 
copper (generating nearly 8% of export earnings). As a land-locked nation bordered by 
seven other countries, further regional integration, in particular progress on the North-South 
corridor connecting Eastern and Southern Africa, will be an important driver of prosperity. 
                                               
8
  See annex IX for a List of persons met. 
9
  Copper contributes for 75% of exports 
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Zambia has a population of 13 million people (half under 15 years of age) dispersed over an 
area of the size of France. Vast areas of the country are thinly populated as about one third 
of the population resides in the two major centres Lusaka and the Copperbelt.10  
The currently weak infrastructure (bad road conditions, excessive telecommunication costs 
and unreliable power supply) makes it very costly and difficult to access export markets or 
move imported goods. Besides the high transportation costs, other (related) challenges in the 
infrastructure sector concern the high cost of building materials and construction equipment, 
and limited local contracting and consultancy capacity, along with unfavourable competition 
between local and foreign government procurement contractors.11  
The private sector in Zambia consists of a few large firms, mostly in the mining sector, and a 
large number of small firms and micro-firms in the informal sector. Agriculture is an important 
provider of private sector initiatives. The share of the informal sector in economic activity and 
employment has been growing.  
Social Environment – MDG Achievements 
Progress on human and social development has been mixed. Zambia is on track to meet the 
education, under-five mortality and HIV Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with net 
enrolment in primary education at around 97% in 2008, up from 70% in 1999. Zambia 
committed itself to the Education for All (EFA) goals and MDGs in 2000, and is likely to meet 
the related targets in the education sector.12 The incidence of malaria has fallen sharply and 
is now under 10% while HIV prevalence stands at 14%. However, Zambia still ranks 164 out 
of 187 countries according to the Human Development Index (2011).  
Zambia is failing to achieve its health MDGs partly because of the challenges of serving a 
geographically dispersed population. Maternal and child mortality are high with over 7 million 
years of healthy life lost annually owing to a high disease burden and inadequate health 
services. Zambia is also off-track on MDG 7 (Environmental Sustainability). Nearly 5 million 
Zambians lack access to safe water and a further 6.5 million lack access to adequate 
sanitation. In order to better tackle these challenges, in 2005 the government developed the 
Human Resource Strategic Plan (HRSP) in addition to the five-year National Health Strategic 
Plan (NHSP) for the period 2006-2011.  
Poverty  
Economic growth helped urban poverty fall by a third between 1996 and 2006. However, as 
mining employs only 50,000 people and contributes less than 2% of GDP in tax, this has 
meant little for the rural areas where two-thirds of Zambians live. Three-quarters of the rural 
population survive on less than $1 a day, mostly from subsistence farming, seasonal labour 
and petty trade. Zambia has not yet adopted a model of pro-poor growth and the distribution 
of income within the population remains very unequal. 
Zambia is therefore seriously off-track on MDG 1 (Poverty). Around 60% of Zambians live in 
poverty with a third unable to meet even basic food needs, and inequality remains very high. 
Only a quarter of children under the age of two have a minimum acceptable diet and 45% of 
under-fives are stunted due to chronic undernourishment.  
Governance and Civil Society 
Zambia has long been relatively stable and peaceful, with twenty years of elections that have 
been free and generally fair. Political authority remains centralised and focused on the 
presidency, leading to a “winner takes all” political structure. Overall, governance has 
improved in recent years with the State broadly more capable, accountable and responsive. 
This is reflected in improving (World Bank) indicators of good governance, which are above 
the average for Sub-Saharan African countries. Important results have been achieved during 
                                               
10
 The two most urbanized provinces are Lusaka (29% urbanisation) and the Copperbelt (42% urbanisation), 
World Bank (CAS 2008)  
11
 See FNDP 2006-2010, p.80. 
12
 Millennium Development Goals – Progress Report 2008,UNDP, p.5 
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the reference period, notably in the areas of protection of human rights, promotion of gender 
equity, constitutionalism, and improved freedom of the press, thanks to the proactive 
involvement from CSOs and economic NSAs. The gap assessment conducted during the 
EDF10 MTR in October-November 2009 concluded that out of 199 commitments made by 
the Zambian government only 15 had been fully met, 95 registering some progress, 78 slight 
progress and seven no progress at all. The GRZ conducted a country self-assessment under 
the APRM process, which involved government, civil society, the private sector and individual 
people. 
There has been broad commitment to governance reforms, although implementation 
has been uneven and has recently slowed as a result of short-term political thinking. The 
risk of misuse of government funds remains high with corruption a persistent 
challenge13. State accountability institutions are still developing and Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) are active. They enjoy a certain degree of freedom of expression, 
which allows participation in public decision-making processes but are often unfocused in 
their attempts to hold government to account.  
Impact of Official Development Assistance (ODA)  
Foreign aid has increased strongly over the last ten years: in real value, grants increased 
nine-fold between 2000 and the record year of 2006 before falling back in 2009 to their 2004 
levels. Per capita total aid (grants + loans) increased three-fold between 2001 (US$53) and 
2006 ($151) and totalled $98 in 2009. According to OECD/DAC data on ODA flows since 
2003 on the proportion of total ODA receipts (excluding debt relief), budget support rose 
continuously from 6.5% of the total in 2003 to 21.9% in 2008, before falling back to 19.7% in 
200914. 
The 2008 Paris Declaration monitoring survey measured the extent to which donors made 
use of country systems for budget execution, financial reporting and audit. On average, 
across the three systems 59% of aid channelled to Zambia was through country systems, 
with 11 donors using all three systems, representing 41% of all ODA channelled to the 
government15. 81% of donors utilised procurement country systems as compared to 41% 
recorded by the PD Monitoring Survey of 2006. The 2010 target for aid using country 
systems for procurement purposes has thus already been attained. This upward trend in 
funds channelled through the government's budget process and PFM system has been 
attributed to policy dialogue and improved national procurement management under the 
Public Procurement Authority. 
Total assistance (including Budget Support in loans and grants, projects, SWAps and other 
forms of basket funding as well as humanitarian aid) has accounted for a stable one-fourth of 
total central government expenditure (with a record 28,7% in 2009). In Zambia budget 
support and sector budget support have brought about an increase in the volume of funding 
channelled through the government’s budgetary processes.  
The country took advantage of an early commitment through the Highly Indebted Poor 
Country (HIPC) initiative the funds relating to which amounting to between 5.5% and 7% of 
GDP16 in the first years of HIPC implementation (2001-2003). HIPC definitely contributed to 
the rebuilding of gross reserves after 2001-2002. After the country had restored them to one 
month’s-worth of imports in 2004, the international reserves were continuously strengthened 
by booming export revenues, which increased three-fold between 2002 and 2006 as a result 
of increases in both the price and volume of copper exported, particularly after 2005-2006. 
This in turn contributed to increased budgetary earnings, thanks to improved budgetary 
discipline, a notable result of the combined donor commitment to PFM reform. In 
comparison, foreign currencies from budget grants culminated more modestly to less than 
                                               
13
  Transparency ranking for Zambia in 2011 is still 91 out of 183 assessed countries (www.transparency.org). 
14
  These figures extracted from OECD/ODA however include aid that is not captured by the budget (i.e. spent 
through NGOs, project structures or at district level) and MoFNP figures on Aid are far lower. 
15
  PD Monitoring Survey 2008 Report; and FNDP Annual Progress Reports for 2007 and 2008 
16
  As a reminder BS funds never exceeded 2% of GDP 
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two weeks’-worth of imports. 
The increase in Foreign Direct Investment is the second driver of reduced Zambian 
dependency on aid during the second part of the evaluation period, FDI increasing tenfold 
between 2001 and 2010. Whereas budget grants17 accounted for half of the international 
reserves in 2003 (and still accounted for 40% in 2005), their share of international reserves 
has fallen below 20% since 2005 and has remained below 10% since the 2009 crisis. 
 
3 EU Co-operation Strategy and Intervention Logic 
Thematic scope of the cooperation 
Cooperating Partners (CPs) generally work well with the Zambian Government (GRZ) with a 
good donor division of labour under a Joint Assistance Strategy (2007-2010). As the 
economy has grown, dependence on traditional donors’ development aid – Official 
Development Aid (ODA) – has fallen to 18% of the government’s budget. Non-ODA sources 
of development finance are becoming increasingly important, especially from China.  
EDFs 9 and 10 globally aimed to support the objectives of the PRSP and of the FNDP 2006– 
2010. Implementation of the CSP-NIPs 2001-07 and 2008-13 shows that the development 
aid provided by the EU Commission to Zambia encompasses a wide range of aid modalities 
(programme/project approach, GBS/SBS) to improve value-for-money and reduce the 
fiduciary risks of its sector-wide approaches, mainly in transport.  
The EU selected three focal sectors in each of the programming cycles covered during the 
reference period. The support for the road infrastructure and management sub-sector was 
continued through EDFs 9 and 10, as was support for PFM (macroeconomic support and 
capacity building). The third focal sector changed from capacity building – including private 
sector development and agriculture – in EDF9 to the health sector in EDF10. 
Figure 2: EU co-operation with Zambia: evolution of focal & non-focal areas  
 
* Source: Own compilation based on information from CSPs and NIPs 
                                               
17
  It appears that “Budget grants” presented here among official transfers represent slightly (few %) different 
amount from “PRBS grants” presented in the 2011 BS evaluation. 
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In addition to programmable aid under the EDF country programmes, other instruments and 
funding sources were used in co-operation with Zambia during the period 2001-2010. 
Zambia has benefitted from regional EDF funding for Eastern and Southern Africa and the 
Indian Ocean (ESA-IO), for which the initial global allocation was €223m under EDF9 and 
€645m under EDF10.18 
Aid modalities used 
Of the approximately €1.1 billion of country strategy financing in the 2001–2010 period, 
roughly equal proportions were allocated to general budget support (39.2%) and project 
assistance (39.9%), Sector Budget Support being allocated the remaining one-fifth of total 
resources (20.9%). The mix of instruments, approaches and financing modalities changed 
over the period in line with the evolving context and the subsequent EDF cycles.  
Figure 3: Total EDF Resources Allocation to Zambia by Aid Method/Modality (2001-2010) 
 
Source: EU CRIS database 
The EDF8 portfolio consisted solely of project assistance (all 23 interventions). The three 
General Budget Support (GBS) interventions under EDF9 represented almost half of total 
allocated resources (47.0%), increasing further to 55.3% under EDF10. Sector Budget 
Support (three SPSPs in transport, education and health) accounted for 29.4% of EDF9 
resources, reducing slightly to 25.9% under EDF10 (three SPSPs in transport, health and 
electoral systems). Overall, the share of project approach (PA) financing fell from 100% 
under EDF8 through 23.5% under EDF9 to 18.8% under EDF10.  
To the extent that total actual payments in relation to the total allocated or committed 
amounts can be considered a proxy indicator for the efficiency of aid delivery (e.g. in relation 
to absorptive capacity), under EDF9 94.4% of the allocated GBS budgetary resources were 
actually paid compared with 87.5% for SPSP resources and 66.1% for project approach 
resources. Unfortunately no data are available on actual expenditures in relation to the 
intended uses or results, owing to an absence of performance budgeting and expenditure 
monitoring.  
The rebuilt intervention logic of the EU strategic response to the Zambian challenges 
during the reference period is presented in the following graph, underlining the focus on 
economic transition through infrastructure (road sector), regional integration, Public Finance 
Management (PFM) and support for private sector development.  
The numbers in the circles stand for the number of the Evaluation question (cf. chapter 5), 
their placement in the diagram show their focus (strategy/sectoral) and level of analysis 
(activity/impact) in relation to the intended strategy. 
 
                                               
18
 RSP-RIP 2002-2007 p. 26 & RSP-RIP 2008-2013 p.44 
Sector Budget 
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Figure 4: EQs and consolidated reconstructed intervention logic 
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4 Findings 
This section presents the assessments for all EQs. For more information on raw information 
and sources relating to the analysis for each of the judgement criteria, please refer to the 
information matrix in Annex XI (volume III).  
Difficulties encountered 
The Delegation was particularly helpful in providing ample documentation on its past 
interventions in all sectors (with the exception of health). The staff made themselves 
remarkably available during the field mission, including the Head of Delegation and Head of 
Cooperation. The main difficulty encountered was the limited time available to organize 
meetings at high level in central government departments, particularly line ministries. In rare 
instances, less experienced staff replaced senior managers. The same time constraint made 
it necessary to condense the meetings, interviews and focus groups in Kaoma district into 
only one working day.  
Last, the team’s preliminary understanding of the context, and more specifically the recent 
changes in macroeconomic trends and their effects on GRZ revenues vis-à-vis EU budget 
support, had to be updated and put in perspective. The Delegation was supportive in this 
regard.  
Change in Judgement criteria and indicators 
The evaluation structure is almost unchanged from that approved at the end of the inception 
phase. Only JC 1.6 on health was removed and is instead addressed in the EQ wholly 
dedicated to health (no. 5). JC 2.6 on vocational training was ignored, as this component of 
the initially envisaged EU support to private sector development was in the event not put into 
effect. 
For a few indicators (EQ4, EQ5, EQ7) data were not readily available in the accessible 
documentation but could be informed by at least qualitative proxies during the field phase. 
The indicators with limited or no added value for answering the EQs, such as workforce 
training (EQ3, JC4) or urban markets (EQ7 on agriculture, JC6), are analysed in the 
Information Matrix but not integrated in the main text. Below follows a presentation of the 
findings for each Evaluation Question. After a reminder of the JCs (the chain of reasoning), 
each EQ is answered and then followed by an analysis at JC level.  
The quotes (for ex. JC 9.4 or I-2.3.4) included in the answers relate to a far more developed 
analysis in the information matrix (in the Annex XI). Tables, figures, and extracts from the 
relevant sources are presented there for each indicator.  
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4.1 RELEVANCE AND COHERENCE  
EQ9:19 To what extent has the EU cooperation at national and regional levels 
addressed the needs of the population as well as the policy priorities of the GRZ? 
JC 9.1:  The objectives of the strategy reflect the views and priorities of GRZ with respect to a 
comprehensive policy dialogue with the EU 
JC 9.2:  The objectives of the programmes correspond to needs of the population 
JC 9.3:  The selection of focal sectors of intervention and subsequent changes in the EU strategy 
were taken based on the comparative advantages of the EU (e.g. experience and expertise 
in the sectors) 
JC 9.4: The EU's co-operation strategy for Zambia and its regional strategy were mutually reinforcing 
Overall assessment 
The EU response strategy was particularly relevant up to the mid-2000s. It then continued to 
be aligned on GRZ priorities but missed the economic recovery and the corresponding 
reduced aid-dependency of Zambia. The quality of the policy dialogue weakened in the 
second half of the ten-year period against the background of an unchanged EU demand for 
structural reforms in the policy dialogue platforms and aid coordination fora.  
The EU response strategy has focused reasonably well on the needs of the population. GBS 
ensured enhanced resource allocation to the social sectors, to the MDGs, and to poverty 
alleviation. The macro-economic situation, which has been gradually helping Zambia evolve 
into a lower-medium-income developing country since around the middle of the past 
decade, has not been at the root of the response strategy. Priority alignment of EU 
objectives and GRZ priorities are less clear in the regional strategy.  
The EU strategic response is well aligned on the population’s needs and the 
government’s poverty reduction policies. It proved capable of adjusting to changes in 
GRZ policy and to integrating new financial instruments in a coherent framework. 
This was achieved in the near-absence of high-level political dialogue.  
The EDF9 CSP/NIP, covering the period 2001-2007, had been designed in line with the 
GRZ’s most important overall development plan of that period, the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP). This also applies to the three focal areas of the EDF9 CSP/NIP: 
(i) transport infrastructure, (ii) institutional reform and capacity building, and 
(iii) macroeconomic support. Similarly, the GRZ Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) 
2006-2010 formed the basis for the discussions of the new EDF10 support programme 
(2008-2013) and the related programming exercise (JC 9.1). 
The in-country dialogue between GRZ and Cooperating Partners on policy and 
programming priorities for the EDF10 CSP/NIP has been well facilitated by the Joint 
Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) at three levels, i.e. the strategic - policy level; the 
tactical - sectoral level; and the operational - interventions level, in line with the GRZ-
Cooperation Partners’ agreed division of labour (DOL). Overall, however, there is no 
evidence that the response strategy has been reviewed or, where appropriate or necessary, 
adapted to the emerging new overall macro-economic and macro-financial situation in which 
Zambia is gradually moving towards lower-middle-income developing country status.  
As far as the overarching goal of poverty alleviation is concerned, the EU support, 
particularly through GBS, contributed to a positive performance, albeit with differences 
between the various sectors.20 The 2009 Mid-Term Review of the FNDP provided evidence 
                                               
19
  The presentation of the findings starts with EQ9 for its all-embracing scope. 
20
 Measured on the basis of selected FNDP poverty indicators from the base period to the EDF10 CSP/NIP mid-
term review period. Detailed poverty alleviation performance information on key indicators is included under 
the Indicator I-9.1.1 summary assessment in the Information Matrix annexed to this report (Volume III) – 
Source: FNDP MTR (2009) p43; Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010 - Mid-Term Review of October 
2009 - Chapter 2.6 Performance of Selected Poverty Indicators. 
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that during the 2006-2008 review period annual budget allocations to Poverty Reduction 
Programmes (PRPs) registered an increase from 42.6% in 2006 to 47.2% in 2008 (I-9.1.1).  
Integrating emerging policy priorities through the Mid-Term and End-Term Reviews ensured 
that the initial EU response strategy remained relevant. The strategy also provided an 
appropriate framework for absorbing the additional funds allocated to addressing the effects 
of the global financial and food price crises (e.g. V-Flex GBS). Some emerging policy 
priorities were addressed, albeit with mixed results: Public Financial Management (PFM) 
good governance issues, which could have challenged even GRZ’s eligibility for budget 
support; the new National Anti-Corruption Policy, despite subsequent policy setbacks; and 
the whole cross-sectoral thematic area of migration (covering brain drain, refugees and rural 
migration) (I-9.1.2). 
The over-concentration on policy dialogue and policy formulation was to the 
detriment of the quality of projects’ programming and operationalization, while the 
lack of political backing to policy dialogue during the last years of the reference 
period weakened the gains of the generalized budget support approach (I-9.1.2 and I-
9.2.1).  
Especially under the budget support programmes (GBS and SBS), the EU has striven to 
establish a balance between interventions supporting policy formulation and interventions 
improving policy implementation. However, whereas traditionally CP-government dialogue 
concentrated more on implementation issues, this changed with the overall switch to more 
budget support with over-concentration on policy dialogue and policy formulation issues, to 
the detriment of working with the government to address crucial implementation issues and 
bottlenecks (I-9.1.3). 
The logical frameworks in the Zambia country level programming documents are partially 
incomplete and mostly very general. They do not contain performance indicators with 
baseline values or target setting, all requirements for meaningful policy dialogue. Further 
operationalisations are to be considered in the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF). 
All ROM-monitored projects in 2010 reportedly had good potential for sustainability, but had 
the lowest rating for effectiveness. All projects were reported to have weak Logical 
Framework matrices and had had difficulties with setting up working Monitoring and 
Evaluation systems. Henceforth, it is not the design of the strategy and the 
programmes/projects therein, but their implementation, which poses the greatest 
performance challenges (I-9.2.1). 
The need for an innovative EU response strategy commensurate with Zambia’s 
evolving macro-economic status has only partly been addressed.  
During the preceding decade, Zambia managed to re-establish a macro-economic balance 
and growth, reaching the HIPC completion point in 2005 and therefore receiving large-scale 
international debt cancellation. Currently, the importance of aid in the economy has declined 
considerably as compared to earlier decades.21 Major changes have been emerging since 
around the middle of the last decade, for example steady and substantial GDP growth; 
                                               
21
  The sixth national development plan for the period 2011-15 was an opportunity for the donor community, to-
gether with the Government and the rest of Zambian society, to reflect upon how the country can move more 
effectively towards full independence in terms of financing its own development. Global experience has shown 
that it is important in such processes to move decisively towards the mobilisation of domestic revenues 
through taxation and non-taxation-related local funding, thereby firmly establishing a more mature relationship 
between the firms, the citizens and the State. The elected government and the parliament must increasingly 
become responsive to its electorate rather than to external aid agencies and considerable funding flows from 
outside. The emergence of a truly independent and genuine modern African state without the strengthening of 
this link will be difficult. A movement away from large-scale grant aid in Zambia in the next 5-10 years is 
possible if CPs, in tandem with GRZ, put increased emphasis on domestic revenue mobilisation, domestic 
accountability institutions and efficient and transparent public expenditures, coupled with effective national and 
sector development strategies. There is no conclusive evidence that these insights and lines of thinking which 
were shared with the evaluation team have constituted a consistent basis underpinning the new JASZ-II for 
the period 2011-2015. 
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extensive foreign direct investment; particularly from the BRIC countries and South Africa; 
and rising domestic public revenues, mainly from mining thanks to the booming world 
demand for copper and concomitant rises in commodity prices. The combination of these 
factors has led Zambia to achieve lower-middle-income country (LMIC) status by the end of 
the decade (JC 9.2). 
Limits in engaging all stakeholders and in positively impacting on poverty reduction  
There is no evidence of systematic needs assessment, satisfaction surveys or other similar 
types of analyses at the level of the targeted beneficiaries or of the population. An overall 
appreciation of the outcomes and impact of budget support on poverty reduction was 
provided in the 2011 budget support evaluation, which concluded: “Within its short 
existence, budget support could not contribute very much to the reduction of poverty in 
Zambia. While some improvements are visible regarding poverty reduction and MDGs 
attainment, any progress has been slow”. So far, Government and Cooperating Partners 
have not been able to meet the rising expectations of the poorest groups, particularly in the 
poor rural areas. It would be illusive to think that with the relatively small amounts of aid 
per capita it would be possible to “make poverty history” within a few years. The EU 
contribution to budget support was not that high in comparison with the overall size of the 
national budget to make a real difference in generating leverage for encouraging pro-poor 
policy decisions. Moreover, many other variables and macro-factors are at stake (e.g. 
increased Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), increased public resources from mining 
taxation, overall growth of gross domestic product, etc.), which entailed at least equally 
important repercussions on general poverty levels (I-9.2.2). 
Engagement of other stakeholders such as parliamentarians and Civil Society Organisations 
in policy dialogue platforms and external cooperation frameworks have remained limited. 
The substantial CSO capacity-building project originally planned under EDF9 was not in the 
end pushed through for various reasons, and has been postponed to EDF10 under which it 
is still awaiting implementation (I-9.2.3). In view of the limited participation of CSOs in policy 
dialogue platforms, it is unlikely that noticeable changes in policy frameworks have been 
brought about by CSOs up until now (I-9.2.4).  
The selection of focal sectors and subsequent changes in the EU strategy have been 
attained based on the EU’s comparative advantages, for example its experience and 
expertise in the sectors. An exception may be the dropping of education as a focal 
sector in the EDF10 CSP/NIP.  
The broader reference framework for the selection of EU focal sectors for the EDF10 
CSP/NIP has been the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ). The JASZ is the main 
institutionalised forum for policy dialogue between the Cooperating Partners (CPs) in 
application of division of labour (DOL) principles. These DOL principles are also in line with 
the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity22 (especially insofar as complementarity with 
the programmes of the EU Member States is concerned). Zambia, under the inspiration of 
the EU and other lead CPs, appears to be a pioneer of and trendsetter for these DOL 
principles as further concretisation of the Paris Declaration principles regarding development 
effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. Rather more critical assessments have been 
made (see EQ8) on the JASZ’s abilities and performance as regards its DOL track record, 
although generally confidence in the JASZ was reconfirmed as also demonstrated by the 
signing in November 2011of the new JASZ-II for the coming years (I-9.3.1 and I-9.3.2).  
                                               
22
  See the analysis of EQ6 indicator I-8.6.1 “The EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of 
Labour used in strategic/programming documents determining donors’ aid modalities”, information matrix 
excerpts in Volume III, including the 11 principles of conduct of the Code - EU (2009) p3. 
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The comparative advantage of the EU in Zambia is demonstrated by its leadership in the 
two focal sectors of health and transport infrastructure. These focal sectors correspond to 
Zambia’s need to create an enabling environment to implement growth strategies. The non-
focal areas, specifically those relating to agriculture and EPA support, are important in 
supporting the efforts of GRZ in diversifying the economy (EDF10 MTR) (I-9.3.1 and I-9.3.2). 
Need for stronger performance M&E with a balanced, complementary focus on results 
effectiveness, aid efficiency and economic inputs management  
The GBS monitoring and evaluation indicators basically focus on outcome and impact 
(PRSP-related as far as the EDF9 CSP/NIP is concerned, and FNDP and PAF/PRBS-MDG-
related for the EDF10 CSP/NIP), and on input indicators (relating to Public Expenditure 
(Management) and Financial Accountability (PEFA/PEMFA) financial utilisation and good 
governance). For the sectors with sectoral budget support (SBS – SPSP), the afore-
mentioned were complemented by the efficiency indicators (activities and direct outputs) 
from the sectoral M&E performance systems, for example the Health Sector Performance 
Monitoring Framework (HPMF). Together these were expected to provide a synthesised 
performance measurement picture covering all levels of the results chain (from inputs to 
impact), and also the three “E”s of performance management (Economy, Efficiency and 
Effectiveness)23. 
The development effectiveness of the EC General Budget Support was further strengthened 
under EDF10 by the conclusion of an MDG contract with GRZ which makes the release of 
variable GBS tranches dependent on measurable progress towards the achievement of the 
MDGs, in addition to the Public Financial Management (PFM) criteria, on which GBS 
variable tranche releases were dependent already before. 
As is the case with the broader JASZ M&E set-up in general and in the context of the 
CSP/NIP management and monitoring, there appears to be an over-emphasis on the 
economy and effectiveness dimensions of “3Es” performance management. The M&E of the 
efficiency (operational) dimension remained largely underdeveloped (I-9.3.3).  
There is evidence of emerging mutually-reinforcing complementarity between the 
EU’s co-operation strategy for Zambia and its regional strategy, albeit with important 
challenges remaining as regards further strengthening of this complementarity, 
particularly in relation to the regional-national transposition processes24. 
A key aspect of these challenges relates to the rather complex institutional set-up for the 
regional response strategy, with the Eastern and Southern Africa – Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) 
regional strategy and programme (RSP-RIP) covering not less than four organisations, each 
with different membership (COMESA, IOC, EAC and IGAD), along with SADC as a fifth 
regional organisation.  
A comparison of the division of budgetary resources for the different sectors and thematic 
areas within both the national and regional strategies shows that they are not strongly 
aligned, different strategic priorities being set at each level.  
The EU Delegation has been involved in the preparation process for the ESA RSP-RIP 
(EDF10). The NIPs of the ESA-IO region (incl. Zambia) have substantial linkages with the 
RIP. This particularly pertains to the large regional infrastructure projects, private sector 
development, food security, rural development and agricultural development, along with 
specific activities for supporting implementation of the regional and bilateral trade agenda, 
including FTAs, customs unions, monetary unions, EPAs, and so forth (I-9.4.1). 
 
                                               
23
  The “Economy” dimension of “3Es” performance management refers to the optimum quantity and quality of 
inputs, their timely availability, and their actual and economic use in the execution of activities and processes 
to produce the development results. So the Economy dimensions concentrate on the input level of the (log 
frame) results chain. 
24
  Based on the recently conducted MTR of the RSP/RIP, other documents, and feedback collected during the 
evaluation field visit during December 2011. 
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Regarding implementation of regional and national strategies, generally the outputs from 
regional programmes are not well synchronised with NIP interventions in such a way as to 
facilitate implementation of national support and vice versa. National strategies (on which 
the NIPs are aligned) do not sufficiently take into account the regional dimension and the 
commitments made during the various Regional Organisations (ROs) summits. In the 
meantime special initiatives have been launched to address this situation, including the 
issue of a quarterly newsletter by the EUDel regional section. 
EDF programming (both national and regional) is potentially of help in resolving obstacles to 
regional integration. But to make that happen, a different balance may be needed to better 
support implementation of regional commitments at national level (the process better known 
as transposition of regional commitments at national level). A major remaining challenge is 
having the implementation of common regional programmes managed by ROs on the basis 
of umbrella Contribution Agreements (CAs) with the member countries concerned. This not 
only would ensure a sustained and sufficient funding basis for RO operations from regular 
Member Countries’ annual contributions, but also ownership by these Member States of 
regional policy directions, strategic orientations and actual programmes.  
The effectiveness of RSP/RIP implementation is difficult to measure owing to the recognised 
lack of ROs and of MSs’ capacity to monitor implementation of RO commitments at national 
level.  
There is a general absence of awareness by the national authorities of what is happening 
under the ESA-IO EDF programme. A more efficient and effective division of labour (DOL) 
between the regional and national levels in the broader context of strengthened subsidiarity 
would be welcome. This particularly pertains to road infrastructure projects where 
implementation is reportedly better suited to the national level, as the necessary capacity in 
terms of personnel exists (I-9.4.2). 
Overall, the level of coordination and complementarity between EU staff, project managers 
and technical assistance missions in relation to the EC’s regional programme and its 
national response strategy for Zambia is not optimal. Substantial improvements are noted as 
a result of the upgrading and institutional anchoring of regional cooperation concerns into a 
fully-fledged EUDel Operations Section25. Moreover, the section has been strengthened in 
terms of human resources and a variety of concrete initiatives have been undertaken to 
strengthen communication, coordination and complementarity between the different EU 
parties concerned (including EU staff, project managers and technical assistance missions). 
Also, at regional level coordination is improving, thanks to a large extent to strengthened 
coordination on the part of the Inter-Regional Co-ordinating Committee (IRCC) Secretariat 
and its organisational systems now in place. The IRCC meetings have taken on increased 
significance throughout the year with participation by senior EU staff, as well as by SADC 
and the ACP Secretariat (I-9.4.3). 
 
                                               
25 
 Development Cooperation is the largest area in which the Delegation is active, and its operations are 
subdivided into the following four operational sections (i) Economics and Rural Development, (ii) Infrastructure 
(iii) Social Sectors and Governance, and (iv) Regional Cooperation  
(http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/zambia/about_us/internal_organisation/index_en.htm) 
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4.2 DIRECT AND INDUCED OUTPUTS OF BUDGET SUPPORT 
EQ1: To what extent have the EU interventions through budget support contributed to 
improve the framework for public policy, expenditure and aid management? 26 
JC 1.1:  GBS and SBSs induced an increase in size and share of EU funding subject to government’s 
budgetary processes 
JC 1.2:  GBS and SBSs improved the predictability of aid flows overall, and particularly of EU 
contribution 
JC 1.3: GBS and SBSs facilitated the establishment of a framework of policy dialogue, focused on 
key government strategies and priorities 
JC 1.4:  GBS and SBS facilitated the delivery of strategic and demand driven non-financial inputs 
(e.g. TA and capacity development) that are aligned to government priorities 
JC 1.5:  GBS and other EU interventions have assisted in improving core indicators for primary 
education service delivery 
Overall assessment 
Despite favourable prospects at the early stages of the reporting period, the EU failed to 
contribute to substantially improving the public policy framework. Improved expenditures 
and aid management were left halfway. 
EU Budget Support increased the size and share of aid in the budgetary processes, and 
served as a catalyst by improving GRZ’s planning, accounting and reporting procedures. As 
the first GBS contributor to the budget, the EU played a major role in the first half of the 
evaluation period in helping Zambia restore its external position and rebuild its international 
reserves. As copper earnings increased, budget support only complemented government 
resources. During the second part of the evaluation period, and despite the fact that the EU 
remained the major BS contributor, the financial leverage of GBS diminished further, with 
Zambia becoming less and less aid-dependent.  
While Zambia’s comparatively inclusive dialogue structures provided government and the 
EU with a platform for addressing sensitive and controversial political and economic issues, 
the government lacked the capacity and political will to contribute to these dialogue 
structures in an effective and efficient manner in spite of sustained EU commitment and 
support. EU budget support has neither substantially improved predictability nor reduced 
transaction costs as it was initially expected to. Even the MDG contract failed to improve 
sustainably the predictability of EU financial inputs, again owing to major shortcomings in 
implementing complex structural reforms of the public policy framework, as demonstrated 
two major crises (one of corruption in the Health Ministry, the other of over-commitment of 
RDA during the election period).  
Lastly, while progresses have been reported in the area of institutional support, domestic 
accountability by government remains weak. 
EU Budget Support releases increased in size and share, contributing to 
macroeconomic recovery. However, EU inputs eventually lost weight and 
corresponding influence owing to recovery of tax revenues on exports. 
The sustained EU commitment to most of the budget support for the period brought about 
an increase in the size and share of EU funding subject to GRZ budgetary processes, and 
served as a catalyst by improving planning, accounting, and reporting procedures for the 
Government since 2004. As an early and major GBS contributor, the EU played a prominent 
role in the first half of the evaluation period in helping Zambia to restore its external position 
and rebuild the international reserves of the country. It also enabled the country to take 
                                               
26  
The current evaluation takes place shortly after a comprehensive evaluation on BS in Zambia “Between high 
expectations and reality: An evaluation of budget support in Zambia (2005-2010)”: Synthesis report (Antonie 
de Kemp (IOB) Jörg Faust (DIE) Stefan Leiderer (DIE), 2011; It will consequently refer to it and take the 
opportunity to addressing some additional relevant elements from EU perspective. 
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advantage of a favourable conjuncture with increased earnings from copper exports to 
implement effectively its development objectives. The EU must also be credited with shifting 
the balance towards “aid through government mechanisms” and away from project-based 
aid. 
The share of budget support (provided as both loans and grants) both in Central 
Government expenditure and in the share of external funding transferred through national 
financial mechanisms (I-1.1.2) increased. The amounts released in budget support 
(GBS+SBS) steadily increased in real terms, from a record low of €25.3m in 2003 to a 
record high €198.6m in 2009. The EU has remained the major contributor with a record 44% 
of total (grants and loans) disbursements in 2009.27 Despite high and sustained financial 
commitments, the share of both projects and BS in the financing of total government 
expenditure decreased over the evaluation period, the difference being covered by 
increased domestic expenditure. With the improving relative share of BS in donor aid, this 
trend was less perceptible for BS (which financed between 4% and 6% of budget 
expenditure over the period) than for project aid, the share of which was reduced by half 
from 20.2% in 2002 to 10.9% in 2008. 
The reclassification of Zambia as a lower middle-income country has propelled an improved 
economic environment. In addition, Zambia’s increased FDI, with favourable copper 
earnings and Chinese economic influence, has significantly reduced the economic and 
political importance of BS. Therefore, during the second part of the evaluation period, 
despite the fact that the EU remained the major BS contributor, the financial leverage of 
GBS diminished, with Zambia becoming less aid-dependent. 
EU Disbursements did not, in the end, improve predictability of aid flows. 
The EU as a major BS contributor has a prominent responsibility to boost predictability of 
disbursements, but did not perform exemplarily in terms of disbursement delays, with 6-9-
month delays in commitments over the last four years (JC 1.2). In order to enhance 
predictability of EU aid, there is a need for improvement of the timing and quality of 
government requests for disbursements according to the Financing Agreement agreed 
calendar and evidence.  
Figure 5 :  Graph of BS disbursements (2004-2010) by position (left side) / total (right side) 
 
Source EU data 
                                               
27
  This included the release of the V-Flex tranche of €30m (see Addendum 1 to the FA, signed in December 
2009) just prior to suspension of BS due to governance issues in health and roads, which underscored the 
positive results of the PRBS dialogue on PFM and good governance and sent contradictory signals as 
Sweden simultaneously suspended its disbursements (€18m).As a result of these PFM issues in the road 
sector, only €40.3m was disbursed in 2010: but if scheduled disbursements of the first fixed floating tranche 
(€12.3m), Road (€24m) and Health Sectors (€8.5m & €3.15m) had taken place, the level of disbursements in 
2010 would have exceeded even that of 2009. 
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The EU brought a key contribution to the issue of predictability with the design of the 
MDG-C. The key feature of the MDG-Contract is a "Base Component" complemented by the 
"Annual Performance Tranche" (APT)28 and the "MDG-based tranche", the sharing-out of 
which should be adapted to local circumstances. The Annual Review serves as a basis for 
the assessment that takes place at the Mid-Contract Review (MCR), which includes a 
recommendation on the level of funding for the second phase of the MDG-Contract.29 
While the design of MDG-C improves the predictability of disbursements over a longer 
period, its implementation after the Mid-Contract Review may reduce the tightness of the 
policy dialogue since the amount of the upcoming fixed tranche has been mechanically 
increased. Furthermore, with the absence of Parliament and CSO’s concrete involvement 
over the MDG-C first three years of implementation, there is a weak domestic accountability 
for budgetary process. 
EU active support to policy dialogue not been utilised to its full potential as the 
process has remained irregular, very formal, and with no concrete follow-up from the 
GRZ side  
Taking into account the huge amount of resources that the EU provides to government, the 
evaluators would have expected more visibility and proactivity in policy dialogue. The 
Zambian government and its cooperating partners have established an elaborate 
coordination structure, which facilitates policy dialogue. This was reflected in the Joint 
Assistance Strategy Framework (JASZ I) and was further elaborated in JASZ II (JC 1.3). 
The EU role in policy dialogue is critical, notably because of the importance that budget 
support plays in a country such as Zambia. The EU Delegation actively participates in both 
the PRBS reviews and the HLPD on the strategic and long-term developmental agenda. The 
EU was notably involved in contributing, as part of the Cooperating Partners’ Group (CPG), 
to the discussions on the development of the Six National Development Plan (SNDP). In line 
with the Division of Labour arrangements, the EU took the lead in the road sector and has 
been leading sector dialogue on substantive collective issues on behalf of other CPs, which 
has subsequently fed into high-level policy dialogue or the PRBS reviews. The role of the 
EU in dialogue on public financial management issues over the years has been widely 
acknowledged by both government and other cooperating partners as a driver of PFM 
reforms (JC 1.3). The EU has harmonised its policy dialogue with that of other CPs in order 
to influence dialogue with GRZ and actual policy implementation. It is worth noting that the 
EU has been active in financing Non-State Actors such as CSPR30 so as to improve their 
capacities to engage government on developmental issues and ultimately contribute to 
fruitful dialogue.  
Notwithstanding all the formal prerequisites for policy dialogue, it has not been used to its 
full potential. Policy dialogue is mainly conducted during the semi-annual PRBS Reviews, an 
exception occurring in 2009 when two 'scandals' erupted in the Health and Transport sector 
(respectively concerning mismanagement of funds and over-commitments) which led to an 
                                               
28  The APT performance score is triggered by four PFM indicators 
29
 In the case of Zambia the Mid-Contract Review (MCR) took place as expected in 2011. Owing to the poor PAF 
performance at 37.5%, no APT should be paid out in 2012 of the 62.5% planned for years 2 and 3. But the 
positive review of the MDG base tranche allowed mobilisation of the MDG-tranche for the three upcoming 
years, Increasing mechanically the amount of the fixed tranche for the remaining time of the MDG contract. 
EUDel however recommended adjustment of the MDG-T for the period 2012-2014 from the €7.07m annual 
entitlement to €5.75m based on PAF performance. Therefore, a combination of €5.75m and the annual base 
component of €26.25m would provide the government with a total fixed tranche of €32m for each year of the 
period 2012-2014. Disbursements under PRBS1 included a very large variable component (91% of total), with 
60% linked to PFM indicators. This approach was effective in providing an appropriate incentive mechanism, 
with amounts disbursed increasing for successive tranches. In addition, PRBSII increased focus on outcome-
based indicators, improved donor harmonisation, and reduced variable component (at 50%). With an average 
disbursement rate for the variable tranche of 71% for PRBS II and 63% for PRBSI, PRBS II was rated as a 
successful program despite poor performance mainly in rural roads and reforms in agriculture sector, 
negatively affecting achievement of MDG1. 
30
 “Civil Society for Poverty Reduction”, http://www.csprzambia.org/ 
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intense formal PRBS Dialogue, with donors questioning the 'Underlying Principles' for 
providing BS, and regular meetings with the Secretary to the Treasury (JC 1.3). The 
Reviews are conducted in a rather formal manner and conclusions are often reached, 
although certain issues such as the 'rural-urban divide' are not addressed systematically. 
GRZ often shies away from open dialogue and refers everything back to 'Cabinet 
discussion'. As for sector dialogue, which should underpin all policy discussions, the Sector 
Advisory Groups have been dysfunctional, very few meeting regularly or addressing key 
policy issues. While GRZ agreed to institute a High-Level Policy Dialogue in which Heads of 
Mission and Ministers would interact on critical issues, the process has remained irregular, 
very formal, and again with no concrete follow-up from the GRZ side. This is compounded 
by lack of capacity within the MoFNP (human resources, reliable and detailed budgetary 
data) in order to sustain effective and quality dialogue mechanisms. 
EU registered significant achievements in capacity building for PFM (budget 
programming and execution, procurement) though with limited effects on vertical 
accountability mechanisms.  
The EU has been consistent in supporting capacity building activities in the areas of public 
finance management with a view to enhancing domestic accountability and also 
strengthening the role of civil society in budget execution. Over recent years, PFM reforms 
have progressed, albeit at a slow pace. This is demonstrated by the PEFA 2008, finalised in 
February 2009, which indicated positive trends since the first PEFA of 2005 (JC 1.4).  
The EU and other cooperating partners have contributed to the increased coverage capacity 
of the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG; now at 79%), as also its capacity to carry out 
specific audits (e.g. performance audits). Audit Reports are submitted in timely fashion to 
Parliament (through the President). Follow-up of OAG recommendations is also improving.  
EU support has thus contributed to reductions in irregularities (2.29% of actual 2009 
expenditure compared to 3.28% for 2008).  
A major achievement of capacity building in PFM by the EU is the revision of the budget 
management cycle in 2009, which has been an obstacle to effective budget management in 
Zambia for the decades. The ongoing PFM reforms have accelerated since 2009, with a 
number of concrete policy decisions, which have positive implications for budget execution 
such as capital projects. In addition, the EU have also been advocating successfully for 
increased capacity building in government procurement, although capacity building is still 
required at ministerial level.  
The EU contribution proved sustainable as the government is developing a successor PFM 
reform programme (from 2013), while in the meantime focusing on few priority areas, such 
as the Treasury Single Account and internal audit reforms.  
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4.3 SHIFT TOWARDS PRIVATE SECTOR LED DEVELOPMENT 
EQ2: To what extent have the EU interventions (GBS, SBSs and capacity development 
programme) contributed to enabling a private sector led development? 
JC 2.1: Support to PEMFA enhanced predictability and transparency in public investment and 
expenditure 
JC 2.2:  Support to PEMFA enhanced fiscal discipline 
JC 2.3:  Support to PSD improved the policies and regulatory framework in which the private sector 
operates 
JC 2.4:  Capacity-building initiatives supplied the qualified human resources needed by the private 
sector 
Overall assessment 
The private sector developed independently of the EU interventions aimed at improving its 
enabling environment.  
The EU contributed significantly to enabling GRZ to support private-sector-led development 
at macroeconomic and policy level, and to extend support to the main export activities. EU 
support for efficiency in facilitating economic transition through improving the firms’ 
regulatory and administrative environment was impeded by the lack of capacity and 
ownership demonstrated by Ministries’ middle management staff.  
The major EU contribution to PSD dates from the first years of the reference period, with the 
SYSMIN, Mining Diversification and Export Development Projects. Following this targeted 
support mainly to mining industries under EDF8, the EU embarked on a more 
comprehensive approach to economic transition through Private Sector Development 
(PSD), linking GBS, Road SBS, Public Expenditure Management and Financial 
Accountability project (PEMFA), and Capacity Building for PSD (CBPSD). Although it initially 
gave momentum to PSD reforms, it was not possible to sustain this initiative following the 
signing of the Financing Agreements (FAs). Implementation of the projects was confronted 
by inertia in the Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MoFNP) and the Ministry of 
Commerce Trade and Industry (MCTI). The PEMFA project was resisted by Line Ministries 
because it implied more accountability to the Ministry of Finance. Policy dialogue at global 
and sectoral levels was both too limited in scope and quality and too formal to contribute to 
solving issues arising during implementation of agreed reforms and EU projects. Around the 
mid-2000s the EU failed to grasp (or underestimated) the increased resistance of GRZ to 
donor-led reforms while it was pushing for structural reforms under an elaborate 
combination of aid modalities.  
In all its major programmes in Zambia the EU has consistently advocated for private-
sector-led development in coherence with GRZ31 priorities, but faced only a limited 
buy-in on the part of GRZ.  
EU advocacy and support covered all reforms relevant to PSD: improved macroeconomic 
stability with GBS (with a reduced inflation rate); liberalised trade policies with EPA; more 
predictable PFM with PEMFA (Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability 
project); improved business environment with CBPSD (Capacity Building Private Sector 
Development); providing business opportunities with SBS (mainly road SPSP, all works 
being openly procured); loans with EIB; measures accompanying the sugar protocol; and 
export promotion projects (EPD 1 and 2). In addition the EU contributed to improving the 
condition of the Core Road Network, increasing domestic and international trade 
opportunities. PSD therefore was a major transversal component of the EU’s strategic 
response with the potential for contributing to economic growth and achieving the MDGs 
                                               
31
  Spelled out repeatedly along the whole reference period by several planning and programming documents 
(FNDP, Vision 2030, SNDP, PSD reform programme, etc.). 
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during the evaluation period, and supporting economic transition.  
Both PEMFA and CBPSD only achieved their intended outputs to a limited extent and with 
major delays32. The maximum momentum in reforming PSD policies was reached around 
2004-2005 when the GRZ was negotiating the EU’s budget support and the accompanying 
provision of technical assistance (TA) and equipment. Both were typical components of 
support channelled through PEMFA and CBPSD. The policy dialogue during the formulation 
of the projects, in particular the CBPSD, brought about reforms in the policy framework and 
institutional arrangements. It proved to be a thorn in the side of the EU’s capacity to 
contribute to improving the private sector regulatory environment: Once financial 
agreements had been signed, both projects were impeded by various management issues. 
Final evaluations of PEMFA and CBPSD found that results had been adversely affected by 
weak administrative management on GRZ side, and by a lack of commitment and an 
inadequate administrative culture among senior and middle management staff, both in the 
direct beneficiary organisation (Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry (MCTI) for the 
CBPSD programme) and in sector ministries. From GRZ point of view, the driving factors in 
the lack of commitment were EU regulations and issues encountered in the management of 
TA, rather than lack of ownership.  
Weak GRZ ownership in most EU-led PFM improvements 
PFM was one of the main topics of EU high-level policy dialogue. Almost all GBS PAF 
indicators were related to core PFM or extended aspects of PFM (oversight). CPs had given 
high priority to PFM right from the beginning of the evaluation period, in order to reduce the 
risks associated with basket funding and budget support while improving the value-for-
money of public resources. The concern for improving PFM was shared by GRZ, as it was 
perceived as helping increase the government’s access to external resources, improve 
predictability and reduce transaction costs. However the government’s buy-in did not go 
much beyond this point, as shown by the weak ownership of most EU-driven PEMFA 
components, as demonstrated by the limited involvement of senior staff in programme 
management and the inconsequential staffing of related services. On the other hand, PEFA 
assessments were carried out regularly after 200533, which suggest that PFM was treated as 
a priority topic in EU-GRZ policy dialogue. However at the end of the evaluation period the 
policy dialogue on PFM was overshadowed by two PFM issues, one for each of the EU focal 
sectors (I-2.1.1,) demonstrating systemic weaknesses in PFM and oversight. This issue is 
far beyond the scope of EU interventions, at least as long as they are not extended to 
comprehensive support for vertical and horizontal accountability.  
PFM improvements carried over by the MoFP but not relayed by line ministries 
PFM reforms, including the introduction of Mid-term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF), were 
implemented by the GRZ with a significant contribution from the EU, channelled through 
PEMFA. Even though the programme was affected by design weaknesses, inappropriate 
procedures and some shortcomings in long-term TA, it contributed to improved reliability of 
the MTEF and its underlying econometric modelling system, under Component 3. Major 
achievements in MTEF preparation and use were familiarisation of Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning (MoFNP) with Green Papers, Budget Framework Papers, preparation of 
MTEF and ABB (Activity Based Budgeting) guidelines. These deliverables were 
complemented by the establishment of an inter-governmental fiscal architecture manual and 
by training of staff of Ministries, Provinces and Spending Agencies (MPSA) in the operation 
of ABB. The related PEMFA Component (no.4) was subject to under-disbursement (from 
3% to 19% of annual work plans), owing in part to overly ambitious spending targets in all 
components, but also because some of the planned activities, in particular Public 
Expenditure Reviews (PERs) and MTEF reviews, were not implemented. The three PEFA 
assessments carried out in 2005, 2008 and 2010 suggest relatively steady improvements in 
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  See the two final evaluations of PEMFA and CBPSD 
33
  Three PEFA exercises in five years (2005, 2008, 2010). 
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public financial management over this period. But the two major issues (mismanagement in 
the health sector and over-commitments in the road sector) that occurred at the end of the 
evaluation period detract from this record (I-2.1.2), although – at least for the health sector – 
they facilitated implementation of long-term corrective measures. 
PEMFA components 3 (Policy, planning and budgeting) and 4 (Budget preparation and 
execution) (see I-2.1.2) helped improve the tools available to the MoFNP for enhanced 
coordination between the planning and budgeting functions. However, the programme failed 
to include sector ministries in the process. The integration of line ministries was either not 
considered when designing the component or was resisted by the ministries themselves34 
(or, more realistically, both). PEMFA was therefore not in a position to address the main 
planning and budgeting issue, namely the need for stronger involvement of the sector 
ministries so as to facilitate realistic sector strategic analyses, reliable budgeting of current 
expenditures and investments projects, and improved reviews of budget implementation 
during previous fiscal years. The PFM crises at the end of the evaluation period confirmed 
the design weakness of having focused all PEMFA efforts on the MoFNP.  
In sum the EU was not able to improve coordination between the MoFNP and the sector 
ministries, despite having supported both sides through GBS/PEMFA and SBS35, aligned its 
support with the GRZ policy framework36, contributed to all levels of the policy dialogue 
(high-level and SAGs), and used about 90% of its NIPs for these purposes (I-2.1.3). 
Improved procurement regulations and management 
More tangible results were achieved by the EU and the PEMFA programme in the areas of 
procurement and audits (internal and external). The legal and institutional framework for 
public procurement was completely revised, although too late in the reference period for an 
assessment of its effective implementation. Extensive efforts were made under EU 
leadership to produce additional procurement regulations and guidelines and to provide 
training. Here again the results achieved with MoFNP were impeded by line ministries that 
benefited from increased procurement thresholds37 regardless of whether their procurement 
procedures were or were not certified by the MoFNP.  
The EU supported improvements in internal audit capacity by financing the renovation of 
office space, providing equipment, and organising training courses, although however 
without bringing about any noticeable changes in the traditional way in which the staff 
undertake their function (final CBPSD evaluation, 2010). External auditing by the Office of 
the Auditor General (OAG), although supported by the EU in a similar way, also benefited 
from support from Norway for its strategic approach. By the end of the reference period 
external audit coverage had clearly improved, as had the quality of reporting and the 
development of specialist (value-for-money audit, etc.) audit reporting and skills. The best 
example is the 2009 Road Audit and the commitment shown by the OAG during the 
subsequent enquiries. Corrective actions, many short-term and some long-term, were taken 
in the face of the reluctance of the line ministry, demonstrating that accountability works in 
getting PFM reforms implemented.  
The strategic lesson learned is that external audits proved to be an important accelerating 
factor in addressing weaknesses in Zambia’s public financial management that had not 
been adequately addressed by the earlier across-the-board development of capacities 
under PEMFA. 
                                               
34
  PEMFA final evaluation, 2010. 
35
  Roads, health, both being EU focal sector under the EDF10 
36
  Both at central and sector levels 
37
  PEMFA final evaluation, 2010 
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Strengthened public expenditures management upstream from budget 
implementation 
Fiscal discipline was only very indirectly addressed by PEMFA, which merely targeted 
systems and procedures. The issue was therefore mostly a matter related to GBS and high-
level policy dialogue (see EQ1). The final evaluation of the programme assessed that 
“PEMFA has had very modest influence at best on strengthening public expenditure 
management and financial accountability to date”, which also applies to revenues and debt 
management. Although limited, the EU contribution to improving fiscal discipline through 
PEMFA was achieved by promoting resource optimisation during planning, establishing 
macro-economic modelling as a method of forecasting fiscal resources and promoting the 
evaluation of alternative policies (ZAMMOD). The MTEF was introduced as a tool for 
managing public expenditure (JC 2.1). The dedicated PEMFA component improved external 
and internal debt management capacity (I-2.2.2).  
Lack of significant improvement of the meso-level PSD enabling environment 
Between 2001 and 2010 the EU implemented several projects that targeted private sector 
development (PSD), using several of its various instruments38. Its involvement dated back to 
EDF839 and continued up to 2010 with the closure of the CBPSD. Against this longstanding 
involvement, the EU failed to provide a comprehensive framework for its support in the two 
successive CSPs covering the reference period. For example, the EDF9 NIP’s sole 
orientation is: “the need to develop capacities for public-private dialogue as a basis for 
building a policy and institutional environment to promote private sector led economic 
growth, particularly in the areas of investment, export promotion and trade.” The initial 
framework of the PSD reform programme was complemented by the Fifth National 
Development Plan (FNDP, 2006-2010), and then the Sixth National Development Plan 
(SNDP) (I-2.3.1) with EU contributions to high-level policy dialogue platforms.  
The EU CBPSD programme started in 2005 and ended in 2009. Beneficiaries of the TA 
were mainly the MCTI and its departments, as well as its Statutory Bodies such as ZABS 
(Zambia Bureau of Standards), ZWMA, ZDA (Zambia Development Agency) and CCPC 
(Competition and Consumer Protection Commission). The project also catered to Private 
Sector Intermediary Organisations (PSIOs) and Civil Society Intermediary Organisations. 
The main objective of the CBPSD Programme was to enhance the conducive environment 
for private-sector-driven economic activity40 in terms of (i) the regulatory framework (policies 
and regulations), and (ii) the availability and quality of and access to business support 
services. The major partner that facilitated the expected outcomes was the ZDA that 
provides incentives and opportunities to the private sector.  
The government revisited its PSD policy soon after signing the EU financial agreement, 
introduced new regulations, and replaced the minister who had championed the EU project. 
As a result the institutional environment of the project became unstable and hardly 
conducive to designing a new strategy. MCTI senior staff became reluctant to be involved in 
the project, eventually leading to an ownership issue. ZDA was the one organisation among 
the statutory bodies that should have benefitted from the intensive support from the EU41. 
Open conflict with EU TA led to the EU’s scaling-down of its support for the provision of 
equipment42, which drastically limited the impact of the project on PSD (I-2.3.2). This 
shortcoming was reinforced by the lack of interest of MCTI senior staff in the project, and 
even by resistance to the management of the project by the long-term TA.  
The MTCI did not help improve the enabling environment of the private sector owing to 
institutional issues that arose soon after the signing of the financial agreement. The policy 
                                               
38
  EDFs, ProInvest, EIB, Sugar accompanying measures, Sysmin and probably export related instruments such 
as EBA, FLEX, etc. 
39
  With an Export Development programme, €5.9m 
40
  Investments, production, foreign and domestic trade 
41
  TAs, equipment, trainings, workshops, etc. 
42
  CBPSD final evaluation, 2009 
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dialogue platforms were not able to devise appropriate solutions to the resulting lack of 
ownership by the MTCI and its most strategic statutory body, the Zambian Development 
Agency. Some small project components benefitted from a more favourable context and 
achieved the expected results, mainly focusing on provision of equipment and related 
training, for example for the Zambia Bureau of Standards or Zambian Weight and Measure 
Agency (ZWMA). However in some cases allocated annual budgets were insufficient for 
running and maintaining the equipment provided (laboratory, IT, vehicles…).  
Although the EU provided substantial support to the Foreign Trade, Domestic Trade, and 
Industry departments (training, workshops, equipment, etc.), the CBPSD final evaluation did 
not find any evidence of renewed coordination or improved service delivery (I-2.3.3). 
The limited EU-driven improvements in PFM with PEMFA and a “doing business” 
environment with CBPSD did not contribute to the emergence of private-sector-led 
development. Nevertheless the EU contributed to enhancing firms’ competitiveness, on the 
one hand by helping to reduce inflation rates, and on the other hand through its targeted 
support for the main export activities of copper and coffee growers associations, yielding 
high profile results. However, the SMEs remain at an embryonic stage, as also do large 
numbers of farmers, showing that there is still a long way to go before bringing to fruition the 
economic transition in the sectors and thereby potentially generating sustainable economic 
growth, domestic demand and large-scale employment. In sum, the private sector 
developed independently of the EU interventions aimed at improving its enabling 
environment. 
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4.4 TRANSPORT SYSTEM PUBLIC MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
EQ3: To what extent have the EU interventions contributed to improving in a 
sustainable manner the institutional framework of transport infrastructure 
management and transport operations regulation? 
JC 3.1:  The transport sector policy and programming framework have improved in line with EU 
performance assessment framework 
JC 3.2:  The financing framework for transport infrastructures maintenance and expansion is viable 
and sustainable, in line with EU performance assessment framework 
JC 3.3:  Institutional performance of transport sector management has improved at all administrative 
levels 
JC 3.4:  Transport sector agencies improved in a sustainable way the quality of their human 
resources 
JC 3.5:  EU has contributed to set donors coordination mechanisms in place in support to policy 
dialogue 
Overall assessment 
The EU contributed to major institutional reforms and to setting up the Road Development 
Agency (RDA), the National Road Fund Agency (NRFA) and, to a lesser extent, the Road 
Safety Agency (RSA) by providing financial inputs through one of the very first EU SPSPs in 
Africa, accompanied by ample TA support. During the very first years of the reference period 
the EU successfully advocated for the principles of the Road Financing & Management 
initiative, which helped develop the tools for financing road maintenance, rationalise its 
programming and improve road contract management as a whole. It usually takes around 
five years for such a radically new framework to become fully operational and owned. 
Although deceptive, the 2009 office of the Auditor General (OAG)’s audit findings (large 
over-commitments, weak design and supervision, poor contract management, and 
systematic over-engineering of the CRN rehabilitation) did not come as a surprise, and the 
EU seized this opportunity to answer the in-built weaknesses of the GRZ’s institutional 
arrangements. The EU suspended the final SPSP1 disbursements and the launch of SPSP2 
and requested corrective measures from GRZ. Agreed short-term measures were 
implemented but longer-term measures are still pending. Subsequently the GRZ found 
alternative funding opportunities free from policy dialogue requirements through a steady 
increase in tax revenues and support from South African and Chinese cooperation. This 
reduced GRZ’s appetite for EU support.  
The CPs’ coordination in the road sector consisted of a troika with EU, as lead donor, 
together with WB and DANIDA.  
The 2009 Road Audit conducted by the OAG (supported by Norway and EU under PEMFA) 
confirmed the shortcomings in planning and implementation identified by the EU. The audit 
itself identified major PFM shortcomings, such as considerable over-commitments by the 
Ministry of Works and Supply/ Road Development Agency (MWS/RDA) that presented a 
major risk (value-for-money, sustainability) to the EU financial contribution to CRN 
rehabilitation and maintenance (JC 3.1). Other more technical weaknesses at design, 
contract management and supervision stages within RDA were confirmed by the OAG’s 
audit. Consequently EU technical support, even though provided extensively and in 
accordance with the current state-of-the art (JC 3.4), did not succeed in overcoming in-built 
resistance from senior RDA management staff43 (JC 3.3). By the end of 2010 the short-term 
corrective measures were agreed and implemented by the RDA. By end-2011 the EU was 
still unable to disburse the last SPSP1 variable tranches or engage SPSP2 as long-term 
corrective measures were still pending. Alternative funding opportunities free from policy 
dialogue requirements, made possible by steady increases in tax revenues and support 
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from the South African and Chinese cooperation programmes, reduced GRZ’s appetite for 
EU support. Most other CPs, less focused than the EU on the reliability and sustainability of 
the policy framework, resumed their support at project level (even EIB).  
Regular maintenance of the 40,000 km Core Road Network requires an annual budget of 
€190m. With its own resources (fuel levy and other road user charges), the NRFA can 
address no more than 46% of CRN maintenance needs. RDA, against repeated EU advice 
in policy dialogue platforms, contributed to this structural imbalance by over-engineering44 
road rehabilitation (paving roads irrespective of the traffic load) and construction under 
ROADSIP II. In the coming 5-10 years this legacy will further impede GRZ’s capacity to 
meet road maintenance costs, all the more so as rural roads were left untouched during the 
entire reference period (JC 3.2).  
During the very last years of the reference period, and in the context of the 2011 election, 
NRFA resources were complemented by the national budget in such a way as to meet 96% 
of maintenance needs. Given the macroeconomic context, the high level of the fuel levy, the 
weak political position of GRZ vis-à-vis the trucking industry, and the prospect of further 
construction cost increases, the financing framework for CRN maintenance is neither viable 
nor sustainable. The EU succeeded neither in having the ROADSIP II work programme put 
in better perspective, nor in having corrected the bias progressively introduced by RDA in its 
successive annual work plans in terms of sustainability.  
CPs’ coordination and even harmonisation improved notably over the reference period for 
the road sub-sector, in parallel with the JASZ process. Joint donor missions and fora were 
organised on a regular basis under EU leadership, focusing increasingly on road projects 
rather than policy reforms. The SAG proved to be a weak vehicle for policy dialogue, owing 
mainly to the lack of ownership by GRZ45 and the poor quality of reporting by RDA. This 
combination of limited scope for policy dialogue, lack of ownership of the policy framework 
beyond relatively formal institutional reforms, and structurally inadequate funding of the 
CRN, limited the progress achieved during the early years. It is expected that the 
implementation of long-term corrective measures and the EU support provided under 
SPSP 2, once fine-tuned in an addendum, will further improve road network management 
performance, despite the increasing weight of alternative funding sources (JC 3.5). 
Successful involvement of the EU in road policy framework and organization 
The EU was (and still is) heavily involved in improving the GRZ institutional framework of 
road infrastructure management46. The GRZ institutional and legal framework for road 
management, mainly Core Road Network (CRN) management, improved during the period 
under review. Road development, funding and safety agencies were enacted, created and 
operationalised by 2006, as required for many years by the EU and other leading CPs in the 
transport sector (WB, AfDB).  
The EU helped strengthen significantly the policy and programming framework of the road 
sub-sector, based on the SPSP1. The Ministry of Transport finalised the transport policy in 
2002, covering all transport modes. However, only the road sector policy (2003) was 
translated into an investment programme, the ROADSIP47. The ROADSIP II (2003-2013) 
was developed to support an extension of the Core Road Network from 12,204 km to 
40,113 km. Its updating was required as a corrective measure following the 2009 Audit, and 
yet was still not approved at the end of the reference period. 
The road policy framework was fully consistent with the expectations of the CPs, particularly 
                                               
44
  Point disputed by RDA. 
45
  This has to be seen retrospectively in the light of the 2009 audit 
46
  The EU also supported other sub-sectors, using individual projects to support development of sites with large 
economic potential (e.g., Lusaka and Livingstone airports) or with urgent needs (Kazungula pontoons). An 
integrated approach for the transport sector was supported through the GRZ Transport Master Plan at early 
stages of the reference period, but was ultimately not adopted by the EU. This prevented the development of a 
balanced approach for promoting intermodal transport, still required in the Sixth national Development Plan. 
47
  The first version preceding the Transport policy, which translated the same principles. 
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aligned with the Road Financing and Management Initiative promoted by the WB (and 
adopted by the EU). The GRZ adopted WB best practice, notably maintenance performance 
based contracts, which are not yet in evidence nowadays in many other Sub-Saharan 
African countries. The new road agencies (NRFA, RDA) were jointly supported by CPs, with 
heavy EU involvement in funding of technical assistance (seven long-term TAs), equipment 
and road condition surveys. Both agencies relatively quickly became operational (created in 
2002, staffed and equipped in 2006) (I-3.1.1). 
NRFA was however developed as a hybrid from the original second-generation road fund 
model. Its resources from the budget as well as from user charges (including the fuel levy) 
are pooled, and NRFA rules do not prescribe any system of sharing between road 
development, maintenance and rehabilitation. Allocation to road maintenance is driven by 
RDA programming, without scrutiny from NRFA.  
The RDA is in charge of road construction and maintenance planning, design, procurement, 
contract management and supervision. Most of the regulatory framework was revised and 
operational guidelines set with TA support financed under EU SPSP1, in accordance with 
road financing and management good practices – except for the NRFA. An exceptionally 
intensive48 TA support programme was granted (seven long-term positions), mainly to RDA, 
covering almost all strategic functions of CRN management (and rural roads at a later stage) 
in order to ensure value-for-money and resolve management weaknesses, as required in a 
SBS approach. The EU successfully supported axle load control, also co-financed by 
Norway and implemented by RDA. 
Early warnings on RDA planning and management, EU supported, ending with the 
2009 Audit of the OAG 
SPSP1 was designed at the early stages of the then emerging SBS formulation guidelines. 
The assessment of seven key areas or equivalent was not conducted because GBS and 
PEMFA were also expected to introduce substantial improvements in planning and 
budgeting practices at sector level (see EQ1 for GBS and EQ1&2 for PEMFA). Early 
technical audits and even an EU-commissioned mid-term review identified some 
management issues, albeit without proper reaction from GRZ. 
The EU strongly supported the set-up of a reliable and updated road management system49, 
centred on HDM4’s system of rationalising annual work programmes. Although the system 
is running, there are doubts as to the consistency between HDM4 results and the works 
programme implemented by the RDA, as demonstrated by the 2009 Road Audit. The level 
of service applied to most rehabilitation projects (paving), even for roads carrying fewer than 
150 vehicles a day, does not conform with the basic principles of economic rate of return 
supposedly built into HDM4 parameters (I-3.2.2). Moreover, the road data management 
system is using outdated data on both traffic and road condition. The EU is supporting an 
update of the later.  
From 2007 onwards, successive EU audits and reviews supported and co-financed by EU, 
WB and DANIDA warned that GRZ was not using the road management tools for 
programming maintenance and rehabilitation works. Brought to the sector policy dialogue 
platform, this issue did not receive attention from the MWS/RDA, and no corrective 
measures were put in place50. The road audit undertaken in 2009 (with EU and DANIDA 
financial support) by the Auditor General confirmed the earlier results, as did the 2011 
revision of ROADSIP II which found that large trunks of the CRN had been over-engineered 
(I-3.1.2). 
A non-viable financing framework against improvements in resources mobilization 
and increase oversight of NRFA on road works 
The design of the NRFA is not fully in line with the second-generation road fund as 
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  But evaluated negatively by GRZ. 
49
  I.e., with 7 fulltime long-term TAs, equipment, surveys worth €5.5m 
50
  SPSP1 Mid-term Review, 2008 
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maintenance resources are not ring-fenced, but it still brought some improvement in 
comparison with the previous organisation.  
The targets set initially for road financing were exceeded for GRZ’s contribution as well as 
for fuel levy collection and direct remittances to the NRFA. This contributed to the release of 
the first three variable tranches of EU SPSP1 but, given the steady rise in construction 
costs51, only 46% of routine and annual maintenance needs could be covered by user 
charges. By the end of the period reviewed 92% of maintenance needs were financed by 
GRZ budget allocations (including inter alia EU financial inputs under SPSP), direct donor 
contributions and commercial borrowings. 
However, this achievement is fragile. The situation might lead quickly to the loss of the 
massive capital investment made during the reference period on paved trunk roads, 
especially if the EU were to discontinue its SBS in response to inadequate corrective 
measures following the mismanagement revealed by the OAG’s 2009 Road Audit, which 
was still not remedied by the end of 2011. Until now increased copper revenue earnings 
have allowed the GRZ to circumvent the withholding of EU support by increasing the NRFA 
allowances by 50%. For 2012, up to 52% of NRFA’s resources are projected to come from 
the national budget. NRFA signed an MoU with RDA and RTSA (Road Transport and Safety 
Agency; managing transit fees, road taxes) to find additional resources. Financial markets 
might complement these resources.  
The overall financial prospects for the transport sector are not yet on a secure footing. A 
global MTEF is maintained by the Ministry of Finance (supported by EU PEMFA project) but 
was not disaggregated to sector level owing to resistance from the MWS (Ministry of Works 
and Supply). The ROADSIP II cannot be considered in any way as an equivalent tool for 
providing reliable visibility on the road sub-sector financial framework, subject as it is to 
annual budget arbitration. The update that was ongoing at the time of this evaluation 
followed a method similar to that used by the previous update, and will therefore not improve 
financial visibility (I-3.2.1). 
EU supported RDA with improved capacity but lacked autonomy and accountability 
During the period under review EU support to institutional performance was only granted to 
the road sub-sector, and more specifically to road infrastructure management under the 
SPSP152. As mentioned earlier the RDA and, to a far lesser extent, the NRFA benefited from 
a strong team of long-term TAs over three years. Although the implementation of the reform 
by the NRFA is commendable, RDA was kept at arm’s length by the Ministry of Works and 
Supply (MWS). RDA absorbed the major part of EU technical assistance. The OAG’s 2009 
Road Audit and subsequent detailed technical, financial and institutional reviews showed a 
very low level of performance in works design, contract management and work supervision, 
against a higher-than-expected administrative cost ratio (I-3.3.1). 
The two major road agencies (RDA and NRFA) were established in 2004 and were fully 
staffed in 2007, in line with the targets of the EU performance assessment framework. The 
recruitment process was competitive (I-3.4.2) and was monitored and approved by the EU, 
aided by attractive remuneration packages53 (I-3.4.4) to assemble a strong staff with a 
balanced combination of public and private backgrounds. The staff benefitted from training 
and long-term TAs (I-3.4.1). Turnover is not mentioned as an issue (I-3.4.3). From 2006 to 
2009, RDA was presented as a major improvement in road management performance. 
Relatively minor warnings progressively accumulated regarding the reliability of 
programming, weaknesses in works supervision and contract management, but on a scale 
felt to be manageable with EU support. The large over-commitments uncovered in 2009 by 
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  Cost increases, limited competition among major contractors due to the soccer WC 2010 and the AFCON 
2010, the suspension of advance payment to works contractors by GRZ, and the "blacklisting" of 40 works 
contractors by GRZ (which reduced considerably the already weak competition), mismanagement within RDA 
52
  The EU only recently started to consider supporting the reform of transport regulations for the civil aviation 
under the EDF10. 
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the OAG led to the firing of the Board and senior staff. The Ministry as well as RDA are still 
largely disputing the Audit conclusions, and are also questioning the quality of the TA 
provided by the EU, the unplanned requirement for outcomes indicators, sovereignty 
aspects, and other issues. RDA already benefits from support that resumed or started soon 
after the 2009 crisis, variously from the World Bank (training), Development Bank of South 
Africa, AfDB, EIB (TA for corrective measures), KFW (baseline survey), China, and others. 
A cartelised construction industry 
Private sector participation was a major landmark of the 2002 transport policy, congruent 
with government policy promoting the transition to a liberalised market economy. The 
recourse to force account was thus not considered, even if the national private sector at the 
beginning of the reference period was at best embryonic. Promoting and developing the 
national construction industry capacity was rightly a major component of ROADSIP and thus 
of EU support. This promotion of private contractors was initially planned with the National 
Council for Construction (NCC), which was expected to provide training and technical advice 
to its members. It eventually failed to support SMEs. Its contribution ended by being limited, 
far below the national industry’s needs and prospects, based on what seems ex post to be 
some sort of misunderstanding.  
The road works market was taken over by foreign contractors (South-African, Chinese) for 
major construction and rehabilitation projects. Local contractors were mainly hired for 
routine maintenance work. The quality of works quickly became a concern, along with price 
increases and delays. The absorption capacity of the Zambian construction industry 
remained far below expectations, roughly 50% of RDA’s annual work programmes for CRN 
only at the end of the period under review. The GRZ is even establishing force account units 
under RDA for rural roads maintenance (I-3.3.2). 
EU-driven coordination and policy dialogue resisted by GRZ 
The EU has made a very significant contribution to setting up CPs coordination structures in 
the road sector, first by ensuring an effective leadership within the DOL framework, and 
second by supporting the improvement in GRZ reporting as the most relevant basis for 
policy dialogue. The overall policy dialogue architecture was formally established under 
JASZ I, consisting of Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) and a high-level platform. The EU, as 
lead donor for the road sector, took a pro-active role in strengthening the transport system.  
Against these EU efforts the scope of the SAG was too wide, especially in comparison with 
the almost exclusive focus of CPs on the road sector. The lack of GRZ ownership led to 
postponed meetings, limited attendance and excessive turnover of participants. In a way 
Joint Donor Mission aide-memoires had become a better platform for exchange54 between 
donors than face-to-face meetings, thus losing the type of constructive dialogue platform 
under GRZ leadership that was expected under EU SPSP (I-5.3.1). 
The first formalised attempt to establish a clear division of labour was the JASZ I. At sector 
level the DOL is not very detailed (only identifying lead, active, silent, etc. partners) and it is 
difficult at this stage to assess the practical benefits of this structure. However it is worth 
noting that under EU leadership coordination was particularly effective: joint donor missions 
and fora were periodically organised and established apparently excellent working 
relationship between sector CPs (I-5.3.2). Coordination was strongly solicited during and 
after the 2009 crisis. Under EU leadership CPs reached common positions on corrective 
measures, short-term and long-term. Many donors suspended their cooperation, but 
important players like the World Bank and the AfDB remained. By 2011, despite the lack of 
commitment from the GRZ to implement long-term corrective measures, most CP projects 
had resumed, notably the EU/EIB Great East Road. The EU SPSP1 last tranche and launch 
of SPSP2 are still suspended pending GRZ agreement on corrective actions and an 
updated ROADSIP II. 
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4.5 IMPROVED ACCESSIBILITY AND MOBILITY 
EQ4: To what extent have EU interventions in the transport sector contributed to 
improving economic accessibility: locally (to marketing and inputs for agriculture 
products) and at country level (to external markets)? 
JC 4.1: The maintenance of road, and rail networks and airports has improved in line with EU 
performance assessment framework 
JC 4.2: The extension of infrastructure networks has improved Zambia’s connectivity 
JC 4.3: Access to rural areas and external markets has improved 
JC 4.4: Passenger and freight transport has improved 
JC 4.5: Transport operator’s benefits from EU road interventions were passed on to customers 
Overall assessment 
The EU interventions made a major contribution to improving Zambia’s economic 
accessibility for and to external markets through SPSP1’s financial input for Core Road 
Network (CRN) maintenance and rehabilitation, particularly on regional corridors. The same 
cannot be said for the feeder roads of the CRN, the situation on other rural roads being even 
worse.  
The improved condition of the Core Road Network supported under EU SPSP 1 has made 
possible significant reductions in travel time and vehicle operating costs, paving the way for 
reducing the transport costs of bus and truck companies. The Zambian trucking industry is 
exposed to international competition and transport prices are deregulated. EU intervention 
benefits were passed on to users, and eventually to customers as a whole. Recent surveys 
however demonstrated that those price cuts are unlikely to exceed 3-4%, which does not 
compare favourably with the return on investment from far cheaper transport facilitation 
measures (10-15%).  
The EU interventions made a major contribution to improving Zambia’s access to external 
markets through funding made available for CRN maintenance and rehabilitation, 
particularly of regional corridors. The EU used both SBS and the project approach to a total 
commitment of €169m (EDFs 8 and 9, excluding TA) (JC 4.1). The share of Zambia’s CRN 
that could be improved under SPSP1 cannot be clearly determined, owing to the pooling of 
funds under the SBS approach. The three EU projects55 rehabilitated some 100 km of paved 
trunk roads, added to which are the results of the maintenance operations under the Output 
and Performance Based Contract’ packages. The EU did not support the extension of the 
network apart from under its support to the Rural Accessibility and Mobility Programme 
(RAMP) under SPSP1 (JC 4.2). The extension of the network beyond its existing financial 
capacity for maintenance, particularly of the paved roads, became an issue with RDA and 
the MWS at the end of the reference period (see EQ3).  
Rural accessibility was largely left aside, despite explicit support from the EU under SPSP1 
in the form of two dedicated TA positions for ROADSIP II implementation. However GRZ’s 
limited financial allocation for maintaining rural roads, even for feeder roads covered by the 
CRN, calls into question the relevance of extending the rural network. Unpaved road within 
the CRN suffered increasing degradation due to lack of maintenance, and the feeder road 
network was not extended (JC 4.2). 
This significant contribution to improving paved road conditions has helped reduce transport 
costs by drastically shortening travel times and lowering vehicle operating costs, although 
the extent of this decrease during the reference period cannot be quantified (JC 4.3). 
Surveys conducted in 2008 cast doubt on transport price elasticity vis-à-vis improved road 
conditions: a 10% increase of resources spent on road maintenance translated into a mere 
3-4% decrease in transport prices. More value-for-money can be expected from transport 
facilitation measures, notably one-stop border crossings (as for WB support to the Chirundu 
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border post), thus calling from the EU to a more diversified approach to its support for 
increased performance from the road transport services. 
The Zambian trucking industry is competitive and prices are deregulated. Productivity gains 
linked to reduced travel time and vehicle repairs are passed on to users, at least for long 
haulage (import-export). Other freight market segments were not surveyed, nor were 
domestic passenger services which are of particular importance for smallholders’ 
agricultural products (JC 4.5). 
A (paved) core network in better condition 
In the two transport sub-sectors supported by EU during the reference period, the condition 
of the infrastructure improved substantially. The percentage of the total length of paved 
trunk roads and regional corridors of the CRN in good and fair condition increased from 79% 
to 94%, partly at the expense of almost unchanged conditions in the unpaved network (I-
4.1.1). The capacities of the Livingstone and Lusaka airports (the main Zambian airports) 
were adjusted to the traffic requirements and the GRZ pro-growth policy. Improvements 
were achieved despite the poor performance of the contractors (I-4.1.3).  
Improved accessibility to ports, at the cost of rural areas accessibility  
Zambia’s connections to external markets have improved considerably over the evaluation 
period; particularly through ports served by improved roads along regional corridors. Links 
interconnecting main cities and regional corridors also benefited from EU support through 
the SPSP1 and individual rehabilitation projects. The EU contributed mainly to physical 
connectivity rather than transport facilitation, which was more far-reaching in terms of its 
impact on transport costs (I-4.2.2). 
The rehabilitation of the Livingstone runway and the extension of the Lusaka runway with 
EU support also helped to improve Zambia’s connectivity, here again mainly in response to 
international demand for transport (tourism and business respectively) (I-4.2.3). 
Rural access improved far less, since most of the road sub-sector budget had been 
allocated to the paved CRN (I-4.2.1). 
Although considered under the SPSP1, improvement of the primary feeder roads was not 
fully taken into account in RDA’s work programmes, which gave priority to the paved 
network and to gravel trunk roads in need of rehabilitation (I-4.3.1). The condition of the 
unpaved roads of the CRN stayed almost unchanged during the reference period, and the 
TA support specifically provided by the EU for the rural road network (2 long-term TAs) did 
not contribute significantly to the setting-up of a dedicated decentralised maintenance 
system.56 The GRZ decision to create force account units to carry on maintenance and 
rehabilitation of the rural non-gazetted roads did not greatly change rural road conditions. 
Co-financing (fuel, operators’ allowances) is required from District Councils (acting as RDA 
agents), thus strongly limiting operations to spot improvements, while most of the rural 
network has not been maintained for the last 10-20 years. RDA interventions are extensively 
delayed and technical specifications are not respected. District councils would prefer 
managing through their own non-gazetted road maintenance programmes.  
The access of Zambian road freight to external markets improved steadily as a result of EU 
support. Most rehabilitation and maintenance work under the SPSP1 was focused on the 
regional corridors, reducing travel time up to the border. They were complemented by road 
works implemented through projects (I-4.3.3). However, surveys of truck operators showed 
that long processing times at border crossings were the main factor in delays (up to 60 
hours in Chirundu for a consolidated load). The opening of a one-stop post in Chirundu with 
WB support paved the way for a further reduction in travel time to or from ports (I-4.3.4).  
Even more than with road freight, rail freight is still affected by differences in standards 
between networks, insufficient coordination, lack of traction capacity, and so forth, 
reinforcing the comparative advantages of road freight. 
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Transport conditions improved, mainly for import-export road freight 
The EU interventions in the transport sector significantly improved road and air transport.  
The SPSP1 financial inputs targeted maintenance and rehabilitation, as well as individual 
rehabilitation projects. Almost all of this support was delivered during the last few years of 
the evaluation period owing to procedural delays and contractual issues with contractors. 
However, this support nonetheless helped reduce VOCs and the travel time between main 
cities and those in neighbouring countries, including ports (Dar es Salaam, Durban). The 
poor quality of the works undertaken under the management and supervision of the RDA57, 
which covers most of the EU support, implies that not only the value-for-money of the 
investments was lower than expected but also that the economic benefits of road transport 
will be lower and less sustainable than intended (I-4.4.1, 4.4.2). 
The EU contribution to upgrading Lusaka and Livingstone airports to meet the increasing 
demand for mobility and the growth potential of the areas served improved passenger 
connections and, albeit to a far lesser extent, freight linkages, mainly with countries in the 
region and the tourist international market. The main cities are too close to justify major 
development of national lines. In this sub-sector the EU interventions contributed to 
improving security and runway capacity rather than to reducing running costs. (I-4.4.4) 
Cost savings probably passed on to road freight beneficiaries 
The Zambian trucking industry can be characterised as competitive, with segmented 
markets, several operators and deregulated transport prices (I-4.5.3). The conditions for a 
level playing field are in place (although not all; the cabotage regulations of South African 
operators are particularly restrictive). Transport costs for international operations are aligned 
on South African standards, and national freight prices are higher taking into account higher 
fuel prices in Zambia (I-4.5.1). There are therefore no apparent market distortions in price 
setting. Price flexibility over time is not documented (I-4.5.2).  
The illegal checkpoint tolls were noted (I-4.5.4) but do not seem to be an important factor in 
fixing transport prices for long-distance haulage, which are far more affected by waiting 
times at border crossings and fuel prices. 
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Figure 6:  EDFs 7 to 10 road infrastructure projects in Zambia 
 
Source: EU Delegation 
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4.6 POPULATION HEALTH STATUS 
EQ5: To what extent did EU interventions in the health sector contribute to improving 
the health status of the population, in particular regarding the fight against HIV? 
JC 5.1. EU support contributed to increased service utilisation and intervention coverage 
JC 5.2.  EU support contributed to enhanced service availability & quality related to infrastructure, 
equipment and drugs 
JC 5.3.  EU support contributed to enhanced service availability & quality related to health care 
workers 
JC 5.4.  EU support contributed to increased affordability of health care 
Overall assessment 
The EU’s combined GBS and health SBS contributed to substantial budgetary increases 
and improved services, with increased utilization of health facilities. EU’s specific focus on 
human resources management reform provided a significant impetus for its successful 
implementation and allowed addressing of the issue of persistent staff attrition in a context 
of an imposed staff employment freeze.  
However, the combined EU/DPs support was not a sufficient response to the increasing 
vulnerability of the population, related to unequal access to the country’s growth benefits 
and correlated with a deteriorating health environment directly impacting on nutritional 
issues (especially for pregnant women and infants) and on patients’ responses to AIDS 
treatments: for instance, despite substantial progress results in the maternal mortality ratio 
are still far from the targets set in the MDG. In addition, findings from recent studies will 
need to be addressed in the next support programmes, especially those confirming 
households’ increased preference for private suppliers of services and drugs.  
Finally, the 2009 crisis with the misappropriation in health funds, which led to a uniform 
response in terms of a temporary interruption to PRBS disbursement, played a pivotal role in 
the on-going reform of sector governance. 
The EU was successful in contributing to a renewed health policy framework, notably 
by managing the 2009 mismanagement crisis 
Zambia pioneered "basket funding" with its cooperating partners as early as 1993, and a 
Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) involved partners in pooling resources programmed in 
accordance with GRZ budgetary allocations. The whole process might have acted during 
the first half of the evaluation period as a disincentive to the Government’s financial 
commitments to the health sector, which decreased in 2004 to an alarming 4.7% of total 
government expenditure, a trend since reversed (JC 5.2). However the expected improved 
transparency associated with GBS/SBS processes (with improved PFM and sustained 
policy dialogue) did not succeed in attracting other donors to contribute to funding the 
Government Budget and a large share of donor support remained off-budget. The main 
increase in external aid during this period was largely financed from flows of large 
philanthropic disease-specific commitments58. In addition, external support mainly focussed 
on capital investments, accounting for from 11.5% of total health expenditure in 1995 (15% 
in 2001) up to 42.5% in 2005 and 32.1% in 2008.  
The sustained EU commitment to the health sector was mobilised throughout EDFs 959 and 
1060. Complementary to EU resources channelled through EU GBS (PRBS I-II and MDG 
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contract), additional resources were channelled through two sector budget support 
programmes: Retention for Human Resources for Health (€10m under EDF961) and 
Supporting Public Health Service Delivery in Zambia (€35m under EDF1062). Whereas 
disbursement of the EDF9 programme was subject to attainment of benchmarks set out in 
the Human Resources for Health strategic plan logframe, the conditions relating to 
disbursements under the EDF10 Programme (monitored in SBS PAF63) were drafted in 
coherence with the outcomes (monitored in GBS PAF64). It is also worth noting that a 
contribution agreement of €0.4M with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
supported achievement of the 2007 Zambia Demographic and Health Survey, still used as 
the reference document for the MDG progress reports65. 
Both EU-financed GBS and SBS were aligned with government’s global (FNDP) and sector 
strategies. The dialogue under GBS formalised in the Zambia Aid Policy and Strategy 
and the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) was further structured at 
sectoral level, an MoU being signed in April 2005 that formalised all partner contributions to 
implementation of the National Health Sector Policy (NHSP 2006- 2010) with the objective 
of significantly improving equity of access to essential health services, in part by improving 
the availability of essential infrastructure and equipment.  
The health partnerships were organised through Joint Coordinating Mechanisms and 
consultative and coordination structures such as (i) Annual Consultative Meetings (ACM), 
(ii) Sector Advisory Groups (SAG), (iii) MoH/CP Consultative Policy Meetings, (iv) Technical 
Working Groups/Sub-Committees and (v) Health CP Group Meetings.  
EU took advantage of its specific commitment in GBS and SBS for linking both overall and 
sectoral dialogue platforms: the functional link between overall GBS and health sector 
specific platforms worked quite well as illustrated by DFID’s current membership of the 
troika that chairs health sector policy dialogue despite its not directly financing the sector. 
In 2009 the crisis resulting from misappropriation of health funds served as a useful warning 
signal: it first revealed weaknesses in the effectiveness of dialogue mechanisms, as the 
policy dialogue did not help avert mismanagement within the sector. It led to delays in PRBS 
disbursement to, and basket funding of, the health sector, and a High Level Policy Dialogue 
(HLPD) was jointly initiated on the underlying principles stipulated in the MoU’s PRBS. This 
in turn led to the formulation of a Joint Governance Action Plan in the health sector, which 
agreed implementation steps representing triggers for resumption of CP disbursements. The 
whole process has been acknowledged as a starting point for substantial organisational and 
managerial decisions in areas as wide apart as staff or supply chain management. 
The EU contribution through GBS, SBS and the health SWAp complemented 
government’s efforts and yielded notable results in terms of improved health (JC 5.1), 
service availability (JC 5.2) and affordability (JC 5.4).  
In contributing to financing un-earmarked health expenditure consistent with the MoH 
strategy, the EU (as well as other CPs within the health SWAp) contributed to substantial 
budgetary increases between 2005 and 2010, as well as appropriate and timely budgetary 
disbursements (running budget and drugs) to health care facilities in the districts. In addition, 
the specific EU focus on health outcomes in its GBS monitoring contributed to facilitating the 
dialogue between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance and National Planning 
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  FA signed in March 2007. Scheduled disbursements in two fixed disbursements in 2006 and 2007 of €3m and 
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  FA signed in December 2007 with a fixed (€8.5m) and a variable tranche of (€3m) to be disbursed in second 
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year of age in the 20 worst-performing districts 
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(MFNP) for improved budgeting and planning processes in the health sector.  
The government’s efforts yielded notable outcomes in terms of service availability and 
utilization66: physical and financial access to health care facilities improved, especially in 
rural areas (I-5.2.1), with improved coverage of prevention activities and treatments relating 
to HIV/AIDS infection (I-5.2.2). Substantial efforts have been directed to effective availability 
of essential (I-5.2.3) and ART drugs (I-5.2.4).  
This led to some improved health-related MDG indicators (JC 5.1) between both 2001 and 
2007 ZHDS. The Under-Five Mortality rate fell from 168 per 1,000 live births in 2002 to 119 
in 2007, exceeding the 2010 target of 134 per 1,000 live births. Recent updates indicate a 
sustained improvement in infant mortality (86 per 1,000 live births in 2009 against 99 in 
2000). The spread of malaria diminished slightly from 373 per 1,000 persons in 2002 to 358 
in 2007, and the HIV prevalence rate finally dropped in 2007 to 14% for adults aged 
between 15-49 years, from an observed 16% in 2001/2002.  
These encouraging results are correlated with the upward trend depicted in the HMIS health 
bulletins, for instance in terms of improved service utilisation and intervention coverage (I-
5.1.1) improved children immunisation (I-5.1.4), improved family planning (I-5.1.5), improved 
malaria treatment (I-5.1.6) or improved antiretroviral therapy coverage (I-5.1.7). 
These achievements should however be balanced with reservations as to their scope and 
sustainability, especially those related to mother and child health in a context of high HIV 
prevalence and increasing vulnerability within the population. 
The Maternal Mortality ratio decreased from 649 per 100,000 living birth in 2002 to 499 
deaths in 2007 and 470 in 200967, still far above the MDG target of 162 set for 2015 – a 
trend confirmed by the HMIS data on improved antenatal care coverage and increases in 
the number of births attended by skilled personnel, which indicate – following a slight 
improvement – a persistent reluctance on the part of pregnant women to deliver in health 
centres (I-5.1.3). Whereas supervised deliveries, as well as stocks of antibiotics, greatly help 
reduce maternal fatality cases68, the reported direct causes of maternal death include 
haemorrhage (34%), sepsis (13%), obstructed labour (8%), hypertensive conditions (5%) 
and abortion (4%), with indirect causes related to malaria (11%) and HIV (10%)69. The range 
of these indirect causes of maternal mortality indicates that the EU-CP support was not a 
sufficient response to the increasing vulnerability of the population, linked to a deteriorating 
environment for health which directly impacts on nutritional issues (esp. for pregnant women 
and infants) and on patients’ response to AIDS treatments, for instance. In its CSP-NIP 
2008-2013, the EU planned to strengthen the link between combined GBS/SBS and projects 
funded from the EU thematic instruments such as the poverty-related disease budget line, 
but did not follow through with it70. GRZ had instead asked the EU to contribute to the MDG 
initiative, addressing the issue of maternal health in the 16 most vulnerable districts. 
In addition, major shortcomings have already been mentioned in relation to the supply 
chain management cycle for drugs and pharmaceuticals, laboratory services and 
medical imaging: the 2008 MTR of the national health policy recalled for instance GFATM, 
WB, and Auditors General reservations on the procedures followed by the 
MOH/Procurement and Supplies Unit. The need for substantially improving the supply chain 
management and logistics became even more urgent following the afore-mentioned 2009 
crisis. 
The EU Programme for retention of human resources for the health sector was built on 
a shared vision with the National Health Strategic Plan, namely to assure equity of access to 
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  Maternal mortality ratio has been recently estimated at 591 per 100,000 live births. Source : MoH concept 
note, Accelerating Progress Towards Maternal, Neonatal and Child Morbidity and Mortality Reduction in 
Zambia, June 2011. 
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  Budget Support evaluation health case study (2011) 
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  MoH concept note (2011), op.cit. 
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good-quality, cost-effective and affordable health services as close as possible to the 
family71. Concomitant EU financial releases in support of the sector policy helped bear the 
financial cost of the Basic Health Care Package (BHCP), which in April 2006 abolished user 
fees (including drugs) for primary health care. The joint GRZ and CPs financial commitment 
appears to have increased the affordability of health care, especially in rural health 
facilities72 as the public health facilities or missions accounted respectively for only 5% and 
1% of households’ total health expenditure73. In spite of government commitment through 
BHCP, households still account for nearly half of all curative care spending, consistently 
from out-pocket expenditure for private for-profit healthcare providers (including traditional 
health practitioners, private hospitals and clinics as well as drugs supply)  (I-5.4.2).  
This raises the issue of how to address the changes in patients’ expenditure patterns, 
especially with a contributions to insurance schemes representing only 1% of total 
health expenditure (I-5.4.1). This issue was also highlighted in the 2008 MTR NHSP, 
advocating implementation of a social health insurance scheme for formal sector employees 
as soon as possible. However the contribution of the private for-profit sector74 remains 
marginal at an average of 5.5% of total health expenditure75, which raises sustainability 
issues in relation to compensating for a possible drying-up of large donors’ disease-specific 
contributions. The recommendations of the 2008 MTR NHSP still appear to be relevant 
today, favouring initiatives such as encouraging private investment in the country’s health 
sector through PPP arrangements and work-based health and HIV/AIDS prevention and 
treatment programmes. 
The results in terms of improved financial accessibility for the most vulnerable people 
(I-5.4.3) are also mixed: the 2008 MTR of the Zambia Health Development Plan mentions 
some “equity challenges relating to access to health facilities in terms for instance of urban 
versus rural settings”. For people living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHA), the provision of free 
ART helped decrease household expenditure on HIV care, but this increased proportionally 
the cost of care for opportunistic infections. 
EU brought a significant and specific impetus to the health policy in terms of policy 
dialogue and financial support, with the EU Health Worker Retention Scheme 
provided through Sectoral Budget Support (JC 5.3).  
The EU’s commitment to MoH’s health workers’ retention scheme76 was consistent with the 
EU global strategy for action in response to the crisis in human resources for health in 
developing countries77, approved in December 2005. And while basket funds and disease-
specific financing were not able formally to finance staff-related expenditure, it created more 
flexibility and contributed to improved GRZ resource allocation.  
The focus on benchmarks (such as improvements in ‘population to health professionals’ 
ratios or in payroll management) for disbursement of the variable tranches of the EU 
programme provided a significant impetus for successful human resources reform 
                                               
71 
 FA TAPS Overall Objective. 
72
  Noted as well by the mid-term review of the Zambia National health Strategic Plan (Nov 2008) 
73
  MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009 
74
  i.e. the contribution of private companies for the heath care of their staff and families 
75
  Zambia National Health Accounts (2009), op. cit. 
76
  MoH developped in 2003 the Zambian Health Worker Retention Scheme, a three-year commitment that 
allowed allocation of ZMK 32 billion in addition to the normal personal emoluments. Then a strategic plan for 
human resources for the health sector (2006-2010) was adopted that aimed at ensuring an adequate and 
equitable distribution of appropriately motivated, skilled and equitably-distributed health workers providing 
quality services. This allowed incorporation of the corresponding financing needs into the country’s macro-
framework and corresponding MTEF. And in a context marked by the debate on the wage sustainability, the 
MoH was exempted from the public sector employment freeze. 
77
  In Zambia staff attrition became obvious after the approval of the revised establishment for MoH shortly after 
the dissolution of the Central Board of Health in 2006: the needed posts were re-evaluated in accordance with 
WHO recommendations from an initial 23,000 to about 50,000. For the health sector it was reported that 
virtually unqualified health workers ran 45% of the rural health centres. The situation was severe and called 
into question the country’s ability to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, such as MDG 5 relat ing to 
maternal health.  
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implementation. It encouraged the GRZ to further develop the human resources 
development plan, which is currently being updated78, with continuous strong pressure from 
the EU in the elaboration process. 
This approach led to substantial results. Besides specific efforts to increase the number of 
specialised personnel such as pharmacists, nutritionists, radiologists or dental surgeons, 
MoH also strengthened its clinical staff. (I-5.3.1) At national level, the number of medical 
doctors doubled between 2006 and 2010 (from 574 to 1,076 respectively), the number of 
midwives increased moderately (from 2,240 to 2,745), and the number of nurses increased 
from 6,496 to 7,795 (+20%). The figures from the last census indicate a significant 
improvement in coverage by medical doctors (1:21,019 in 2006, 1:12,125 in 2010), and 
slight improvements in coverage by midwives (1:5,386 in 2006, 1:4,753 in 2010) and nurses 
(1:1,857 in 2006, 1:1,674 in 2010)79. However, the brain drain of medical personnel has still 
not been overcome and high staff vacancies rates are still reported. Moreover, the strong 
EU focus on outputs at district level80 might have restricted absorption capacities in delaying 
the releases to the beneficiary.  
Finally EU institutional support for the Health Management Information System (HMIS) 
through the dedicated component of PRBS, allowed strengthening of government’s only 
comprehensive facility-based information system for improving poverty reduction 
monitoring.81 It also helped develop a Health Sector Performance Monitoring Framework 
(HSPMF), to be used for the 2011 assessment of the variable tranche of the on-going 
programme. 
                                               
78
  It focuses on the improvements in training, equitable distribution of health workers with appropriate skills mix, 
and adequate human resources planning and management. 
79
  Staff distribution per province is detailed in Annex XI, JC5.3.2 
80
  Note to the file 10/12/2008. Among the specific conditions for the release of the 2008 variable tranche: no 
district should have presented a ratio above 7,000 whereas 14 were still showing a higher ratio.  
81
  HIMS and PE2-BRBS1 (13,5 MZKW, Dec. 2006) and PE1-PRBS2 (8,9 MZKW, Nov 2009) 
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4.7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
EQ6: To what extent have EU interventions contributed to enhancing democratic 
governance? 
JC 6.1:  The legal and regulatory framework for civil society is conducive to CSOs involvement in 
policy processes 
JC 6.2:  The presence and interface of CSOs with the population and the government is ensured 
JC 6.3:  CSOs become sustainable entities operating in all relevant policy areas and in 
complementarity with other NSAs 
JC 6.4:  The EU support has contributed to that the electoral process was transparent and well 
organised 
JC 6.5:  The EU has ensured the overall coherence of its interventions for reinforcing civil society 
capacity in relation to governance processes 
JC 6.6:  Cross-cutting issues advocacy and implementation are supported by CSOs supported by the 
EU 
Overall assessment 
The extent to which EU interventions have contributed to enhancing democratic governance 
during the 2001-2010 period is limited as CSOs in Zambia are still facing substantial 
challenges in becoming sustainable entities operating in all relevant policy areas. A 
landmark in contributing to democratic governance was the EU’s support for transparent 
electoral processes and well organised elections. 
EU support for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), which is a major component of its 
response strategy for enhancing democratic governance, was provided in the absence of a 
conducive legal and regulatory framework aimed at maximising the potential of CSOs as 
development actors. The majority of CSOs proved very weak with regard to capacity. This 
capacity challenge was a key factor for the limited achievements in enhancing the presence 
and interface of CSOs with both the government and the population. 
Substantial grant support (about €68m, including thematic programmes) was provided to 
CSOs in the ten-year period. However, the protracted process and the ultimate failure to 
approve the special CSO support programme under the EDF9 CSP/NIP has made it difficult 
for the EU to achieve an overall coherence of its interventions for reinforcing civil society’s 
capacity for addressing governance issues. 
The EU has throughout fostered open dialogue, especially through regular consultations 
with CSOs in the Thematic Programmes. CSOs were involved in defining the priorities in the 
Calls for Proposals. The EU additionally offered support for grants management and Project 
Cycle Management through ad hoc workshops and meetings.  
The EC aimed to enhance the coherence of its interventions for reinforcing Civil 
Society’s capacity for addressing governance issues but important challenges 
remain, including the need for stronger demand-driven focus.  
Approval of the special, comprehensive CSO capacity strengthening and institutional 
support programme under EDF9 took a very long time and ultimately the programme was 
cancelled for a variety of reasons. The case is illustrative of a yet-to-be-achieved balance 
between the political and development objectives and the programming components of the 
country strategy. CSOs and economic NSAs, for example, were not yet fully recognized – 
particularly by GRZ – as partners in the political and strategic policy dialogue process, 
especially as regards governance issues. This was particularly the case during the second 
part of the ten-year period, despite progress and initial accomplishments. In addition, the 
synergy between the political and development components of the EC country-level 
response strategy for Zambia would need more proactive steering and coordination at the 
level of the EUDel. This would be more in line with the Lisbon Treaty, which places strong 
emphasis on the political dimension of national and regional development and integration. 
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On the other hand the Commission’s lead in governance issues amongst the Cooperating 
Partners was confirmed for the Government-Oriented Division of Labour (GO-DOL) and 
JASZ II will be applied under the Sixth National Development Programme (SNDP - 2011-
2015). This in principle puts the EC in a favourable position to further enhance the 
coherence of its own and other CP interventions for reinforcing civil society’s capacity to 
address governance issues (I-6.5.1). 
The design of the EU response to the different actors in the governance arena has been 
quite comprehensive, as it targets the main stakeholder clusters and different actors, 
including government, parliament, electoral processes, justice, police, civil society 
organisations, and so forth. They were addressed either explicitly or exclusively through 
special project-type interventions, or in the broader framework of an over-arching 
programme (PRSP, PEMFA, PRBS, &c). However, it is not clear whether and how these 
different components of the governance response strategy targeting the different 
stakeholder groups relate to each other, or how far they are complementary and mutually 
reinforcing. This particularly pertains to the different components of the Access to Justice 
Programme, as was evident from the document study and also from various interviews with 
key stakeholders during the field phase. The failure to push through the special CSO 
capacity strengthening project under EDF9 was a major set-back in this regard. 
One of the major criticisms82 of the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) process and 
of General Budget Support as the main EU aid modality in Zambia relates to the inadequate 
attention given to the demand side of the programme strategy, in the context of both 
domestic accountability (active participation of NSAs, Parliament, local government, etc.) 
and capacity-building. At the same time it is recognised that needs were and are not always 
clearly spelled out. In short the PRBS as a flagship programme absorbing about half of the 
total budget of the EDF9 CSP-NIP lacks demand-driven focus and ownership. The Mid-
Term Review of the EDF10 CSP-NIP comes to a roughly similar conclusion on NSA/LA 
involvement in the policy dialogue. The NSAs were indeed actively consulted by the EU 
Delegation during the EDF10 MTR process and it is clearly the intention to strengthen 
support for and dialogue with NSAs in Zambia, but no strategic roadmap yet exists for actual 
interaction between the EU and NSAs (I-6.5.3).  
NSAs generally form part of Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) and have contributed well in 
some sectors (health, education, macro-economic), but less so in others (private sector 
development, agriculture). The Delegation regularly involves NSAs in its programming and 
implementation processes, notably in focal sector 2 on health, in which NSAs are consulted 
on assessment of Sector Budget Support. Dialogue with NSAs is also particularly intense on 
the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), on which the EU Delegation regularly 
interacts in workshops and seminars (I-6.5.4). 
The EU support contributed to the fact that the September 2011 national electoral 
process was transparent and well organised.  
The “Statement of Preliminary Findings” on the 20 September 2011 General Elections in 
Zambia by the EU Election Observation Mission to Zambia summarily concluded as follows: 
“A generally well administered election day and a highly competitive campaign despite the 
absence of a level playing field”. Some critical aspects and challenges mentioned in the 
Mission’s statement refer to (i) reforms of key aspects of the electoral framework for future 
elections; (ii) a few failings in voting and counting of ballots; (iii) unequal access to 
resources, meaning that there was not a level playing field for campaigning; and (iv) the 
failure of the State-owned media to meet even their minimal obligations as public service 
media, as key programmes such as news bulletins lacked any degree of balance in their 
coverage (I-6.4.1).  
The September 2011 General Elections were only one highlight of EU support to electoral 
processes in Zambia. This support spans an extended period of time and covers both pre-
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  EU – Government of Zambia Joint Annual Report (JAR) 2010; p8 
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and post-election processes: Longer-term planning and preparatory assistance for election 
events (e.g. voter education, voter registration, etc.) and post-elections process 
institutionalisation and after-care assistance, both sub-processes with involvement of CSOs. 
This long-term support for the electoral process was provided through EDF10 CSP support 
for the Zambian 2009-2012 Electoral Cycle project with a CSP-NIP A-envelope totalling 
7.4m and an operational implementation phase of 44 months. It is a “classical” project-type 
approach embedded in a trust fund setting with five other CPs and with UNDP as lead. 
Certain difficulties remained as regards information – especially in respect of monitoring – 
which is not always complete or timely, hampering effective supervision.  
Capacity and budgetary constraints delayed progress. There are still major outstanding 
challenges relating to institutionalisation and mainstreaming of the EU project 
accomplishments insofar as many of the trained project personnel were hired on a 
contractual basis, and transfer of knowledge into the mainstream organisation is now in 
jeopardy on account of the impending termination of these contracts. Other outstanding 
issues relate to anchoring of the ICT system and tools (a major EU contribution); and 
electoral support capacity strengthening at provincial level and below, including voter 
education through CSOs and the establishment of civil registration as a precondition for 
transparent voter registration (I-6.4.2).  
The EU support did not allow enhanced CSO involvement in policy processes in the 
absence of a conducive legal and regulatory framework  
At present there is no conducive legal and regulatory enabling environment for maximizing 
the potential of CSOs as development actors. CSOs are still governed under rules and 
regulations unsuited to their needs and characteristics. The NGO Act No. 16 of 26 August 
2009 is contested83 as it mainly concentrates on the obligation on CSOs to register with the 
public authorities (MCDSS, now MCDMCH84) and is perceived by the CSOs as threatening 
their independence rather than bringing about the intended enhanced transparency, 
accountability and performance. The restricted coverage of the various types of CSO by the 
law (e.g. professional groups or organisations, trade unions, churches, clubs and religious 
organisations are excluded) is another issue of contention, as is the composition of the 
Board and the Working Groups in charge of drafting the rules and regulations of the Act. 
Despite the EU’s support CSOs were not in a position to build a consensus on the 
necessary governance and self-regulation mechanisms (mainly a Code of Conduct and a 
self-regulatory council) (I-6.1.1). 
Relations between the Government (GRZ) and CSOs are not always easy, with GRZ 
nonetheless recognizing the added value of CSO engagement, mainly in respect of 
provision of services in line with the National Development Plans, away from advocacy 
work. To date no legislation for State funding of CSOs exists (I-6.1.2). 
In accordance with the prescribed EU procedures, CSOs are routinely invited to EDF 
programming events including those relating to the CSP/NIP, and thus in principle are also, 
directly or indirectly, involved in aid modality decision-making processes, including those 
relating to General Budget Support (GBS). However the overall quality, added value and 
actual impact of this CSO involvement has not been consistent across the board (I-6.1.3). 
The CSO interface with the population and government remained limited despite 
incentives provided by the EU 
The interfacing of CSOs with government and the population is basically externally 
facilitated by the Cooperating Partners and particularly the EU, rather than an endogenous 
national process. The MoU signed between GRZ and Cooperating Partners on development 
and aid effectiveness provides for a dialogue architecture which sets out the complementary 
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  EUDel Note to the File dated 24 August 2011, in which reference is made to Mumba (2011) 
84
  Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, now renamed as Ministry of Community 
Development and Mother and Child Health 
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fora in which GRZ, CPs and Non-State Actors interact in policy dialogue to improve the 
effectiveness of development assistance (e.g. sector dialogue, dialogue on cross-cutting 
issues, reforms and aid effectiveness, high level policy dialogue). Dialogue with NSAs and 
CSOs has however remained limited. Since 2003 there has been a certain lack of continuity 
in progress on Zambia-EU political dialogue with CSO involvement, but the process gained 
momentum from 2009 onwards, particularly through the Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) in 
health and education (I-6.2.1). 
The cancellation of the comprehensive support programme to CSOs under EDF9 signified a 
major setback for the institutionalisation and mainstreaming of the civil society consultation 
process. The government kept delaying the signing of the Financing Agreement, ultimately 
leading to its termination.  
The quality of CSO-GRZ dialogue events is poor and their outcomes are limited, with the 
exception of those relating to the poverty reduction strategy. There is not much inclination to 
acknowledge CSOs’ influence and impact on governance and accountability issues, apart 
from some relatively substantial budget tracking and monitoring. (I-6.2.2) 
One of the eight weaknesses of CSOs, cited as constituting the rationale for the EDF10 
NSA capacity-building project, is weak vertical linkages with the grassroots level of society, 
thus limiting the pressure from below for accountability. Generally CSOs are strongly 
dependent on aid flows, with limited (if any) constituencies and low levels of transparency 
and accountability85 (I-6.2.3). 
EU support has not contributed to CSOs becoming sustainable entities operating in 
all relevant policy areas86 
There are only a handful of Zambian CSOs that currently qualify for core funding.87 Even 
these relatively well-established and institutionalised CSOs have proved to be in need of 
substantial improvements in key functions such as M&E and financial management (I-6.3.2). 
The institutional analysis of CSOs commissioned by the EU in 200688, among others, 
concluded that CSOs’ technical skill levels are generally characterised by a weakness in the 
setting-up of projects and their follow-up, and by the fact that they often have structural 
problems regarding their human resources (in particular, the lack of qualified personnel lost 
to international NGOs) that undermine their capacity to fulfil their mission. The reaffirmation 
of most of these weaknesses in later studies is an indirect confirmation that capacity-
building efforts during the reference period have not been successful. In broad terms, 
human resources are assessed as the weakest aspect of the performance of CSOs in 
Zambia; lack of institutional and management capacities is another cited weakness.  
In this broader context the rationale for establishing the Zambia Governance Foundation 
(ZGF), on the Board of which the EU is represented as an observer, was inter alia to lower 
transaction costs for both CPs and CSOs, broaden the base for funding requests, and 
facilitate networking between organisations. An additional aim was to strengthen the 
institutional capacity and autonomy of CSOs to engage actively in policy processes and 
undertake advocacy on behalf of the poor and socially excluded people in Zambian society. 
The ZGF structure is being considered as a conduit for channelling EDF10 capacity-
strengthening support to CSOs on a call-for-proposals basis (I-6.3.1). 
                                               
85
  EUD Lusaka (2011); “Rationale for 10th EDF NSAs capacity building project in Zambia”; p1 
86
  Generally, in the literature a broad based interpretation is given to the term Civil Society Organisation (CSO) in 
the Zambian context, in as much as CSOs also cover non-government entities often referred to as Non-State 
Actors (NSAs), for example those actors active in the economic sector (e.g. professional associations, 
business organisations, labour unions, etc.) or trade sector. This broad interpretation and dito classification 
are also used in this evaluation report. (e.g. see the CSO classification under Data, Figures, Tables related to 
indicator 6.1.2) As transpired from the consultations during the field visit, most stakeholders adhere to this 
broad definition and classification, whereas the NGO Act of 2009 gives a more restrictive interpretation to the 
concept. This is one of the main areas of dispute and discontent with this legislation. 
87
  The IDL Group (2011); Mid-term Review of the Zambia Governance Foundation; p11, 
88
  STEM-VCR Srl (2006); Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia; pp 39-52 
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Civil Society in Zambia has been quite active in interventions on social issues such as 
poverty and public expenditure management. However success in pushing policy reforms 
through has been limited. According to a recent organisational survey, only slightly more 
than half of the CSOs surveyed have been pushing for policy reforms and these have had 
only limited success. CSOs face substantial challenges in influencing policy processes, 
including a lack of institutionalised mechanisms and governmental mistrust and suspicion.89 
CSOs focusing on advocacy work are finding it more difficult to have their contributions 
recognised as useful for achieving poverty reduction goals.  
Dialogue with CSOs, implying their involvement in advocacy and negotiation activities, 
occurs across a wide front, as part of their participation in Sectoral Advisory Groups (SAGs), 
in over twenty sectors.90 CSOs are particularly active on issues of governance, human 
rights, health service delivery, the fight against HIV/AIDs, education and gender 
mainstreaming. In the main, those CSOs that are active include civil society networks, well-
established nationwide organisations and faith-based organisations (I-6.3.3). 
Cross-Cutting Issues (CCIs) are receiving more focused attention from CSOs and are 
gradually being mainstreamed. However, there is still a long way to go as the CCI 
mainstreaming challenges ahead are still very substantial. This also pertains to EU 
support for CSOs, which is gradually including a stronger focus on CCIs. 
The availability of background documents on such cross-cutting issues as gender, 
environment, governance, human rights, social protection and so on has been confirmed by 
the participants in the evaluation focus group discussion with CSOs, but without further 
details of the type, content, quality and quantity of such documents. This availability has also 
been confirmed in umbrella programmes on CSO capacity strengthening as for example 
with the Zambia Governance Foundation (ZGF).91. On the other hand NSA knowledge and 
familiarity with the Cotonou Agreement and with EC policies, strategy instruments and its 
programmes, including those relating to CCIs, remains insufficient.92 In general, CSOs 
recognize that the EU has made important progress in expanding disclosure but still further 
efforts need to be made. CSOs generally view greater disclosure as a key step forward in 
operationalising the civil engagement framework put forward at Cotonou, so as to ensure 
that all non-State stakeholders have the background and information they need to engage 
effectively in dialogue with both the government and the EU (I-6.6.1). 
With the NGO Act not yet operational and no CSO registration in place, the actual number of 
CSOs and Apex organisations involved in crosscutting issues cannot reliably be determined. 
(I-6.6.2). However indirect empirical evidence of growth in the CSO portfolio of CCI projects 
is provided both through the prioritisation in the EU country strategy and indicative 
programme processes, and through other strategy documents and key programmes (e.g. 
general budget support in relation to the PRSP or the successor FNDP with special focus on 
MDGs, particularly those relating to CCIs). The mainstreaming of crosscutting issues such 
as gender and environment is a recurrent annual theme in the subsequent JARs. Efforts are 
being stepped up to further mainstream cross-cutting issues, particularly in the fields of 
gender, environment and HIV/AIDS.93 (I-6.6.2) But there still remain very substantial 
challenges ahead in CCI mainstreaming by CSOs (I-6.6.3). 
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  Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD) and Civicus World Alliance for Citizen Participation; Civil 
Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia - The Status of Civil Society in Zambia: Challenges and 
Future Prospects; 2011; pp 33-46 
90
  Mid-Term Review of EDF10 CSP (16 October 2009) – Conclusions; pp 16-17 
91
  As transpired for example from the recent ZGF mid-term review; The IDL Group (2011) p11 
92
  As shown in the EU commissioned institutional analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia of 2006 - STEM-VCR 
Srl (2006) pp 36-37; 
93
  More detailed information and concrete illustrations are provided in the Information Matrix related to JC 6.6. 
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4.8 FOOD SECURITY AND AGRICULTURE 
EQ7: To what extent have EU interventions contributed to promote smallholder 
agricultural growth and food security? 
JC 7.1:  Access of smallholders to agricultural inputs improved in pilot provinces 
JC 7.2:  Production and productivity increased in pilot province and overall 
JC 7.3:  Value chain/value addition was developed 
JC 7.4:  Food security increased in rural districts, and particularly in districts supported by EU Food 
Facility 
JC 7.5:  The improvement of urban markets infrastructure supported small holders’ production 
JC 7.6:  The food security policy and programming framework has improved 
Overall assessment 
The EU support for the reform of agricultural policy did not overcome government inertia but 
successfully paved the way for innovative sustainable approaches to agricultural sector 
support.  
The central pivot of EU support for agriculture and food security in Zambia, the €15m 
Support to Agriculture Diversification & Food Security Project (SADFS), fell short of initial 
expectations of elaborating a revised policy framework for food security along with 
reinforcing extension services to smallholders, mainly through the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Co-operatives (MACO). The scope for developing an integrated sector strategy and 
ownership is limited. The contribution to improving smallholder access to extension services 
and agricultural inputs (fertilizers, seeds, etc.), or encouraging market-oriented production 
and developing value chains, has been rather limited. Other EU rural development projects, 
funded through NIP or Food Facility, were more thematically or spatially focused. They 
provided useful lessons for a future SWAp but at present their impact does not extend 
beyond local communities and the direct beneficiaries of these projects.  
In consequence, EU interventions had no measurable impact on agricultural growth and 
food security country-wise nor on local communities beyond the direct beneficiaries of 
projects supported by the Food Facility. The projects faced considerable difficulties arising 
from the limited capacities and inertia of the Ministry of Agriculture, which were not 
anticipated during the design phase of the SADFS and Conservation farming projects. Only 
a few small-scale projects, supporting NSA initiatives, were successfully implemented and 
are likely to be sustainable.  
The agricultural sector in Zambia comprises over 1.1 million small and medium scale 
households, providing livelihoods for more than 50% of the population. Production 
concentrates on rain-fed maize (the main staple crop). The sector absorbs approximately 
67% of the labour force and remains the main source of income and employment for the 
rural population. Maize harvests varied between 1.2 million metric tonnes during the 
2007/08 season and 1.8 million metric tonnes in the 2008/09 season. Given Zambia’s 
abundant natural endowment with land and water, agriculture has the potential to become 
the key to rural growth and poverty reduction but chronic food insecurity still prevails in rural 
households. 
The strategic issue for agriculture and food security is that agriculture in Zambia is still very 
much a subsistence activity, kept out of the cash economy and with individual initiative 
stifled by strong dependency on extension services and government-subsidised schemes 
inherited from the former socialist regime. Most MACO services are still passing out-dated 
messages, far from promoting income increases and entrepreneurship. The sole focus is on 
increasing the production of maize through increased use of chemical fertilizers and hybrids.  
EU interventions in rural areas during EDFs 9 and 10 were limited in resources, with 
disbursements during the evaluation period totalling around €40m of which over €20m was 
from the Food Facility and therefore outside strategic NIP programming. Nevertheless, this 
amount was far from sufficient to generate measurable results on production and 
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productivity indicators at country level. The main EDF project in this sector was the €15m 
Support to Agriculture Diversification & Food Security Project (SADFSP), covering two 
provinces. Other projects, financed by the NIP (such as the conservation farming project, 
€1.9m) or by the Food Facility, were locally-based with thematic components which served 
more to provide experience for designing a SWAp than to contribute to improvements in 
agriculture production and food availability beyond their direct beneficiaries. Two new large 
EDF10 Programmes (€20m) focusing on important aspects of scaling-up conservation 
farming and improving sector performance had yet to become effective during the reference 
period. 
A food security policy framework beyond the reach of EU interventions and with poor 
sector monitoring (JC 7.6) 
The policy framework in the agricultural sector has significantly improved over recent years 
with the adoption of the National Agricultural Policy (NAP) in the mid-2000s and of the 
Private Sector Development (PSD) agenda. Past interventions mainly focused on production 
improvements while ignoring the role of markets. The new framework resulted in more 
attention being paid to the whole agricultural value chain, acknowledging the key role played 
by input suppliers and agribusiness firms.  
The EU intervention specifically designed to improve the food security policy framework was 
the SADFSP, particularly its component 1. This project was designed to be fully 
implemented through the Ministry's structure and to pave the way to a future sector support 
programme under EDF10. The project failed to contribute to elaborating a renewed policy 
framework, owing mainly to the inadequate initial TA and the lack of clarity in the FA as to 
the distribution of responsibility. It can be inferred from the overall administrative context that 
the MACO departments were at all levels unresponsive and did not support the EU initiative 
(I-7.6.1). 
The ROM reports repeatedly highlighted weaknesses in the support to MACO for reinforcing 
the M&E system’s baseline data and monitoring instruments and improving its integration in 
the policy and programming processes. Rather than strengthening MACO’s M&E system the 
SADFSP has designed its own system. Although Policy and Planning Department (PPD) 
has the overall responsibility for MACO’s M&E system, to date PPD has not taken 
ownership of the project’s M&E system. The responsibility of monitoring and evaluating 
higher level indicators (outcome and impact) lies with PPD while the individual departments 
within MACO are expected to focus on monitoring lower-level indicators (results/outputs and 
activities). These limits are also linked to the inability of the project to contribute to 
elaborating a food security strategy, the lack of ownership of MACO staff and insufficient 
budget allocation for M&E (I-7.6.3). 
Insofar as the EU intervention failed to contribute in improving the policy framework, it can 
hardly be inferred that it has had an effect on budget allocations by GRZ to the agricultural 
sector. M&E reports are unanimous in their assessment that extension services in pilot 
provinces were left to EU financial resources, even with decreasing budget allocations. At 
the same time it seems common, as confirmed by observers, that when a province is 
externally supported, GRZ passes budgetary resources to other provinces (I-7.6.2). 
A limited contribution to increasing production and productivity in agriculture (JC 7.1 
and 7.2) 
Agricultural performance in Zambia is vulnerable to erratic rainfall patterns and poor 
irrigation systems, lack of access to credit and infrastructural deficiencies, which translates 
into very high transport costs and a lack of adequate marketing channels. Seasonal and 
regional production patterns result in large seasonal and regional price variability. Zambia’s 
poor remain extremely vulnerable to production shocks, not only because droughts reduce 
crop and livestock production and incomes, but also because market price increases 
thereby greatly diminish the purchasing power of poor households. 
The EU interventions in agriculture and food security were focused mainly on promoting 
improved access to inputs, including extension services. The SADFSP was the major 
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vehicle for the EU’s strategic response in the sector, comprehensively integrating 
improvements in the policy framework, reinforcement of MACO extension services (in two 
pilot provinces), and support for NSA initiatives. Some of the latter focused on agricultural 
inputs but that was not their major objective. Other EU interventions had far less financial 
weight, were less integrated within MACO, and had much more localised scope, for example 
the conservation farming and agriculture project or several small scale projects supported by 
the Food Facility through calls for proposals. 
This sector portfolio made a limited contribution to improving smallholder access to 
agricultural inputs, countrywide as well as in pilot provinces. Land tenure issues (I-7.1.1) 
were left unattended to by EU projects on the grounds of their being being politically 
sensitive. Agriculture machinery was out of reach of smallholders. The major expected EU 
contribution was reinforcement of extension services provided by MACO’s decentralised 
departments in pilot provinces. At the end of the reference period these services were still 
unable to reach smallholders owing to a lack of dynamism in extension methodologies and 
an inherent lack of flexibility in their organisation, as shown by a structural inability to 
conduct relevant and responsive research activities, and by an insufficiency of resources to 
support the delivery of agricultural services and information at block and camp levels. An 
average of one extension officer per 600 farmers was also a limitation. The smallholders 
consequently showed little interest in MACO extension services (I-7.1.4). The SADFSP 
component 3, in support of NSA initiatives, was much more efficient in responding to 
smallholder expectations and needs. 
The SADFSP project did not manage in improving the access of the rural population in the 
pilot provinces to financial services as banks require title deeds, otherwise asking for for 
agricultural investment purposes unfeasible interest rates (commonly 50%, sometimes up to 
300%) even for micro-credit schemes (I-7.1.5). Extending access to financial services was 
neither within the scope of the conservation farming project, nor with in Food Facility calls 
for project proposals. 
EU projects promoting conservation farming and crop diversification supported the use of 
fertilizers by beneficiaries through a voucher system. Fertilizer provision suffered first from 
competition with government (and PAM) schemes and second – after adopting the same 
channels – from delays in delivery through the governmental system (I-7.1.2). The degree of 
improvement was as expected.  
The SADFSP project mostly failed to demonstrate the advantages of improved seeds, as 
most seeds procured were from commercial crops, were infected with pests, or arrived late 
and without a proper fertiliser or pesticide package. Where it was successful, sustainability 
is unlikely according to the sources consulted. Another EU intervention for improving the 
provision of seeds to smallholders was launched under the Food Facility, allowing seed 
production and popularisation of growing techniques, even if not on the originally planned 
scale . The 2011 Food Facility country evaluation94 in its preliminary assessment concluded 
that, while the seed production at local level is likely to continue after the end of the project, 
the National Seed Growers Association (NSGA) initiatives at national level are unlikely to be 
successful as this organisation has been very dependent on the project for its recurrent 
costs (I-7.1.3). 
The failure of the SADFSP component 2 to improve the performance of MACO’s extension 
services in pilot provinces implies that contributing to a significant increase in production and 
productivity beyond that of the participating farmers was beyond the reach of the EU 
interventions. Some positive effects were identified by the 2010 households’ survey but the 
limited sample (i.e. 15 households per district) is insufficient for drawing further conclusions. 
Qualitatively, however, the positive trend was confirmed by farmers in the final evaluation of 
the programme (I-7.2.3). 
                                               
94
  The Food Facility evaluation took place in parallel to this evaluation. The final report has not been available 
yet for the country level evaluation and any reference to the Food Facility evaluation refers to the public oral 
presentation of preliminary results only. 
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The EU interventions did not aim to contribute to increasing production of high-value 
agricultural products in the targeted pilot projects. Diversification in SADFSP project was 
more targeted on the food security of smallholders, promoting food crops such as cassava, 
millet, sweet potato, sorghum and rice (I-7.2.2).  
Land area under permanent crops increased by only 1 per cent during the reference period. 
No data is available with which to measure any specific contribution from the SADFSP. 
There is no evidence of differences in production indices in the intervention districts vis-à-vis 
national trends. The other EU projects made no or only an indirect contribution to increasing 
the land area under permanent crops and food production. This issue was addressed during 
the field mission (I-7.2.1, I-7.2.4). 
A narrow focus on food security with little emphasis on market-oriented agriculture or 
value chain promotion (JC 7.3 and 7.5) 
In spite of the NAP and the PSD agenda, there was very little emphasis in the main EDF 
interventions either on promotion of value chains or on improved marketing approaches, or 
on incentives to farmers in respect of market-oriented surplus production to earn a cash 
income. The EU’s interventions did not succeed in making farmers more aware of key 
market information, notably for winter crops. This was due to limitations on whether or how 
key market information was to be communicated to farmers. This reduced access of farmers 
to marketing opportunities, and linkages with credit facilities were not sufficiently explored or 
exploited (I-7.3.1).  
The principal EU project that contributed to promoting smallholders’ commercialisation 
initiatives and increasing local storage capacity was the Food Facility’s “Improving 
Productivity of the Small-Scale Agricultural Sector in Zambia” project. It was managed by 
the Zambia National Farmers Union ZNFU. The ZNFU has over 900,000 Members in 52 
District Farmer Associations (DFA) and is an effective lobbying and advocacy organisation. 
Although no impact data are yet available, one can conclude from the strategic design of the 
project and from the outreach of ZNFU that the construction of Agriculture Service Centres 
with grain storage facilities and related services are likely to achieve the desired outputs and 
that the prospects for positive impact are high (I-7.3.3). 
In addition, a few EC-supported small-scale projects implemented by Northern NGO or their 
local partners promoted market-oriented agriculture to CBOs with some success. An 
example is the collaboration between Self Help Africa and the Keepers Zambia Foundation, 
in which commodity-based groups of 20 farmers were shown how to manage their own 
resources sustainably, disseminate market information, and capture value in value chains. 
Nationwide, a downward trend in agricultural added value per worker was recorded during 
the reference period (see data in I-7.3.2). In areas supported by the EU most of any 
increase in added value retained by the producer would have arisen from better access to 
market information and improved linkages with wholesalers and storage facilities, facilitating 
sale at higher prices. As no such specific monitoring data on agricultural commodities in EC 
supported regions is available, it is impossible to assess whether the EC support had any 
impact on the level of added value retained by the producers (I-7.3.2).  
There is furthermore no evidence that the support for improved urban market infrastructure 
provided any incentive for more market-oriented production by smallholders (I-7.5.3). Food 
vouchers targeted on specific vulnerable households were an innovative welfare-based 
approach that reached its target groups (23,200 households), but it is not clear whether this 
had any effect on trade volumes or agricultural production, and the sustainability of such a 
temporary approach was questioned by observers during the field phase (I-7.5.4). 
Limited or no impact on high level indicators of food security (JC 7.4) 
Zambia’s poor remain extremely vulnerable to production shocks. In fact climatic vagaries 
are so frequent that people have no time to recover before another flood or drought hits, 
resulting in increased poverty and food insecurity. The long-term effects of this situation are 
reflected in high rates of malnutrition. According to FAO 47% of the population in Zambia is 
affected by chronic malnutrition. This is the tenth highest rate in the world. This percentage 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report  
 ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 53 - 
did not change during the reference period even though food intake slightly rose. According 
to the 2006 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, 54.2% of Zambian children under the age 
of five are stunted, 19.7% are underweight and 5.9% suffer from wasting diseases (I-7.4.1, 
7.4.2). 
In addition, food distribution has created a certain dependency among beneficiary 
households and the EU interventions have not been successful in better integrating food aid 
into food security and agricultural development for rural households. 
As already mentioned above, the 2011 final evaluation concluded that the SADFSP project 
had failed to achieve its aim of developing a government-owned food security strategy. This 
implies that the EU did not contribute to increasing food security in rural districts country-
wise. It is therefore of no use tracing the EU contribution in national statistics, as initially 
envisaged under this judgement criterion. 
EU contribution in pilot districts covered by the SADFSP was also limited by the component 
1 failure to develop a task force and strategy as component 2 and 3 were linked by project 
design to the release of the food security strategy. It was only at a late stage that the 
activities in support to MACO’s extension services and NSAs were implemented, the former 
with only limited benefits to smallholders. Other EU projects, through EDF resources or 
Food Facility, have been too limited in their (technical or spatial) scope and financial volume 
to have an effect on outcome indicators of food security in rural areas (I-7.4.3).  
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4.9 AID MODALITIES AND AID EFFICIENCY 
EQ8: To what extent was the EU aid modality combination appropriate to the national 
context and the EU development strategy? 
JC 8.1:  Several options of aid modalities have been discussed for aid activities by sector 
JC 8.2:  Emerging issues were incorporated quickly and effectively into EU programming and policy 
dialogue 
JC 8.3:  The synergy between aid modalities had been discussed both within each focal sector and 
overall 
JC 8.4:  Combinations of instruments and approaches were defined to suit partners’ capacity more 
than regulations of each financing modality 
JC 8.5:  Combining EU aid modalities was an inclusive internal strategic process 
JC 8.6:  Aid modality combinations were the result of complementarity with other donors 
Overall assessment 
Generally the choice of EU aid modalities has been appropriate to the Zambian context and 
aligned with the EU development strategy. At least in some sectors, different options for aid 
modalities had been thoroughly discussed when designing EU strategies and programming 
specific interventions. The mix of aid instruments, approaches and financing modalities has 
generally been well adapted to sector-specific factors and has also changed over the period 
in line with re-assessments of the context. The choice of aid modalities mainly emerged 
from arguments relating to partners’ capacity, rather than from the regulations, procedures 
and characteristics of each modality.  
Shortcomings in the necessary enabling budget support environment substantially affected 
the overall performance of BS programmes in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. These 
shortcomings particularly related to the low level of GRZ ownership, the low intensity and 
quality of high-level political dialogue, weaknesses in the demand focus of General Budget 
Support (GBS) in particular, and the design and operational quality of the BS tools and 
systems, especially process and results monitoring as part of BS’s necessary enabling 
environment. The lack of consensus on the part of the CPs as to the ultimate rationale of BS 
as an aid modality has negatively affected the policy dialogue and ultimately operations, with 
some CPs attaching higher importance to BS as a financing instrument to maximize aid 
development impact, others stressing its functionality as a governance and aid 
accountability enhancement tool. 
Aid modalities debated but not always with appropriate feedback information 
Rather than a rational decision-making process involving a weighing-up of all pros and cons 
prior to the final choice of aid modality for an intervention, decision-making in practice 
depended on the drive to go for a novel modality or on the level of shared enthusiasm and 
success in consensus building with cooperating partners. This particularly pertains to the 
selection of aid modalities during the earlier days of EDF9 programming when procedures 
and instruments were not yet well elaborated and established. The choice of general budget 
support also partly stemmed from continuation of macro-economic support in the framework 
of the consecutive Sysmin and Structural Adjustment Support programmes95.. 
Under EDF9 GBS was aligned with the government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP). The selection of aid modalities for EDF10 was more rational and followed the 
formal EU procedures that had become firmly established by that time. 
                                               
95
  In one way or another, Sysmin and SAP programmes as such were budget support aid modalities “avant-la-
lettre”. 
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Policy dialogue and technical discussions on aid modalities took place in the context of 
programming and project preparation processes.96 EU guidance and notes explaining the 
comparative advantages of the various instruments and approaches in the specific Zambian 
context have in practice been used by key stakeholders in varying degree. The mood 
surrounding the discussion of the Green Paper on the Future of Commission Budget 
Support at the end of the period under review (late 2010) was one of fatigue in respect of 
issues pertaining to budget support. The specific Zambian context was reportedly one of 
difficult discussions on the relevance and effectiveness of BS. The EU (with other CPs) 
challenged the government on its commitment to Public Finance Management (PFM) and 
good governance following the misappropriation crisis in the health and transport sectors. 
This seems to have affected the degree of participation and interest in the consultation 
process on the desirability and priority of BS as an aid modality.97 However, the September 
2011 elections seem to have brought about renewed openness and prudent optimism 
regarding a quality high-level policy dialogue on aid mechanisms and coordination (I-8.1.1).  
There is also evidence of lessons learned from previous or other aid modalities being 
documented and integrated into strategic programming documents. On the other hand, joint 
knowledge management in this regard has been rather weak. This particularly relates to 
different interpretations among Cooperating Partners on how to craft and implement 
conditionality and disbursement mechanisms, and on how inter alia to design and implement 
joint monitoring. Relevant information such as budget analyses, sector assessments and 
disbursement activities has been mostly provided on an ad hoc basis and was widely 
dispersed among Cooperating Partners. This situation caused massive duplication of work 
by individual Cooperating Partners and GRZ and impeded more efficient use of invested 
human capital. The absence of a permanent PRBS secretariat responsible for joint 
knowledge management has been a heavy burden on GRZ in respect of establishing a 
more solid, fact-based dialogue process and ensuring actual use of lessons learned in 
strategic programming documents98 (I-8.1.2).  
There is no evidence that monitoring and evaluation focused systematically on the efficiency 
of aid modalities, and thus on the quality and efficiency of operational performance in 
converting aid inputs into development results. In general M&E has been assessed as one 
of the weaker aspects of all aid modalities, but particularly of General Budget Support. The 
need for further strengthening of performance monitoring and evaluation in the Fifth NDP 
and upcoming Sixth NDP is agreed across the board (I-8.1.3 & 4). 
Well-established coordination and harmonisation fora for policy dialogue are in place 
with the JASZ’s well-elaborated institutional multi-stakeholder platform, but their 
actual functionality has proved limited at moments of crisis.  
The policy dialogue has produced positive outcomes in terms of division of labour and action 
plans for enhanced political and economic governance. Examples are the cases of 
mismanagement of public funds in the transport and health sectors involving SBS 
resources, which were discussed in the JASZ. By opening up these governance issues and 
making them widely visible, the JASZ and its related policy dialogue instruments and 
reporting mechanisms have fulfilled important transparency enhancement functions.  
At the same time, the two mismanagement cases also offer clear illustrations of the inherent 
weaknesses of these dialogue platforms. The JASZ and related fora were not able to 
prevent contamination of the entire political dialogue. It also directly affected the overall 
cooperation strategy and programme, and as such negatively affected the country’s MDG 
and poverty alleviation performance. On the other hand, and on a positive note, under the 
                                               
96
 As evidenced in many key review and evaluation documents as for example the MTR of the EDF10 CSP, the 
MoFNP commissioned country evaluation on the implementation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia, Phase II, 
the EDF10 CSP-NIP document and individual project files as the Access to Justice project. 
97
  EUDel Lusaka; Note on the Local Consultation on the Budget Support Green Paper; 31 December 2010. 
98
  DIE-IOB; Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia – Synthesis Report; 2011: Main Findings of the Evaluation 
regarding Joint Knowledge Management; p vii 
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health Governance Action Plan drawn up to remedy the situation the Ministry continued to 
implement the remedial measures for strengthening financial governance agreed with the 
Cooperating Partners. With the new government in place, there are positive signs of 
enhanced and sustained quality of policy dialogue (I-8.2.3). 
The policy dialogue has not been proactive enough in adapting to the new macro-economic 
situation progressively developing from the middle of the period under review. This period 
saw Zambia becoming a lower-middle-income country, with drastically improved foreign 
direct investment (especially from the BRIC countries and particularly from South Africa), 
and increased revenues from the copper mines following intensified world demand and 
concomitant higher commodity prices, yielding increasingly substantial public resources 
from taxation of the mines and consequently reduced dependence on foreign assistance. 
On the other hand, this trend at macro level towards lower-middle-income country status 
has also been accompanied by lagging MDG, socio-economic and human development 
indicators, growing social exclusion and widening regional disparities and urban-rural 
divides. These trends and their possible consequences for the CPs’ response strategy, and 
thus also for the evolving optimal synergy of aid modalities for this updated response 
strategy, have not featured consistently in policy dialogue (JCs 8.2 and 8.3).  
Strong synergies between EU aid modalities 
As far as the synergy between aid modalities, both overall and within each focal sector, is 
concerned (JC 8.3), evidence of such analyses of links between instruments, approaches 
and financing modalities in the EU strategy formulation documents is found both at country 
strategy formulation level (notably the two CSP-NIPs covering the reporting period) and at 
regional level (Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean – ESA-IO) with 
direct repercussions for Zambia at national level (e.g. the RSP/RIP of 2008-2013). The 
financing modality worked out for the health sector, for example, consisted of the Poverty 
Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) operation complemented by Sector Budget Support with 
a focus on activities and direct results, which among other things aimed at improving the 
retention of health workers in the most deprived and remote locations.99 The rationale for the 
complementarity of Sector Budget Support and General Budget Support was widely 
discussed over the preceding two years100. In the transport sector the road maintenance 
support programme, which initially had been prepared as a “classical project’, was 
‘retrofitted’ as a “sector policy support programme” (SPSP) in support of ROADSIP II, its 
funding to be channelled through the Treasury to the Road Fund (I-8.3.1). 
In the CSP focal sector identification and preparation documents, the project approach is 
still considered the “regular, traditional” aid modality, whereas sector budget support (SBS) 
is still a “special case” requiring special justification. In the context of the Paris Declaration 
and Accra Agenda for Action on aid effectiveness, this is a kind of reversed, upside-down 
situation. Project approaches are apparently coming back into vogue. This also reflects the 
rather sensitive issues surrounding the discussion of good governance in relation to GBS 
issues, which “poisoned” the discussions to a large extent and muted political dialogue on 
the issue. However, budget support has been reconfirmed by GRZ as the preferred aid 
modality (I-8.3.2).  
There is still substantial room for improvement in assessing and, above all, taking 
account of sector-specific institutional capacity in the determination of the mix of 
instruments, approaches and financing modalities. 
Capacity assessments and their results are featured in at least some of the EU’s 
programming and project or programme implementation documents. However, one cannot 
conclude that this is the general rule. Moreover, these capacity assessments have rarely 
been translated into comprehensive capacity development strategies and programmes, 
                                               
99
  The quality of the complementarity of the criteria and indicators used for monitoring of general and sector 
budget support (GBS and SBS) used for decision making on tranche disbursements is discussed in the EQ8 
information matrix include under Annex XI to this report in relation to indicator I-8.1.3. 
100
  JAR 2007 
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even though most, if not all, general and sectoral budget support programmes have an 
built-in capacity development component. At the same time EU programme and project 
documents stress the importance of capacity strengthening (I-8.4.1). 
The decision not to pursue support for the education sector in EDF9 through a sector budget 
support programme was based on perceived institutional weaknesses, including lack of 
deep knowledge of the specific sector dialogue. It is also acknowledged101 that budget 
support and similar aid delivery methodologies require special coordination and managerial 
capacities which are rather demanding, with the result that only limited time is left for the 
planning, steering and management of the actual development actions benefiting the 
targeted beneficiaries. In such cases the budget support policy dialogue agenda may in 
practice entail negative repercussions on the development agenda. From a political 
economy perspective the general assessment is that while it would definitely be over-
optimistic to expect budget support to resolve all GRZ’s problems, the instrument could have 
been better adapted to conditions in Zambia102 (I-8.4.1 & 2). 
Limited stakeholder involvement in the choice of aid modalities 
The first important component of an inclusive strategic process for choosing and combining 
EU aid modalities is policy dialogue with the main national stakeholders. This policy 
dialogue necessarily covers the main types of stakeholder, including the NAO, the line 
ministries for focal sectors, and the Civil Society Organisations and Non State Actors, and 
necessarily involves different levels from lower operational to high strategic103. Although the 
EU organised fora and workshops for stakeholders104 on its procedures, instruments and 
approaches, these were mostly ad hoc events and not part of a more comprehensive and 
structured capacity-building programme and process. The need for more systematic and 
comprehensive capacity strengthening – including training105, on EDF procedures, aid 
modalities and approaches – concerns both the national stakeholders and the EU 
Delegation itself. Towards the end of 2011 the EU initiated a structured local consultation 
with the main local stakeholder parties on aid modalities, following the issue by the EU of 
the Green Paper on Budget Support (I-8.5.2 & 3). 
Effective coordination framework for optimizing the configuration of aid modalities 
stayed a challenge 
The configuration of aid modalities has mainly resulted from efforts to increase 
complementarity with other donors, particularly in relation to the EDF10 CSP/NIP. In Zambia 
formal donor coordination and harmonisation was pioneered from the very outset of the 
2001-2010 period, as shown by the list of policy agreements on the subject over the ten-
year period.106 This complementarity and division of labour was especially facilitated through 
the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ), in which the EU played a prominent role. 
However the overall assessment of the JASZ, both in this regard and also in relation to 
optimisation of the configuration of aid modalities, is not wholly positive, with the potential 
not fully realised (JC 8.6).  
The EU Code of Conduct for the implementation of complementarity and division of labour 
(DOL) in development was only adopted in 2009, and thus obviously could not have been 
applied to the EDF8, 9 and 10 strategic and programming documents. At the same time, 
even ahead of their codification the principles listed in the Code already provided strong 
                                               
101
  For example in the 2011 Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia. 
102
  As was concluded in the recent budget support evaluation (DIE – IOB (2011), pp v-vi) and confirmed by the 
2010 evaluation of the Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) as cited in the 
2010 JAR 
103
  As further discussed under below JC-8.6 on effective coordination and complementarity. 
104
  Both government and non-government 
105
  As for example reported in different EAMRs. 
106
  These policy agreements include in chronological order: HIP in 2003; WHIP in 2004; the Poverty Reduction 
Budget Support Memorandum of Understanding (PRBS-MoU) in 2005; the Zambia Aid Policy and Strategy in 
2006; the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) in 2007; and the successor JASZ-II recently in 
November 2011 for the period 2011-2015. 
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guidance on the elaboration of the strategic and programming documents and determined 
the EU’s aid modalities in Zambia. This complementarity and division of labour was 
especially facilitated through the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) institutional 
and strategic coordination framework established in early 2007 by the 17 CPs present in the 
country. The EU has played a prominent role in the establishment of the JASZ and in its 
functioning ever since. A number of improvements in implementing the Paris agenda in 
Zambia, notably with respect to CP alignment, use of country systems, and aid predictability 
have been achieved.107 Challenges remain in the areas of coordinated technical 
cooperation, numbers of PIUs, and mutual accountability108 (I-8.6.1). 
The JASZ has been instrumental in strengthening coordination and complementarity 
between the CPs, and in relation to the aid modality combinations109. While harmonisation 
and alignment of CP engagement has improved, the JASZ has been less effective in 
enhancing GRZ ownership, building mutual accountability between government and CPs, 
and managing for results110. The general assessment of the JASZ is one of partly unrealised 
potential. Further improvements need to be made in processes and tools. This constitutes 
special challenges for the successor JASZ-II (I-8.6.2). 
The general concern about the need for enhanced cross-sector complementarity underlying 
the DOL and JASZ also includes the need to prevent or to remedy situations in which some 
sectors receive significantly more donor attention (“the darling sectors”) than others (“the 
orphan sectors”). This cross-sector complementarity is one of the issues successfully taken 
up by the JASZ and under the DOL issue in general. In the EDF10 CSP/NIP document of 
2007 this cross-sector complementarity was already introduced “avant-la-lettre” for 
designing the EU country strategy and indicative programme, complementary to the EU 
Member States’ and other EU inputs, for example those of the EIB (I-8.6.3). 
 
                                               
107
  As for example reported in the 2007 Paris Monitoring survey conducted in 2008  
108
  As for example reported in the Mid-Term Review of the EDF10 CSP - Conclusions on “Division of Labour and 
Aid effectiveness”; p.6: 
109
  As confirmed in the March 2010 evaluation of the JASZ. 
110
 It was these latter challenges and concerns that were especially brought to the attention of the evaluation team 
during the field visit interviews and consultations during December 2011. 
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5 Conclusions 
The conclusions are divided into two categories: global and specific.  
Global conclusions relate to an overall statement on EU co-operation with Zambia and to 
issues that cut across the EU’s strategic response and its implementation, such as the fight 
against poverty, private sector development and other issues mainstreamed in all EU 
interventions.  
Specific conclusions are more on the technical side, providing feedback on sectoral or 
thematic issues. They provide the basis for implementing meta-recommendations.  
The numbering of global (cGx) and specific (cSy) conclusions allows linking of 
recommendations with the respective conclusions.  
5.1 GLOBAL CONCLUSIONS 
cG1. Governance and Public Finance Management – A coherent and harmonised 
approach to Capacity Development, under which a formalised coordination and dialogue 
process on TA activities could be established, is lacking in the EU strategic response. 
Governance and PFM progressively became the major EU strategic concerns, 
unexpectedly considering the relative enthusiasm for them during the first half of the 
reference period. The EU contribution in dialogue on public financial management issues 
was however a driver of PFM reforms. The whole new administrative set-up – PFM and 
indeed sector-wise – remained extremely vulnerable to external political pressure and 
demonstrated limited, if any, regulatory autonomy as promoted by the EU. In practice 
PEMFA is perceived by some as primarily an avenue for enabling PRBS donors to control 
fiduciary risks, rather than a genuine capacity development programme owned and led by 
GRZ.  
cG2. LMIC status – The EU response strategy was coherent with the policy priorities of the 
Government of Zambia. It was well focused on the needs of the population in the first, 
2001-2005, half of the ten-year period under review (basically covered by the EDF9 CSP-
NIP). The EDF10 response strategy, although comprehensive and well-articulated, 
underestimated the link between increased export tax revenues and the loss of appetite 
for donor-led policy dialogue. Since around 2005 the combination of improved macro-
economic performance, booming revenues from the copper mining industry, growing 
BRIC countries’ interests and South-African FDI, has enabled Zambia to make rapid 
progress towards lower-middle-income country status. At the same time – and this is a 
major Zambian characteristic – the contribution of SMEs to private sector development, 
government capacity, decentralisation and the rural-urban divide has kept lagging behind. 
The need for high-level policy dialogue is rightly perceived by the EU but has faced 
increasing reluctance, if not resistance, from the government.  
cG3. Desire for accountability – In parallel with economic growth, an increasing demand for 
accountability emerged first in Civil Society and the Media, and then was progresively 
taken on board by the government, notably with EU support (PBRS Reviews, PEMFA 
components, performance assessment framework). The 2009 crises relating, among other 
issues, to misappropriation of funds (mismanagement for health, over-commitment and 
poor value-for-money for roads) and corruption, increased the pressure from Civil Society 
and a united donor community on the government for accountability. Accountability and 
performance monitoring are the fields – among EU interventions and more widely – in 
which government ownership is high. The result of the 2011 elections created even higher 
expectations among the Civil Society and Cooperating Partners.  
cG4. Absolute increase of budget support – The magnitude of EU funding subject to 
government budgetary processes has increased over the years as demonstrated by 
PRBS 1 (€117m), PRBS 2 (€60 m) and notably MDG Contract (€255m). GRZ perceived 
the MDG contract in Zambia as a reward for improved macroeconomic performance over 
the period covered by PRBS 1 and 2. During the first part of the evaluation period EU 
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budget support increased the size and share of aid subject to GRZ‘s budgetary 
processes. Furthermore EU support facilitated implementation of the FNDP through 
improved planning, accounting, and reporting procedures for the Government with regard 
to aid inflows. Overall there was minimal reduction in the transaction costs of development 
cooperation. The amount of off-budget aid requiring parallel planning, administration, and 
reporting processes is still substantial. 
cG5. Relative decrease of influence – Against this increase in the size of EU GBS funding, 
its share in government expenditure decreased from an initial 6.4% in 2002 to 3.7% in 
2004 and eventually to 2.5% in 2010. The EU underestimated the related loss of influence 
in overall and sector policy frameworks, aggravated by the multiplying offers of financial 
support based on a different understanding of the nature of cooperation and partnership 
vis-à-vis that of the EU and other traditional donors. China, India, Brazil and South Africa 
are opening up markets rather than promoting poverty reduction and good governance, 
with transaction costs that are not directly comparable. The government has often 
complained of the difficulties of accessing EU financial support, such as lengthy 
procedures, one-sided decision-making, heavy reporting, and packaging of politically 
sensitive issues, with high transaction costs.  
cG6. Policy dialogue – EU-GRZ dialogue was limited in scope and poor in substance, 
creating challenges to come to significant policy reforms this way. The quality of dialogue 
is also weak for all platforms but health. Notwithstanding all the formal prerequisites for 
policy dialogue, it has not been utilised to its full potential. Policy dialogue is mainly 
conducted during the semi-annual PRBS Reviews, except in 2009 when two main PFM 
issues erupted in the Health and Transport sector (mismanagement of funds and over-
commitments, respectively) which led to an intense formal PRBS Dialogue, with donors 
questioning the 'Underlying Principles' of providing BS, and involving regular meetings 
with the Secretary to the Treasury. PRBS Reviews are conducted in a rather formal 
manner and conclusions are often reached although certain issues such as the rural-
urban divide are not addressed systematically. GRZ often shies away from open dialogue 
and refers everything back to 'Cabinet discussion'.   
cG7. Performance Assessment Framework – The EU focuses more on PFM and 
governance indicators in the PAF and is eager to see government attach importance to 
these areas as they are fundamental to economic growth. However, there is generally a 
lack of consensus among cooperating partners, and also between government and 
cooperating partners, on the appropriate size and substance of the PAF. The PAF is the 
pivotal instrument of PRBS policy dialogue but Cooperating Partners have not managed 
to harmonise their different expectations under this central monitoring tool. Despite CPs‘ 
awareness of the shortcomings of the PAF and their general willingness to move forward 
in harmonising their approaches, the prevalence of diverging preferences among CPs 
regarding the focus of the PAF indicators presents a problem. 
cG8. Institutional support to domestic accountability – A major achievement of capacity 
building in PFM by the EU and other cooperating partners was the revision in 2009 of the 
budget management cycle which had for a long time been an obstacle to effective budget 
management in Zambia. While progress has been recorded in increased capacity and 
expansion of the Auditor General’s Office, there is continued weak domestic accountability 
by government due to lack of active participation by Parliament and CSOs in budget 
implementation. The EU should use its financial leverage to contribute to policy 
discussions on lack of capacity, coordination problems and the lack of consistent political 
will through institutional support which would also help enhance its relevance to economic 
and social development. 
cG9. Cross-cutting issues – Cross-cutting issues were difficult to push through by the mere 
fact that EU support to Civil Society was not implemented during the reference period to 
the extent expected. EU relayed its concerns about cross-cutting issues in managing its 
individual (sector) projects but the administrative intake was therefore limited due to the 
lack of external pressure from CSO advocacy in national debates.  
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5.2 SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 
5.2.1 RELEVANCE AND COHERENCE (EQ 9) 
cS1. Alignment – Since the EDF10 response strategy is linked to or aligned with the 
FNDP, stronger EU policy dialogue and technical interactions with GRZ and the other 
CPs was opportune, given the situation analyses and forecasts at the root of the national 
development strategies and plans, their monitoring and their updates.  
cS2. Operationalisation – The CSP-NIP strategy and programming documents were 
insufficiently explicit in providing overall directions and guidance for the operationalisation 
of the response strategy. This particularly pertains to the quality of the Logical 
Frameworks and of their translation into operational plans and implementation schedules 
which, to a large extent, determine the quality of the link between strategy design and 
implementation.  
cS3. National/Regional – The synergy of the EU’s CSPs-NIPs national response strategy 
for Zambia and its RSP-RIP regional strategy with the EAS-IO region in the relevant 
strategic documents is relatively weak. This weakness is being addressed in practice 
through a range of interventions, initiatives and processes initiated at national and 
regional levels by the EU and partners, which contributed to further strengthening of 
institutional coordination and dialogue fora, sharing of information, and better 
synchronisation of outputs from regional programmes to facilitate implementation of 
national support programmes (and vice versa). 
cS4. Political dialogue – The political dialogue component of the EU’s responsibilities 
following the Lisbon Treaty and in accordance with Art. 8 of the Cotonou Agreement has 
not yet been fully taken up. 
5.2.2 AID MODALITIES AND AID EFFICIENCY (EQ 8) 
cS5. Combination of aid modalities – At  sector level the mix of EU aid programming 
instruments, approaches and financing modalities has generally been adapted relatively 
well to sector-specific factors and has changed over the period along with the context. 
For sectors covered by both general and sector budget support there is room for better 
synchronisation of both aid modalities for enhanced sectoral programme efficiency, 
effectiveness and impact, for example linking improved PFM to sector-based 
programming (road sector). Decision-making on the ultimate choice of aid modalities and 
their combinations has been made more to suit partners’ capacity than to conform with 
the regulations inherent in each financing modality. 
cS6. Performance measurement – Whereas concerted and sizeable improvements have 
been made in the later part of the review period under the EDF10 CSP-NIP, important 
challenges still remain in respect of further strengthening of integrated results-based 
performance measurement, monitoring and evaluation of sectoral and overall portfolio 
performance. There are issues in their efficiency dimension and in the perspective of 
maximising the potential of performance M&E systems as both operational and strategic 
management tools, including their early warning functionality.  
cS7. Coordinated policy dialogue – With the JASZ and the SAGs, in principle a well-
elaborated institutional multi-stakeholder platform is in place for facilitating policy dialogue 
between the Government of Zambia and the Cooperating Partners. The important role of 
the JASZ and DOL in providing the broader strategic framework for the donor mapping of 
sectoral involvement and their perceived comparative advantages is widely 
acknowledged, as is the proactive engagement of the EU in this context. The common 
approach to dialogue enjoys different levels of appreciation among the CPs. Some feel 
that this shared understanding or common view on specific sector issues does not reflect 
their individual views and that therefore emphases may be affected.  
cS8. BS crisis management – As a lesson learned from the 2009 mismanagement of 
budget support in the transport and health sectors, EU tools, systems, procedures, rules 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report  
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 62 - 
and regulations were unable to contain a deterioration in policy dialogue on governance 
issues in budget support environments. Achievement of the encompassing strategic 
goals of poverty alleviation and MDG achievement at the level of deprived groups and 
communities in society was disproportionately affected, or was so for too long, by policy 
dialogue or governance issues at macro level. One cannot but conclude that there was a 
relative failure of these policy dialogue mechanisms, as empirically demonstrated by the 
different CP reactions to the mismanagement in the health and transport sectors, leading 
some donors to pull out of Zambia while others continued business as usual.  
cS9. The EU and its Member States confirmed the importance of prior preparatory 
dialogue between them ahead of joint CP-GRZ policy dialogue meetings under the aegis 
inter alia of the CPG, JASZ and SAGs. 
cS10. Capacity for policy dialogue – The policy dialogue agenda has necessitated 
stretching of capacities to such an extent that only limited time and capacity has been left 
for the strategizing, steering, management and monitoring of the actual development 
actions benefiting the targeted beneficiaries and communities. Contributing to – and even 
more leading – policy dialogue at high and sector levels requires background studies, 
training and experience that are rarely available among EUDel staff. Local experts 
recruited to provide this expertise and contextual knowledge are already overloaded with 
administrative procedures and quickly lose their expertise and local connections.  
cS11. Policy dialogue impact – The actual impact of the ongoing policy dialogue on GRZ 
policies has not been measured. The EU did not develop a methodology and related 
tools and publications for doing this, while in several sectors, in which an ownership 
deficit gives rise to a substantial element of risk in the policies implemented, an open 
dialogue and innovative thinking on the relevance and effectiveness of the current 
cooperation arrangements and architecture may be essential.  
5.2.3 GBS, SBS AND MDG CONTRACT (EQ 1) 
cS12. Aid predictability – EU Aid predictability has remained comparatively poor (even 
though the EU was committed to timely disbursements in the EU-GRZ financing 
agreements), which has undermined government’s effective budget planning and 
programme implementation. In addition the MDG Contract is a long-term financing 
agreement which provides a minimum level of predictability essential for effective 
government planning. However, performance has been less satisfactory than expected, 
particularly in year 1 and 2 of the MDG contract. 
cS13. Uneven progress – While some progress was recorded in health, education and 
HIVAIDS, poor performance was recorded mainly in the areas of rural roads and reforms 
in the agriculture sector, which has had a negative impact on achievement of MDG1, due 
mainly to the formal dialogue in 2009, which questioned the eligibility for general budget 
support. In addition, there was also copious correspondence between the Delegation and 
Headquarters on PFM issues such as the mismanagement of resources in the road and 
health sectors. Reforms in the agriculture sector did not materialise. These issues 
affected the disbursement commitment schedule.  
5.2.4 PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT (EQ 2) 
cS14. Institutional capacity-building – Not even the striking comprehensiveness of the EU’s 
and other CPs’ private sector development framework – which accounted for the allocatin 
of a very large share of aid, directly or indirectly, to promoting the three pillars of private- 
sector-led development (reduced inflation rate, stable public expenditures, competition-
friendly environment, and infrastructures) – was  sufficient to achieve GRZ ownership 
whenever capacity-building was involved. Anecdotal explanations vary (bureaucratic 
mentality, power games between sector ministries and the MoFNP and within ministries, 
conflicts with TAs), but the fact remains that government structures were unable to 
rejuvenate themselves with EU support, and subsequent budget allocations were not 
made. EU PSD projects, like most other CP projects, were strongly perceived as too 
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donor-led and, as such, not worth the commitment of middle management staff. This 
rejection appears to be spreading as GRZ export tax revenues grow 
cS15. Private sector-led development – The private sector developed independently of EU 
institutional support but the EU contribution did contribute to reduced inflation, revolving 
funds for strategic sectors (mining and exports), and support to intermediary 
organisations. The EU contribution has had limited results in accelerating the ongoing 
economic transition. Its contribution to the renewed policy framework has also been 
limited, and the multiplier effect expected from the Zambia Development Agency was lost 
both because of personal conflicts and delayed delivery and also because of ZDA's 
institutional instability. At the end of the reference period the SMEs’ potential was not 
exploited at large, all the more so in rural areas.  
cS16. Accountability – Within the area of institutional support, and particularly with PEMFA, 
interventions targeting performance management and accountability were the most 
effective and best taken over by the government. 
5.2.5 TRANSPORT (EQ 3 AND 4) 
cS17. Enlarged focus – EU interventions in the transport sector were focused on road 
infrastructures, although the EU also seized opportunities to broaden the scope of its 
action to rural roads (addendum to SPSP1, 17.2 M€), civil aviation (airports rehabilitation, 
and now legal and institutional framework), inland waterways (pontoons), and advocacy 
of an integrated approach (agreed by GRZ in the SNDP).  
cS18. Sector policy dialogue – In the early stages of the period under review, EU 
interventions were designed within a framework of constructive and open policy dialogue 
with the GRZ, and in close operational coordination with other CPs, notably the WB. Most 
legal and institutional reforms were agreed and implemented before the start of EU 
SPSP1, as evidence of GRZ goodwill. At the end of the reference period the nature of the 
relationship had completely changed. Right after the beginning of SPSP1 the pace of 
policy dialogue and reforms slowed and came to a standstill with the 2009 Road Audit. 
The EU first revived policy dialogue by putting a hold on disbursements until corrective 
measures relating to the OAG audit were agreed and implemented. At the end of the 
reference period, however, EU EDF10 interventions were (re)formulated more on the 
basis of crisis resolution (such as for implementation of long-term corrective measures, 
the EU ban on Zambian airlines), than on constructive dialogue.  
cS19. Institutional reform – Implementation of the road institutional reform, with the 
establishment of the NRFA and the RDA, showed how ineffective is EU road financing 
and management good practice. GRZ applied the principles of the RFM initiative, but the 
safeguards required by the EU for limiting fiduciary risks on its financial inputs did not 
prevent informal links between senior staff and the political sphere during the run-up to 
elections. Significant EU TA inputs with RDA had only limited impact on performance in 
programming, contracting and supervision of road construction and maintenance. Better 
outputs were reached with NRFA, even though it does not comply fully with the definition 
of a second generation Road Fund.  
cS20. Accessibility – With SPSP1 the EU unquestionably contributed to increased mobility 
on the paved sections of the CRN and the regional corridors, through improvements in 
road conditions. Those benefits were not extended to the feeder and rural roads, mainly 
because GRZ financial resources were almost exclusively targeted on paved roads, 
regardless of relative traffic volumes. The number and choice of the performance 
assessment framework indicators appears all the more strategic for ensuring not only 
value-for-money but also a maximum return in respect of poverty reduction. 
cS21. Mobility – Savings in VOC and travel times brought about by the EU’s contribution to 
RCN conditions were passed on to users by a competitive road transport industry. The 
EU interventions allowed protection of the asset value, which is another reason for the 
GoZ to allocate more resources to service delivery or any other relevant public policy. 
Other less expensive measures complementary to road rehabilitation and maintenance, 
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such as the Chirundu one-stop border crossing, may have had high rates of return.  
5.2.6 HEALTH (EQ 5) 
cS22. Improved overall performance – Joint EU and other CP budget support, combined 
with a longstanding and structured SWAp over the period, contributed to improved overall 
performance of the health sector, ensuring appropriate and timely budgetary 
disbursements to the districts. It contributed to (i) strengthened policy dialogue between 
global and sectoral concerns and (ii) improved monitoring of the implemented national 
and sectoral strategies.  
cS23. Aid fragmentation – The combined EU commitment to Budget Support did not 
succeed in attracting more “in-budget” donor commitments and most donor resources are 
currently tied to specific diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria. This 
fragmentation reinforces the vertical approach that weakens the health system and raises 
sustainability issues. The same issue might arise in the future with the large philanthropic 
disease-specific funds, for instance for the purchase of drugs. 
cS24. Crisis management – The comprehensive structure of the policy (global and sectoral) 
dialogue did not help avoid the 2009 crisis involving misappropriation of funds at the 
Ministry of Health, which indicates that GBS-SBS monitoring does not preclude technical 
commitment from both sides. The rather coordinated response from CPs as well as the 
comprehensive response from MoH (sustained financial commitment and implementation 
of an ambitious Joint Governance Action Plan) finally led to strengthened partnership all 
round. 
cS25. Human resources – The sustained EU commitment against staff attrition is starting to 
yield quantitative (training and retention) and qualitative results with the implementation 
and update of the Human Resources Development Plan. However, ensuring the 
sustainability of the results achieved implies a (very) long-term commitment, far 
exceeding the timeframe of the EU’s 5-year programming cycles. 
cS26. Vulnerable groups – The joint EU/CP support did not elicit an adequate response to 
the persistent vulnerability of the population. Despite substantial progress in health-care 
delivery, Zambia paradoxically belongs to the 26 lowest-performing countries in terms of 
maternal health. And in spite of substantial efforts by the MoH to improve access to 
public health care facilities, the issue of financial accessibility is still pending as 
households still bear the major part of total curative health expenditure. This suggests 
that patterns in the consumption of health services and drugs are changing in a way 
similar to the overall changing development pattern of the country and that donor support 
has to adapt to it.  
5.2.7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE (EQ 6) 
cS27. EU framework – The EU response to the different actors in the governance arena has 
been quite comprehensive as it targeted the different main stakeholder clusters and 
actors, including government, parliament, electoral processes, civil society organisations, 
and so forth, either explicitly or exclusively through a special project approach type of 
intervention, or in the broader framework of an encompassing general budget support 
programme (PRSP, PEMFA, PRBS,…). But it is not clear whether and how these 
different components of the governance response strategy targeting the different 
stakeholder groups relate to each other, or how far they are complementary and mutually 
reinforcing, as the different interventions have generally tended to be stand-alone actions 
and not part and parcel of a broader, encompassing and integrated governance strategy. 
cS28. GRZ framework – EU support to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), which is a major 
component of the EU response strategy for enhancing democratic governance, was 
provided in the absence of a conducive legal and regulatory framework aimed at 
maximising the potential of CSOs as development actors. This substantially affected the 
effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the EU governance response strategy 
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targeting CSOs and their apex structures during the reference period. There are however 
emerging indications that with the change of Government following the September 2011 
elections, Government–CSO relations are evolving in a more positive direction of mutual 
recognition of the complementary roles of both of the key development actors. 
cS29. Capacity development – Capacity strengthening of CSOs (in the broad sense, also 
covering economic NSAs, people’s organisations, professional organisations, etc.) has 
been an integral part of general budget support programme under the EDF9-10 
CSPs-NIPs, but this support has been specially provided (for about two-thirds of 
interventions) through the vertical, thematic budget lines. The overall quality, 
effectiveness and impact of these different ad hoc CSO capacity-strengthening 
interventions or intervention components are however rather limited. They also 
substantially suffered from the protracted non-approval of the special, comprehensive 
CSO support programme under the EDF9 CSP-NIP. 
cS30. Elections – EU long-term support to the electoral process in a trust fund setting with 
UNDP as lead contributed substantially to a transparent and well-organised electoral 
process during the latest national elections in September 2011. Earlier electoral 
processes, including pre- and post-election sub-processes, also benefited positively from 
the support programme. Observed shortcomings in the support process are being 
translated into lessons learned with a view to further improving processes and results 
during the remainder of the support period. This particularly pertains to the 
mainstreaming and institutionalisation within the Electoral Commission of the special 
expertise built up by the support programme. 
5.2.8 AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY (EQ 7) 
cS31. Access to agricultural inputs – The effects of the main EU interventions in support of 
agricultural growth, diversification and food security were constrained on one side by the 
weakness of the MACO at central (FS strategy) and decentralised levels (extension 
services), and on the other by severe procedural delays and deficiencies in TA. MACO 
extension services proved unable to benefit from EU technical assistance and resources, 
and maintained business as usual with outdated messages and little orientation to 
farmers’ needs. Flexibility was introduced in budget allocations between components, 
allowing late development of NSA initiatives under calls of proposals. EU support to CSO 
initiatives (under FF calls for proposals and EDF projects) proved more effective, albeit 
unevenly so. However they provided useful lessons for (i) better integration of food 
security and agricultural development, (ii) designing a SWAp, (iii) promotion of policy 
reforms, and (iv) developing the capacity of MACO central services with a view to 
allowing innovative PPP schemes on the ground.  
cS32. Policy framework – Rural communities and mind-sets still largely reflect the socialist 
period, being demonetarised and fully dependent on government schemes, and with 
MACO extension services lacking resources or motivation unless topped-up by project 
allowances. In the past, little attention was given by EU programmes to agricultural 
diversification, private initiative and value chain development beyond provision of market 
information and storage facilities. The new agricultural policy, although still exclusively 
maize-oriented, builds on a preference for an approach based on private sector 
development and conservation farming, taking stock to a limited extent of lessons learned 
from EU projects. The new EDF10 programmes are better aligned to this new framework, 
although land tenure remains a sensitive issue. 
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6 Recommendations  
The evaluation team selected five meta-recommendations and organised other strategic and 
operational recommendations to contribute to those meta-recommendations.  
The five meta-recommendations, prioritised, are the following: 
 
1. Engage in accelerated adjustment of the EU strategy in response to the steady 
decrease in the leverage capacity of the EU’s financial inputs. 
2. Focus on a “Good Governance and Development Contract” on vertical and 
horizontal accountability, democratic and economic governance, and performance 
monitoring. 
3. Carry on with the project approach in agriculture, focusing on rural investment, 
land tenure and access to agriculture inputs. 
4. Engage in an exit strategy by increasing the Road SPSP II focus on rural 
transport. 
5. Address the issue of persisting rural vulnerability in the districts most at risk. 
 
They address the three main aspects of EU aid to Zambia that need to be improved: (i) 
strategic response/ programming, (ii) aid effectiveness (focused on the partnership) and (iii) 
programme implementation, and are presented along those categories. 
The following strategic recommendations are addressed, as lessons learnt, mainly to 
headquarters. Related operational recommendations are mainly addressed to the 
Delegation(s) although some are at a level that is more general. 
 
Engage an accelerated adjustment of the EU strategy 
in response to the steady decrease in the leverage 
capacity of the EU’s financial input. 
Ranking:  1 
Strategic response 
Related conclusions:  
cG1, cG2, cG1, cG3, cG4 
Related strategic recommendations 
1. Increased leverage – Increase further the focus of EU cooperation and free up more 
leverage capacity by gradually moving away both from road infrastructures to support to 
land transport, and also from SBS to a project approach; this exit strategy from road 
infrastructures will be balanced by the sharp increase in alternative funding opportunities, 
with better potential for ownership within the transport sector as well as in other sectors. 
(cG1, cS4, cS18) 
2. Good Governance and Development Contract – Put in hand preparation of a "Good 
Governance and Development Contract”111 by the end the MDG contract by progressively 
reorienting EU interventions to mainstreaming GRZ vertical and horizontal accountability, 
results delivery, decentralisation, transparency, human rights, democratic governance, 
economic governance, parliament and political parties, ombudsman and complaints 
handling, role of media, checks and balance, and so forth. Reinforcing institutional 
                                               
111
  In line with the COM(2011) 638/2, “The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries”. 
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support for strategy and programme performance monitoring (covering aid effectiveness, 
efficiency and economy in a balanced manner) at central (MoFNP), sectoral-thematic 
(line ministries and agencies) and local (Provinces and Districts local government units) 
levels should be addressed as a first step for reorienting the EU strategic response. The 
contract should cover the three main national development stakeholder partners: (i) 
Government and public sector partners, (ii) Economic Non-State Actors (NSAs) and (iii) 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), as such duly recognizing the respective roles of the 
socio-economic partners and Civil Society for sustainable, inclusive and equitable 
national, local and human development.  (cG2, cS4, cS11, cS13, cS16, cS28, cS29) 
3. Agricultural Reform Contract – In spite of being a lower-middle-income country, Zambia is 
still characterised by substantial challenges in terms of poverty alleviation, sustainable 
and equitable socio-economic and human development, with growing rural-urban and 
geographical disparities; project approach should be continued for agriculture, including 
rural investment, land tenure and access to agriculture inputs. (cG1, cS15, cS20, cS26, 
cS31, cS1,) 
4. Drivers of growth – Reinforce the EU’s support for drivers of sustainable economic 
growth (Vision 2030) typical of lower-middle-income and middle-income countries such 
as trade liberalisation (through Regional Economic Communities {RECs}, followed by 
harmonization at national level) and SME development, with progressive broadening to 
cover social security system development, higher education and research. A project 
approach would meet the need for flexibility in a step-by-step involvement. (cG1, cG7, 
cS11, cS13, cS14, cS16)  
Related operational recommendations 
5. Logical framework – The main overall focus is on performance enhancement with equal 
or balanced attention to performance at all levels of the results chain covering the “3Es” 
of economy (inputs level – financial, human, other), efficiency (Operational level – 
activities and direct outputs) and effectiveness (results level – outcomes and impact). 
Give more systematic attention to aid efficiency (operational performance) in addition to 
focused attention on aid effectiveness and input management within the present aid 
modalities, particularly General Budget Support. Consider as an overall underlying 
principle for the next country strategy and indicative programme the maximisation of a 
balanced win-win approach to both the country strategy or programme partner (Zambia) 
and the European Union (and its Member States), with better adaptation to equal 
partnership with Zambia in the light of its evolving status as a lower-middle-income 
developing country. (cG5, cS1, cS6, cS27) 
6. Political dialogue – Seek clarification of and actively pursue the political dialogue 
component of the EU’s responsibilities following the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 8) and in 
accordance with the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement. The EU Delegation, as the local EU 
presidency, should use this position to strengthen the linkages between political (Article 
8) and policy dialogue. This is important especially in a country like Zambia where most, 
if not all, important policy decisions are politically sanctioned at Cabinet level. The 
linkages may be created between the Rule of Law and Governance issues, sector 
policies and the "Good Governance and Development Contract”. (cG9, cS4) 
7. Policy dialogue – In leading the JASZ-II, facilitate and proactively pursue the high level 
political dialogue and other components of the dialogue process with GRZ, CSOs and 
CPs on transport, agriculture and food security, governance, and macro-economics. 
Budget support has imposed the establishment of policy dialogue frameworks and it is 
essential for government and cooperating partners to move away from project orientation 
towards long-term programming in order to enhance the quality of dialogue. Such a 
comprehensive mechanism requires on both sides strong capacity (government and EU) 
and political will to manage its complex functions efficiently at sector and central levels. 
Engage government bilaterally (directly) so as to focus on its concerns rather than be 
consumed by the CPG common approach to dialogue. The bilateral dialogue approach 
may also be useful for the EU for openly discussing with government contentious policy 
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issues that may be deemed irrelevant by other CPs. Eventually there will be a need for a 
more comprehensive, systematic and customised capacity development programme on 
the different aid modalities for the different user groups, both with the Zambian partners 
(government and non-government) and with the Delegation. (cG4, cG7, cG9, cS7, cS8, 
cS10, cS11, cS18, cS24, cS21) 
8. Crisis management – There is a need for enhanced or updated EU tools, systems, 
procedures, rules and regulations to minimise policy dialogue deterioration on 
governance issues in budget support environments. They should ensure that the 
response strategy development agenda aimed at the achievement of the encompassing 
strategic goals of poverty alleviation and MDG achievement at the level of the deprived 
groups and communities in society is not disproportionately affected by policy dialogue or 
governance issues at macro level. (cG7, cS8, cS24) 
9. Performance monitoring – Strengthen integrated performance monitoring of GBS-SBS at 
central level (spearheaded by the MoFNP) encompassing aid effectiveness, efficiency 
and economy in a balanced manner, based on targeted performance measurement 
indicators at all levels of the intervention logic. Ensure close horizontal collaboration with 
the sectoral and thematic line ministries and agencies on any technical and quality 
assurance aspects. Ensure that this PME system is based on qualitative, regular bi-
directional vertical performance monitoring reporting and information flows to and from 
local levels (especially Districts and Provinces), rooted in the monitoring of District and 
Provincial Development Plans, their progress and their reporting of results, along with 
assured feedback. At all levels establish and strengthen collaboration with and 
involvement of Civil Society (both CSOs and economic Non-State Actors) to ensure 
system ownership and transparency. Ensure complementarity and integration of GBS 
and SBS performance M&E and ensure that individual projects’ PME systems are aligned 
with the overall umbrella GBS/SBS PME system. Support a comprehensive human and 
institutional capacity-strengthening drive on the part of all the main performance 
monitoring and evaluation system proponents and stakeholders to ensure regular use of 
appropriately-owned, sustainable systems as prime development planning, management 
and decision-making instruments. (cG5, cS6)  
10. Higher education & Research – Drawing on EU experience in cooperating with middle-
income countries (for example in Asia), insofar as Higher Education Institutes (including 
Research Institutes, Universities and University Colleges) are also important catalysts of 
sustainable (regional) development, consider higher education collaboration as a special 
CSP-NIP strategy and programme component with special foci on joint research, joint or 
double degrees, academic and student exchanges, academic twinning, N-S-S and N-N-S 
academic networks, research based education, translation of research findings into 
outreach (development extension, policy advice and commercial spin-offs), and so forth. 
Tap into existing specialised EU instruments and tools or support creative and innovative 
initiatives on a pilot basis. (cG1) 
 
Focus on a “Good Governance and Development 
Contract” on vertical and horizontal accountability, 
democratic and economic governance, and performance 
monitoring. 
Ranking:  2 
Aid effectiveness 
Related conclusions: cG2, 
cG5, cG7, cG9, cS27, 
cS28 
Related strategic recommendations 
1. Domestic accountability and national control mechanisms – Improving accountability 
relationships is an effective strategy for developing capacity. Effective accountability 
mechanisms encourage both governmental and non-governmental organisations to 
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remain relevant and responsive to the needs and demands of the groups they serve. 
Therefore the EU should refer to the fundamental EU values of human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law for designing budget support contracts, in particular the following: 
a. Establishment of an accountability policy framework focused on nurturing 
accountability at local level, addressing specific bottlenecks in delivery to citizens of 
basic services (education, health, agricultural extension), while supporting the 
progressive strengthening of CSOs (see below). The EU should engage in high-
level policy dialogue for the policy framework to be consistent with its fundamental 
values. 
b. Establishment of a dedicated Transparency and Oversight112 strategy, defining audit 
arrangements which ensure compliance with financial regulations and effective 
accountability by ministries and agencies; adequate civil service pay and benefits to 
attract and retain skilled staff; and appropriate mechanisms to demonstrate full PFM 
system transparency and accountability, particularly with respect to availability of 
budget information, participation in the budget preparation process by interested 
stakeholders, and open methods of execution and reporting to allow independent 
assessments of process integrity. 
c. Enhancement of the role and resources of the Parliament (vertical accountability). 
d. Support for the Office of the Auditor General on Special Audit coverage (including 
value-for-money audits), financial audits, OAG decentralisation at provincial level. 
e. Support for Internal Audit and Evaluation and Monitoring systems for performance 
monitoring (responsiveness), from central services down to district level. (cG2, cG5, 
cG7, cG9, cS27, cS28) 
2. PFM reforms – Continue to provide resources for PFM reforms within the "Good 
Governance and Development Contract” as they are essential for implementing SWAps 
effectively. The EU should involve government in developing a successor PFM reform 
programme (from 2013), while in the meantime focusing on strengthening ongoing 
reforms such as IFMIS, the Treasury Single Account, procurement reforms, and internal 
audit reforms. Maximising Zambia’s domestic tax base (especially from mining) should be 
at the forefront of this programme. Government has stated its intention to carry out the 
next PEFA assessment in 2012, using as in the past a mixed GRZ-consultant team. 
(cS27, cS12) 
3. Civil Society Organisations – There is a need for a comprehensive and integrated 
capacity strengthening programme with demand-driven, customised services for the 
different main types of CSOs, clustered along two main sub-components:  
a. One through the mandated government regulatory entity regarding legal, 
regulatory, administrative, monitoring, auditing and other aspects of the broader 
enabling environment for CSOs to fully realize their potentials as capacitated 
development partners, and 
b. The other one through the CSO umbrella organisations on capacity strengthening 
and support services to CSOs on, amongst others: (local) governance, policy 
dialogue, advocacy, organisational development and networking, Human 
Resources development, monitoring and evaluation, and on PCM, service 
delivery, and other more technical sector / thematic specific aspects. (cG9, cS29) 
4. Economic and Corporate Governance – Among the most essential foundations of good 
economic and corporate governance is the regulatory framework. In most economic 
sectors some form of ongoing government control is required to handle potential market 
                                               
112
  COM(2011) 638/2: “The fight against corruption and fraud is a key dimension that should have greater 
prominence under this criterion. The Commission will pay particular attention to the fight against corruption 
and will promote a stronger use of anti-corruption provisions. Partner countries need to be actively engaged in 
the fight against corruption and fraud and be equipped with appropriate and effective mechanisms to prevent 
and detect fraud and corruption (including adequate inspections authorities and judicial capacity) as well as to 
provide adequate responses and effective sanction mechanisms”., p.8 
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failures, including misuse of market power in activities that have a high degree of 
monopoly power, as well as environmental, safety, and other concerns. The EU should 
engage in supporting economic regulation, that is (i) by separating the government's 
policymaking and regulatory roles by establishing independent regulatory mechanisms, 
as this helps assure stability in the regulatory environment, including reducing the risk of 
regulation being misused to achieve short-term political ends; and also (ii) by fostering 
the development of regulatory expertise. It should also, as well as supporting corporate 
governance, contribute to enhancing tripartite relations between private sector 
intermediary organisations, government and unions through a call for proposals initiative. 
(cG1, cS14, cS15, cS16) 
Related operational recommendations 
5. EU capacity – As attested to by both the EUDel management and staff concerned and 
also by the CSO partners, the capacity of the Delegation with regard to (both democratic 
and economic) governance matters needs to be strengthened113, particularly with regard 
to technical governance matters, complementary to the regular procedural and 
contracting skills.  
6. Eligibility criteria – To ensure consistency with the NIP the eligibility criteria for budget 
support contracts should not be assessed by the EU Delegations or consultants under 
contract to EU Delegations, as results might be biased. The senior regional teams at 
Headquarters and in Delegations114 should be responsible for formulation of contracts, 
including the three pillars, the seven key areas and risk assessment analyses.  
7. Legal & regulatory framework – A clear and generally agreed definition is needed as to 
what is meant by a Civil Society Organisation and what are the main categories of CSO 
under such a broad-based definition, as this is not clear from the legal and regulatory 
provisions. This is a sine qua non for a comprehensive civil society capacity-
strengthening programme, customised to the specific characteristics and needs of the 
various CSO types and sub-types (NGOs, economic NSAs, apex organisations, 
community-based organisations, media, academia, cultural organisations, etc.).  
8. CSO Fund – Consider a CSO Fund and Programme Envelope (based on competitive 
open calls for proposals) with special budget lines for the different main CSO strategy 
and programme components, covering policy dialogue, advocacy, organisational and 
human capacity strengthening, services delivery (the latter covering a maximum of a 
predetermined percentage of the Fund), and so forth. 
9. Economic governance – For the Economic Non-State Actors (the tripartite social partners 
of Government, SMEs, micro-entrepreneurs, cooperatives, MFIs, farmers groups, etc.), 
consider a programme or project on economic governance covering the broader enabling 
environment for sustainable socio-economic and private sector development, covering 
among other things enabling policy and regulatory frameworks, tripartism, rules, norms 
and standards, incentive schemes, quality control and inspections, and related issues. 
10. NSA Fund – Consider an economic NSA Fund (based on competitive open calls for 
proposals) with components for the different main economic NSA stakeholder types 
(among other things employers’ organisations, professional organisations, workers’ 
organisations, micro-, small- and medium-size enterprises, organisations of farmers or 
agricultural entrepreneurs, etc.).  
11. Decentralisation – The overall framework of such an integrated system is the 
decentralisation process based on district development plans and budgets. It also 
requires strengthened M&E systems in the sectoral and thematic line Ministries and 
                                               
113
  In the framework of the COM(2011) 638/2: “In order to engage in a genuine high-level political and policy 
dialogue with countries eligible for budget support in general, and for Good Governance and Development 
Contracts in particular, staff resources at EU Delegations will have to be reviewed nationally and regionally, 
both in terms of level and expertise. To this end, the Commission will set up senior regional teams, at 
Headquarters and in Delegations, with the participation of relevant Commission services and the EEAS”. p. 7 
114
  COM(2011) 638/2, p.7 
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Agencies, with strong overall M&E system coordination, steering and quality assurance 
vested in the MoFNP’s monitoring and evaluation department. E-networking and E-
government, along with a strengthened development statistics database system, will be 
core features and components of the envisaged overall system. (cS6) Give special 
attention to district-based participatory development performance planning, management, 
measurement, monitoring and evaluation (tools, system, capacity strengthening, piloting 
and roll-out), spearheaded by MoFNP’s M&E Department in close collaboration with the 
M&E Departments of Sectoral and Thematic Ministries and Agencies supporting the 
Districts and Provinces (local administrations and multi-sectoral committees – DDCCs 
and PDCCs). 
 
Carry on with the project approach in agriculture, 
focusing on rural investment, land tenure and access to 
agriculture inputs. 
Ranking:  3 
Aspects addressed: 
Programming & 
performance 
Related conclusions: cS31, 
cS32  
Related strategic recommendations 
1. Support easy access to title deeds for promoting sustainable increase of productivity, 
conservational practices and access to softer loans for agriculture inputs. (cS31, cS32) 
2. Scale down public service delivery in the agriculture sector and include support for 
private sector investment among direct beneficiaries. (cS31, cS32) 
3. Promote capacity-building for diversification in the agricultural sector and value chain 
development. (cS31, cS32) 
4. Support development by micro-finance institutions of agricultural micro-finance products 
for smallholders. (cS31, cS32) 
Related operational recommendations 
5. Take stock of lessons learnt through Food Facility projects for designing EU sector 
strategy for sustaining policy dialogue with the required level of expertise. (cS31, cS32) 
6. Seek good conceptual integration and operational coordination of food security 
interventions and agricultural development. (cS31, cS32) 
7. Support sound sector monitoring with full ownership by MACO. (cS31)  
8. Support knowledge management and dissemination of best practice, and its integration 
into training courses, whether in agricultural colleges or for extension workers. (cS31)  
9. Support CSOs and IOs in entering into policy dialogue and in performance management 
and accountability, along with support for service delivery. (cS31, cS32) 
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Engage in an exit strategy by increasing the Road SPSP II 
focus on rural transport (reorient from road infrastructure 
towards a broader approach to the transport sector, i.e. rural 
accessibility, inter-connectivity, other transport modes). 
Ranking:  4 
Aspects addressed: 
Programming & 
performance 
Related conclusions:  
cS19, cS20 
Related strategic recommendations 
1. Reorient the SPSP2 Performance Assessment Framework with a view to anticipating the 
Agriculture Sector Contract by modifying indicators and target values, minimising the 
weight accorded to paved CRN rehabilitation, and correspondingly increasing the weight 
and target values for the unpaved CRN and feeder roads indicators. (cS20) 
2. Transfer part of SPSP2 from road infrastructure to transport services so as to increase 
the EU’s leverage in rural accessibility, inter-connectivity and other transport modes. 
(cS21) 
3. Advocate and provide incentives through PAF indicators for progressively disband force 
account units at provincial level after organising major training programmes for 
supervisors and technicians in the basics of spot improvement of rural roads. All local 
authorities and communities should be eligible for EU co-financing to improve 
responsiveness to needs and ownership, and thus sustainability. A Local Road Authority, 
appointed by the Minister responsible for Roads, might manage a dedicated fund. 
Labour-based methods should be used for spot improvement (“passability”) programmes 
for rural roads. (cS17, cS19) 
Related operational recommendations 
4. Resume SPSP1 disbursements only after implementation of the long-term corrective 
measures, particularly of the ROADSIP II Addendum.  
5. In SPSP2 re-orient the TA missions; in addition to TA support for the evaluation by NRFA 
of the achievement of RDA contract specifications, an evaluation of the value-for-money 
of the annual work programme prioritisation proposed by RDA should be supported. 
Support should also be given to road transport intermediary organisations and road 
users’ associations. (cS18, cS21) 
6. Within the SPSP2 framework, support improvements to the policy and programming 
frameworks for rural roads and (intermediate means of) transport with dedicated TA. 
(cS20) 
7. Keep supporting routine data input in the road management system but also extend 
support to rural roads and traffic, which are the most outdated, and introduce the required 
changes in annual work programming rationale and procedures. District Councils should 
be duly involved in prioritisation of the Local Road Authorities’ annual work programmes. 
(cS20, cS21) 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report  
 ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 73 - 
Address the issue of persisting rural vulnerability in the 
districts most at risk. 
Ranking:  5 
Aspects addressed: 
Programming & 
performance 
Related conclusions: cS22, 
cS25, cS26 
Related strategic recommendations 
1. Further capitalize on the successful complementarity of the GBS-SBS implemented by 
the EU, with due reference to other pooled donor commitments such as the SWAp in the 
health sector. In particular, build on the comparative advantage of MDG contracts and 
Good Governance and Development Contracts with a view to sustaining a joint long-term 
EU commitment to improved staff management in the context of the EU’s commitment 
within the staff alliance. (cG1, cS22, cS25) 
2. Adapt future EU commitments to changing patterns in the consumption of health services 
and drugs. In particular the EU could encourage harnessing of high household 
expenditures into formalised systems such as social health insurance or community pre-
payment schemes, so as to pool resources and mitigate the financial risk borne solely by 
patients. The EU could also suggest developing mechanisms for encouraging 
contributions from private for-profit companies. (cS22, cS26) 
Related operational recommendations 
3. The increasing consumption trend towards purchasing drugs in the private sector points 
to the need to explore further the opportunities both for improving value-for-money in the 
supply of drugs (in the public sector) and for strengthening support for quality control of 
drugs supplied by Zambia’s public and private sectors. (cS26) 
4. Contribute to the strengthening of health professional bodies, in the context of the EU’s 
recommended commitment to improved overall accountability. In particular, the choice of 
indicators could still be refined with an improved balance between process monitoring 
and results evaluation; the results indicators should be expected to bring about significant 
changes on a year-to-year basis and be tracked by routine information systems. The 
targets have to capture an actual trend within the direct control of the evaluated partner 
(MoH for instance) and more room should be given for appraising the measured results 
prior to final disbursement decisions. (cS25) 
